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ABSTRACT 
I examine the process of evolution for theoretical constructs in the field of organizational 
scholarship, leveraging the sociology of knowledge literature and empirical studies of construct 
development to focus my research.  Prior studies suggest several key factors operating in the 
process—actor-oriented components, including the characteristics and strategies of scholarly 
actors, and situationally-oriented components of historical context and word meanings.  No 
study, however, has assessed these factors in interaction over time.  I address this gap through a 
historical study based primarily on archival data regarding construct usage in journal articles and 
scholarly books.  Specifically, I explore the evolution of “cooperation” and “purpose” in 
organizational scholarship from 1938 through 2005.  My findings contribute to elaboration of the 
theory of construct evolution proposed by Hirsch & Levin (1999), as I observe that a construct 
developing largely within a single disciplinary paradigm is marked by narrowing rather than 
expansion of meaning in the course of increased operationalization. Further, I find that an 
interdisciplinary context of evolution multiplies not just meanings but also the language used for 
a construct.  I also document how antecedent conditions of meaning for the words “cooperation” 
and “purpose,” as well as elements of historical context, affect the evolution process.  In 
addition, my study extends the observations of Barley & Kunda (1992) regarding a cyclical 
dichotomy between rational and normative paradigms in managerial discourse, as I observe this 
pattern contributing to the fragmentation of language and meanings in the constructs studied. 
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CHAPTER 1:  OVERVIEW 
“[T]he theoretical flowering of organization theory’s first two decades was arguably followed by 
three decades of muted theoretical progress or even stagnation. Like symphony orchestras that 
play a repertoire of a dozen baroque and classical composers year in and year out, 
organizational research can sometimes appear like a living museum of the 1970s.”  
 
(Davis, 2010: 691) 
 
Motivation for This Study 
 The concerns expressed by Davis (2010) regarding the current state and prospects for the 
progress of theoretical development in organizational scholarship seem to be shared by others at 
the highest levels of the field.  A recent Academy of Management Review issue focused attention 
on the question:  “Where are the New Theories of Organization?” (Suddaby, Hardy, & Huy, 
2011).  The persistence of theories from the field’s earliest decades, despite “massive growth and 
change in the size, prevalence, and influence of organizations in modern society” (Suddaby et al., 
2011: 236) invites consideration of the dynamics of theory development and how 
institutionalized elements within the field may affect its potential for advancement. 
One article in the issue, Boxenbaum & Rouleau (2011), highlighted the role of metaphors 
in the presentation and production of organizational theory, consistent with an emergent interest 
in the role of language in knowledge management (cf. Steen, 2011).  Largely absent from the 
topics treated, however, was discussion regarding the language of theoretical constructs 
themselves.   As much as the metaphors used to present theories are of interest, so also is the 
language of a field’s theoretical constructs.  Bourdieu’s description of scientific fields 
emphasizes the ongoing process of language negotiation, termed by him as a “paradoxical 
process through which the constraints and controls of rational dialectic have been gradually 
invented and instituted into structures and dispositions” (Bourdieu, 1991: 23).  Understanding the 
invention of such “constraints and controls” is critical because theoretical language ultimately 
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makes accessible the “universe of possibilities” for study in a given scientific field (Bourdieu, 
1991: 10).  The theoretical language of organizational scholarship is thus an excellent place to 
investigate for possible obstacles to its development.  A better understanding of language and its 
role in knowledge production can also provide insights to organizational practice, with the tasks 
of producing and disseminating knowledge becoming increasingly central to organizational life 
(cf. Grant, 1996). 
These issues motivate my basic research question:  How does a theoretical construct in a 
scientific field evolve in meaning and usage over time?  The limited research on this question in 
the field of organizational scholarship suggests important components but also some puzzles 
regarding the process. Hirsch & Levin (1999), presenting one of the most significant studies to 
date, offered a theoretical model for the evolution of “umbrella constructs” within the field.  
Drawing from evidence regarding the decline of research on “organizational effectiveness,” they 
described a process of evolution where popularity in a construct leads to multiplication of 
meanings but then contraction, due to the involvement of “validity police” identifying 
discrepancies in operationalization and seeking to standardize approaches.  These efforts are 
contested by “umbrella advocates” who try to maintain support for a broader construct meaning, 
with the result that typologies often emerge to classify different meanings for different 
applications. 
The process model and propositions outlined by Hirsch & Levin (1999) have been 
partially revisited and tested in only one study, focused on the construct “empowerment” 
(Bartunek & Spreitzer, 2006).  Hirsch & Levin’s prediction of a multiplication of meanings 
during initial construct use was supported by results in this instance, but meanings for 
“empowerment” also continued to multiply as it was used by more and more disciplines, 
 3 
 
suggesting the important role of academic disciplinary boundaries in developing conventions for 
theoretical language. 
Studies prior to Hirsch & Levin’s, in fact, suggested a variety of other potential dynamics 
shaping field language in organizational scholarship.  Barley, Meyer & Gash (1988) documented 
a convergence in rhetorics on “culture” between articles appearing in practitioner-oriented versus 
scholarly-oriented journals; they stopped short, however, of exploring the actual dynamics and 
direction of influence that produced this convergence.  Barley & Kunda (1992) highlighted 
repetitive cycles over time in organizational discourse, alternating between rational and 
normative language that reflects the dichotomous understandings of rational versus natural 
organization (Gesellschaft vs. Gemeinschaft, as labeled by Tönnies).  They connected these 
discourse cycles with concurrent economic cycles of expansion and contraction.  Similarly, 
Shenhav (1995) identified the emergence of “systems” metaphors during the professionalization 
of engineering practice in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, highlighting how the combination 
of these linguistic patterns with contemporary events such as labor unrest helped establish initial 
terminology in management theory. 
Such studies suggest, in fact, that while the interaction of field participants is critical in 
shaping theoretical language, situational factors of historical context and the language and 
meanings provided within it also play a role in determining theoretical terminology.  The full 
range of actor-oriented and situational factors, however, has largely not been studied in an 
integrated way, and my dissertation is positioned to address this gap. 
Research Questions and Approach 
My theoretical framework for this study draws from the sociology of knowledge, which 
generally seeks to “explain the production of knowledge in terms of the interests such production 
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has served” (Shumway & Messer-Davidow, 1991: 217).  Sociology of knowledge, primarily as 
developed through Berger & Luckmann (1967), has largely provided the basis for neo-
institutional theory (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Meyer & Rowan, 1977) in organizational 
scholarship, one of the field’s current core frameworks.  This literature dovetails with research in 
sociology of science (Kuhn, 1996 [1969]; Latour, 1987) or sociology of scientific knowledge 
(Shapin, 1995), which each emphasize the social structure and activities of scientific field 
participants in shaping what is legitimized as “knowledge.”  This work has often highlighted the 
efforts of scientists to establish boundaries of authority for their specific fields (Gieryn, 1983) 
and noted the impacts of similar disciplinary boundaries on the development of interdisciplinary 
academic fields (Klein, 1996) such as the field of organizational scholarship. 
Synthesizing the theoretical basis from this broader literature with findings related to the 
process of construct and language development within organizational scholarship, I identified 
two basic sets of critical factors in the process:  The actor-oriented components of actor 
characteristics and strategies, and the situational components of language resources and historical 
context.  I elaborated my basic research question so as to focus my study on the interaction of 
these factors in the evolution of theoretical constructs.   
My dissertation addresses these key questions:  1) How do actor strategies, language 
resources and historical context combine over time to explain which construct uses or meanings 
are sustained within the field?  2) How do actor characteristics, historical context and available 
language resources constrain or facilitate success for specific actors’ efforts to influence 
construct usage or meaning?  And 3) How does the existence of disciplinary boundaries within 
the interdisciplinary field of organizational scholarship affect actor strategies and occurrences of 
sustainable construct usage or meaning? 
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  To address these questions, I chose two focal constructs for comparative study—
“cooperation” and “purpose” as introduced within organizational scholarship through Chester 
Barnard’s The Functions of the Executive (1938).  The use of these constructs by a single author 
early in the development of organizational theory anchors them in a common origin, which 
offers higher confidence that observation of other factors over time will help explain differences 
in how the constructs have evolved.  From preliminary examination, “cooperation” appears to 
command continued contemporary research attention (e.g., Fischer, 2009; Kiyonari & Barclay, 
2008; Klapwijk & Van Lange, 2009), while research on “purpose” in organizations is rarer, 
appearing somewhat more in books (e.g., Mourkogiannis, 2006) than scholarly journal articles. 
To study the evolution of these constructs from 1938 to 2005, I drew on methodological 
conventions from historical research (Glass, 1989; Gottschalk, 1950) and qualitative data 
analysis (Miles & Huberman, 1994; Strauss & Corbin, 1998), with a focus on the analysis of 
process data (Langley, 1999).  The study generally conforms to a tradition within organizational 
scholarship that has been termed the “historiographic approach” (Ventresca & Mohr, 2002), 
where detailed descriptions and chronological narrative are developed through collection and 
analysis of relevant archival data, then examined in comparison with relevant theory (cf. 
Selznick, 1949).  To understand the antecedent conditions of historical context and language 
resources related to the constructs in the period leading up to 1938, I began with a preliminary 
survey of usage of these words in social science journals and books, starting in the mid-19th 
century.  For the focal construct evolution period from 1938 to 2005, I compiled data on events 
of construct usage in journal articles and books from organizational scholarship and related 
social science disciplines.  Through inductive analysis of data gathered in both phases, I 
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developed detailed narratives regarding the development of each construct, comparing these with 
one another and with relevant theory to deepen insights.   
Study Findings and Contributions 
I found that the historical context prior to 1938 provided important evidence related to 
meanings for the words “cooperation” and “purpose,” developed respectively through rhetoric 
from the Progressive Era and prior Christian Socialism (for “cooperation”) and through the 
emergence of naturalistic and positivistic (thereby anti-teleological) science (for “purpose”).  In 
each instance, this context of historically-situated meaning had lasting impact on how the 
construct evolved.     
Generally, my findings reinforced the conclusions of Barley & Kunda (1992) regarding 
the dichotomous tension in management discourse between conceptions of “natural” versus 
“rational” organization.  An inability to resolve the conflicts presented by these poles of meaning 
made application of “cooperation” problematic in hierarchical (rational rather than natural) 
settings and made use of “purpose” in both an instrumental/rational and idealized/normative 
sense problematic.  It also particularly disadvantaged the sustainability of a combined use of the 
concepts (e.g., as “purposive cooperation” with rational connotations).   
My research makes a contribution through extending this observation of Barley & 
Kunda’s regarding the field with an identification of its operation in specific theoretical 
constructs.  I also extend the work of Hirsch & Levin (1999) on “umbrella constructs” by 
highlighting the role of this tension in leading to the “collapse” or partitioning of such a construct 
in meaning.   
I also found interaction between actor strategies and historical context in shaping 
construct meanings.  Strategies of boundary-work (Gieryn, 1983) played a prominent role in 
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each process of evolution, though at different times.  In the instance of “cooperation,” incentives 
to create a “scientific” research program on the subject prompted psychologists to establish a 
definition suited to the boundaries of their disciplinary perspective.  In the evolutionary process 
associated with “purpose,” on the other hand, the project of creating a scientifically-credible field 
of organization scholarship, beginning after World War II but sharpened after the 1959 reports 
from the Carnegie and Ford Foundations on the state of business education, spurred concerns to 
develop theoretical language aligned with scientific legitimacy.  Early organizational theorists 
thus promoted meanings and language for the construct that resonated with assumptions in the 
behavioral sciences and that preserved the autonomy of organizational scholars from ties with 
practitioner interests. 
By observing how the tendency of such boundary-work (Gieryn, 1983) arguments over 
construct meanings during the formation of organizational scholarship promoted cleavage 
between the perspectives of practitioners and academics, my study offers a contribution to 
greater understanding of the field dynamics reflected in common concerns about the difficulties 
in linking management research and theory with practice (cf. Bartunek, 2007; Ghoshal, 2005; 
Sandberg & Tsoukas, 2011).   Finally, in highlighting the stamp on meanings and usage related 
to both “cooperation” and “purpose” that emerged from research-related resources and field 
interests within a relatively brief window of time, my work connects social structure theory from 
Stinchcombe (1965) with the dynamics of theoretical construct evolution.  This suggests that 
understanding the timeframes within which specific theoretical constructs first became 
prominent in scholarly discourse is a potentially-fruitful way to trace the roots of present 
assumptions about their meaning. 
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My second research question focused on identifying how actor characteristics, historical 
context and available language resources constrained or facilitated the success of specific actors’ 
efforts to influence construct usage or meaning.  In the evolutionary processes for both 
constructs, common characteristics of actors who were able to sustain influence over the field 
were high resources of cultural and social capital (Bourdieu, 1986), such as affiliations with 
prestigious academic institutions, long track records of scholarly publication, and careers 
interconnected with other well-published scholars.  These resources were, however, not enough 
to allow actors to reframe construct usage once alternative meanings had become well-
established.  My identification of this interplay offers a contribution through confirming 
similarities between institutional entrepreneurship (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983) and efforts at 
developing theoretical language in a scientific field.  The dynamics of the process appear very 
consistent with one of “embedded agency” (Seo & Creed, 2002), where actors can leverage 
personal resources in pursuit of institutional change but are also either constrained or facilitated 
by existing meanings and field conditions.   
My third research question focused on the impact of disciplinary boundaries within the 
interdisciplinary field of organizational scholarship on actor strategies and construct meanings.  
Here, the constructs presented an opportunity for contrast, as discourse and development of 
“cooperation” largely took place outside of the focused organizational journals, while the 
evolutionary process associated with “purpose” largely took place within that interdisciplinary 
context.   
A notable contrast between the two processes is the multiplication of terminology 
(“goal,” “objective,” “mission,” “values”) alongside “purpose” for this construct.  The words that 
dominate the field have the advantage of prior use and acceptability in multiple social science 
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disciplines, making them ideal for use as “boundary objects” (Star & Griesemer, 1989) to 
facilitate theoretical conversations across disciplinary boundaries in an interdisciplinary field.  
No similar multiplication of language is apparent for “cooperation,” which is largely discussed 
within just two disciplines (psychology and sociology), and, in these, primarily within a 
relatively-narrow application of conflict resolution. 
While my research contributes to the study of “boundary objects” by identifying how 
theoretical constructs in interdisciplinary fields may play this role, these findings also extend the 
work of Hirsch & Levin (1999) on construct evolution.  The partitioning of language within 
interdisciplinary organizational scholarship to reflect differing disciplinary preferences is one 
more explanation for the formation of fragments that survive the observed “collapse” of an 
“umbrella construct.”   
Organization of Dissertation 
This dissertation is organized as follows.  In Chapter Two I present the theoretical 
framework for my study, reviewing research on theoretical construct development in a variety of 
scientific fields and tying these findings with literature from the sociology of knowledge to 
elaborate upon my basic research question.  I identify how the constructs selected for study and 
my general research approach are oriented to answer these questions.  In Chapter Three I discuss 
my research methods, providing descriptions and examples of my process of data collection and 
analysis.  In Chapters Four, Five and Six I discuss my study’s findings, first for Cooperation 
(Chapter Four), then for Purpose (Chapter Five), then comparing the processes for the two 
constructs (Chapter Six).  In Chapter Seven, I present a concluding discussion summarizing the 
study’s findings, contributions, limitations and implications for both research and practice. 
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CHAPTER 2:  THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
The purpose of this chapter is to present the theoretical framework for my study.  I first 
introduce the theoretical domain of sociology of knowledge, highlighting its emphasis on the role 
of language in developing and communicating knowledge.  This makes it a valuable resource for 
theory to inform my general research question: How does a theoretical construct in a scientific 
field evolve in meaning and usage over time?  The question has particular relevance now in light 
of increasing concerns in the field of organizational scholarship regarding the potential for 
progress and further development of theory.  I identify opportunities to contribute to the field by 
synthesizing prior findings on construct evolution with theory from the sociology of knowledge 
to better articulate the process of construct development, and then define key terms for the 
research question.  After this, I present a summary of prior studies on construct evolution.  
Synthesizing their findings with relevant theory, I suggest a set of relevant factors in the process 
of construct evolution.  My research offers a unique contribution through studying these factors 
in interaction in an interdisciplinary field.  Finally, I describe my research setting and two focal 
constructs for study—”cooperation” and “purpose” as introduced within organizational 
scholarship through Chester Barnard’s The Functions of the Executive (1938).  I elaborate my 
research question within this setting, focusing attention on the factors in construct evolution as 
identified. 
Theoretical Domain and General Research Question 
In framing this dissertation I draw upon theory from the sociology of knowledge, a field 
that has been broadly characterized as an effort to “explain the production of knowledge in terms 
of the interests such production has served” (Shumway & Messer-Davidow, 1991: 217).  A full 
review is beyond the scope of this dissertation, but Kuklick (1983), Swidler & Arditi (1994) and 
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Meyer (2008) offer helpful surveys.  The field’s origin is generally traced to Germany and the 
work of Karl Mannheim, with its extension into U.S. sociology attributed to Robert Merton, 
among others.  The transition to a “new” sociology of knowledge, emphasizing “how kinds of 
social organization make whole orderings of knowledge possible” (Swidler & Arditi, 1994: 306) 
is generally dated to Berger & Luckmann (1967), a touchstone work for those applying 
sociology of knowledge in organizational scholarship via neo-institutional approaches (cf. 
DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Meyer & Rowan, 1977).    
The sociology of knowledge literature also incorporates research focused on the 
sociology of science (or sociology of scientific knowledge (cf. Shapin, 1995)), with exemplars 
including Kuhn (1996 [1969]), Ben-David (1991), Collins (1998), Latour (1987) and Shapin 
(1994).  This more specialized field has been distinguished by its focus on activities of those in 
professionalized roles of scientific exploration, highlighting how knowledge is created and 
transmitted through the common understandings and practices of such individuals.  Pierre 
Bourdieu’s development of the notion of field (cf. especially Bourdieu, 1996: 214ff.; Bourdieu & 
Wacquant, 1992: 94-115) as a sphere of knowledge creation has also been a common resource 
for both neo-institutionalists (cf. Fligstein, 2001) and those studying scientific fields (cf. Klein, 
1996; Lenoir, 1997).  
Common to much literature in the sociology of knowledge is attention to the role of 
language in shaping understanding, whether via Berger & Luckmann’s comment that “[t]he 
edifice of legitimations is built on language and uses language as its principal instrumentality” 
(Berger & Luckmann, 1967: 64) or Bourdieu’s assertion of the “language game” as a central 
characteristic of the scientific field (Bourdieu, 1991).  Neo-institutional scholarship has also seen 
increasing calls from Phillips and colleagues to devote more attention to the role of discourse and 
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language in the process of institutionalization (Phillips, Lawrence, & Hardy, 2004; Phillips & 
Malhotra, 2008).  This has been reinforced by work such as that of Colyvas & Powell (2006) 
documenting instances of language ambiguity and its gradual resolution in ongoing 
communication as evidence of the increasing taken-for-grantedness of technology transfer from 
academic to commercial purposes in a university setting.  They stress the value of studying 
“language and vocabulary” as an important avenue to understanding the “microfoundations of 
institutional processes” (Powell & Colyvas, 2008).  Similarly, Zilber (2008) has highlighted 
needs for deeper understanding of the crafting of “meaning work” essential to the process of 
institutionalization. 
In the realm of science, particularly the social sciences, language plays a key role as one 
of the instruments of measurement and observation that Kuhn (1996 [1969]) emphasizes as 
central in sustaining a given scientific “paradigm.”  Though not as obvious as physical devices 
such as customized telescopes or microscopes, theoretical language is nevertheless a tool that 
enables scholars to translate observations into common terminology, accomplishing the 
“commensuration” (Stinchcombe, 2002) that makes comparison possible (cf. also Glynn & 
Raffaelli, 2010).  Per Rouse (1987):  “[W]e cannot directly compare a scientific theory with what 
we observe.  We must first describe what we observe, so that we can compare one statement with 
another, but we cannot describe what we observe without making use of theoretical assumptions 
built into our concepts” (p. 4).  Much as the tools of observation supporting a given scientific 
paradigm focus attention on certain elements and problems rather than others, the language of a 
scientific field may render visible or invisible specific matters of concern.  Indeed, such is the 
power of language within a scientific field that the metaphor of the “language game” (Bourdieu, 
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1991) highlights how much the struggle to control terminology and meanings in the field is an 
ongoing characteristic of its existence. 
Given the impact of institutionalized language in a field, the importance of understanding 
how such language evolves is evident.  Theoretical constructs are at the heart of the “language 
game,” demanding as they do the creation of consensus on how an abstract notion within the 
field is to be represented.  The construct clothes an abstract idea with a word that has itself a 
specific socially-constructed meaning, and the field comes to regard the abstraction through this 
fusion of idea and word.  With each word choice come connotations of meaning that affect 
understanding of the abstract idea, and application of the construct within the field can further 
affect its meaning.  Curiosity about this critical process leads to my general research question:  
How does a theoretical construct in a scientific field evolve in meaning and usage over time? 
Theoretical Gap and Contribution 
Most prior studies of construct evolution in scientific fields, discussed in further detail 
below, have focused on describing specific examples of its occurrence rather than advancing 
theoretical development about the process.  Moreover, no studies that I identified, not even those 
in which propositions about the process were generated (Hirsch & Levin, 1999) or tested 
(Bartunek & Spreitzer, 2006), linked the authors’ research to broader theory within the sociology 
of knowledge domain.  While previous studies constitute a valuable resource for understanding 
theoretical development within particular fields and have brought important questions and 
assumptions to light, there thus remains significant opportunity to build upon them in the interest 
of general understanding about construct development.   
Comparing the findings from studies describing construct evolution across a variety of 
scientific fields, as well as from different studies within fields, allows preliminary identification 
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of common factors relevant to the process.  By combining these empirical findings with relevant 
literature from the sociology of knowledge, I developed a list of factors—both actor-focused and 
situational—likely to interact in the process of construct evolution.  As no research to date has 
attempted to study these in an integrated way, my dissertation is positioned to offer a 
contribution through observing the interaction of the factors in construct evolution over time. 
Working from the existing but limited base of theoretical understanding regarding construct 
evolution, my study aims at theory elaboration (Vaughan, 1992) through qualitative analysis of 
this process for additional constructs, seeking to enrich understanding of the process beyond the 
extant studies that have highlighted these factors of interest independently.   
Research on construct evolution also addresses calls by neo-institutional theorists, 
particularly those employing it in the study of organizations, for greater attention to how 
everyday activities of individuals serve to establish and maintain institutional understandings, an 
area called the “microfoundations of institutional processes” (Powell & Colyvas, 2008).  For 
scholarly endeavors, the discourse created in academic journal articles and other publications is 
an excellent example of such everyday work.  Zilber (2008) has similarly highlighted the need 
for a greater focus on meanings in institutional work, stressing the importance of studies that 
overcome the bias toward retrospective stories of institutional success.  Instead, she argues for 
studies to fill gaps in understanding by observing “what happens when one party tries to instill a 
certain change of meaning and fails…[or] how…other parties reject those meanings” (Zilber, 
2008: 165).  As scholarly discourse presents multiple opportunities over time to observe both 
meanings that persist and others that are rejected or ignored during a construct’s evolution, my 
study also touches this area of interest.  Through the observation of microfoundational 
institutional work incorporating both unsuccessful and successful efforts at influencing 
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meanings, research on construct evolution offers an important potential contribution to 
knowledge regarding the emergence, maintenance and change of institutional understandings. 
By situating my study in the realm of organizational scholarship, I also hope to contribute 
to the field’s greater understanding of itself.  Recent years have seen increasing questions about 
whether organizational theories can or do “progress” (Davis, 2010) and why new theories have 
failed to emerge (Suddaby et al., 2011).  A deeper understanding of theoretical construct 
evolution in the field promises to offer insights into the field dynamics behind these questions.  
Organizational scholars similarly have consistently expressed concerns about potential 
blindspots in research (cf. Heath & Sitkin, 2001; Mizruchi & Fein, 1999; Walsh, Weber, & 
Margolis, 2003) and discussed difficulties in integrating field research with management practice 
(cf., among many examples, Bartunek, 2007; Ghoshal, 2005; McGahan, 2007).  In each case, 
however, limited information is available to allow understanding of the mechanisms behind the 
patterns observed.  An in-depth study of field language development may shed light on exactly 
where and how specific trajectories of research have been determined, along with possible 
alternative paths that could now be developed.  
Finally, while research related to interdisciplinary academic contexts has expanded in 
recent decades (cf. Frodeman, 2010; Klein, 1996; Repko, 2008), there has been relatively little 
attention on the phenomenon of construct development in such fields, apart from the studies in 
organizational scholarship.  The challenges of “interdisciplinarities” tend to manifest themselves 
through the involvement of a variety of defined disciplines interacting in the field across 
“boundaries” of demarcation for their individual specialties.  Theoretical language, being the 
very medium of communication, is an ideal candidate for such study, and the field of 
organizational scholarship is well-documented as one with an interdisciplinary history (cf. 
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Augier, March, & Ni Sullivan, 2005).  Focusing attention on theoretical construct development 
in an interdisciplinary scientific field thus also allows my study to contribute to this wider area of 
contemporary scholarly interest. 
Basic Definitions 
In defining a “scientific field,” I follow the use by Bourdieu, who describes it as “the 
objective space defined by the play of opposing forces in a struggle for scientific stakes” 
(Bourdieu, 1975: 21).  Klein, a leading scholar on the development of interdisciplinary arenas in 
academia, has cited the value of Bourdieu’s field concept as “a model for understanding 
academic knowledge” (Klein, 1996: 5).  Like Klein, I am studying an interdisciplinary academic 
arena—organizational scholarship—which makes the use of “scientific field” helpful to 
distinguish this overarching domain from the more-familiarly characterized “disciplines” such as 
sociology, economics and psychology whose theoretical foundations contribute to it (cf. Augier 
et al., 2005).   
Because of my focus on language development within a scientific field, “the objective 
space defined by the play of opposing forces” will for the purposes of my study be the space of 
scholarly discourse—books and journal articles produced within the field and its related 
disciplines, commonly linked together through chains of citations.  The authors of such discourse 
are thus the primary actors of interest.  This focus has the limitation of omitting those with 
impact on the scientific field who are not published authors (e.g., academic administrators, 
officials in private or public research funding institutions, consumers of the applied knowledge 
generated by the field), but scholarly discourse sometimes suggests instances of their influence. 
In referring to a “theoretical construct,” I employ the term as generally understood in the 
social and behavioral sciences.  Here, “constructs” have been defined as “terms which, though 
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not observational either directly or indirectly, may be applied or even defined on the basis of the 
observables” (Kaplan, 1964: 55).  The terms “construct” and “concept” are sometimes used 
interchangeably in the context of social scientific theory (Shoemaker, Tankard, & Lasorsa, 2004) 
but also sometimes defined hierarchically at differing levels of abstraction.  A “concept” may be 
considered either more abstract (Kaplan, 1964; Van de Ven, 2007) or less abstract (Shoemaker et 
al., 2004) than a “construct,” but both are differentiated from directly-observed “variables” that 
operationalize the “concept” or “construct” in a research setting.   
One significant study analyzing the process of change in definitions and use of theoretical 
terms within the organization studies field referred to “constructs” (Hirsch & Levin, 1999) but 
two similar studies, each of the word “empowerment,” have respectively labeled the same focal 
term a “construct” (Bartunek & Spreitzer, 2006) and “concept” (Lincoln, Travers, Ackers, & 
Wilkinson, 2002).  In other fields, “concept” has been applied when discussing the evolving 
definitions of terms such as “anomie” (Meštrović & Brown, 1985), “social capital” (Moore, 
Haines, Hawe, & Shiell, 2006) and “embeddedness” (Barber, 1995).  For purposes of this study, 
I will refer to the focal terms of my research as “constructs” or “theoretical constructs,” but, 
given the overlaps in usage, I also examine prior work on the evolution of “concepts” or 
“theoretical concepts” in scientific fields for potential insights into the process of construct 
evolution. 
By specifying an interest in shifts of “meaning and usage” for a construct, I regard as 
significant for my study 1) the definitions offered for a term, either formally or by implication in 
context; 2) changes in terminology (when another word is suggested as a substitute or introduced 
as a synonym for an existing construct) and 3) operationalization of the construct in empirical 
work.  The first element, the definition, is a typical focal point for analysis in such studies (e.g., 
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Bartunek & Spreitzer, 2006).  The second element I consider consistent with tracking of the 
construct’s evolution, in that a shift in the word itself, linked by reference to the initial term and 
suggested as identical to or comparable with it, marks an effort to broaden or replace specific 
meanings in the construct.  No two words are completely identical in meaning, each being, as 
Durkheim has suggested, “collective representations” (Durkheim, 1915: 434) that carry within 
them accumulated history and socially-developed connotations transcending any individual’s 
effort to define them.  An attempt to replace the construct language therefore represents an 
element of its evolution.   
By also including the third element (operationalization) as an indicator of construct 
evolution, I follow Shenhav, Shrum and Alon (1994) in the conviction that “meanings of the 
terms emerge from the empirical investigation of usage and context” (Shenhav et al., 1994: 758).  
Much as the language used for the construct carries embedded meanings and theoretical 
assumptions, the decision about what observations are to be counted or measured with that label 
provides another layer of evidence about meanings imparted by the researcher or 
institutionalized within the field. 
Prior Studies of Construct Evolution 
To date, much research on the evolution of meaning for theoretical constructs (or 
concepts) in a scientific field has focused more on documenting the phenomenon than on 
developing theory about it, and such studies have minimally engaged with the sociology of 
knowledge literature.  A common type of study on construct evolution offers evidence of a shift 
in meaning or usage and then assesses its possible impacts on the field’s development, often with 
a call to recover the original perspective on the term.  An example is that of Meštrović and 
Brown (1985), who identify a shift in sociologists’ use of the concept of “anomie” from a 
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meaning closely linked with morality and notions of sin to that of a more generalized 
“normlessness.”  While they highlight the use of this latter definition in 1957 by Robert Merton, 
they devote most of their article to demonstrating evidence of the initial definition from the 
usage of “anomie” in Durkheim’s work.  They make no significant attempt, however, to identify 
how exactly the concept has come to shift within the field from what they consider its original 
meaning.   
Other studies have focused more on tracing the agency behind such shifts.  An exemplar 
is Camic (1986), which explores the process by which the concept of “habit” as a component of 
human action was effectively expunged from consideration in sociological theory.  Camic, 
noting that earlier European writers like Durkheim and Weber employed “habit,” traces its later 
absence to developments during the early 20th century when sociology was striving for 
legitimacy as a distinct academic discipline.  At this juncture, Camic observes, the likewise-
emergent social science of psychology had developed a strong biological and physiological view 
of “habit” in behavior, linking it to evolutionary processes of development.  Use of the word in 
sociological theory thus invoked those behaviorist connotations and implied an area of 
conceptual overlap between the disciplines—one to which psychology had already staked a 
stronger claim through greater incorporation of theory and methods from the well-established 
natural sciences.   
As Camic notes, in The Structure of Social Action (Parsons, 1937) Harvard-based 
sociologist Talcott Parsons directly attacked the “biophysical” model of behavior, formulating a 
theory of action that excluded even the older notions of “habit” from playing a role.  Moreover, 
he provided an account of the historic development of the field of sociology, including 
Durkheim’s and Weber’s work, in ways that excised their discussions of the topic.  Parsons’ 
 20 
 
motivation, Camic suggested, was to strengthen the disciplinary distinctiveness of sociology vis-
à-vis psychology by articulating a theory that eliminated common terminology.  The result was 
to institutionalize an understanding of action within the field that made the potential contribution 
of “habit” to behavior invisible, effectively eliminating it as a target of future research.   
Questions regarding the origins of shifts in scholarly language also motivated the work of 
Barley, Meyer & Gash (1988), who mapped a convergence of rhetoric regarding “culture” in 
organizations between the term’s usage in scholarly and practitioner-focused writing. Their 
findings suggested that scholarly writing tended to resemble practitioner rhetoric more closely 
over time, but the methods they employed to reach these conclusions (primarily statistical 
analysis of coded articles) were inadequate to uncover exactly how the influence occurred.  
Acknowledging this inability to draw more definitive conclusions, Barley and colleagues suggest 
that an approach of “studying networks of citations to determine who influenced whom” (Barley 
et al., 1988:55) would be needed to shed more light on the process.   
In a different field, Moore, Haines, Hawe and Sheill (2006) did apply citation network 
analysis to trace the increasing reliance of scholars in the field of public health on a definition of 
“social capital” derived from the work of Robert Putnam.  Putnam’s definition emphasizes 
aspects of wider community and social organization rather than describing “social capital” as 
derived from connections in interpersonal networks, akin to the usage by Bourdieu (1986).  In 
their analysis, Moore and colleagues found evidence for the role of a specific collection of 
authors in helping establish the Putnam-influenced definition, and they suggest the implications 
this shift has had on the public health field.  Their study, however, includes no descriptive data 
about these scholars or their activities to help explain why they gravitated toward Putnam’s 
definition or how they gained influence over the field.    
 21 
 
Two other studies have suggested that the language produced within a scientific field 
may be a reflection of wider cultural and historical context factors.  In one notable example, 
Barley & Kunda (1992) matched the alternation between rational and normative discourse in 
management against long-wave trends of economic expansion and contraction.  They suggested 
that rational discourse prevailed during economic downturns and normative discourse was 
favored during economic expansion.  Further, they highlighted an enduring impact of precedents 
in the structuring of ideas—they suggested that development of language in the management 
field is constrained by a dichotomy between Gemeinschaft (natural, culturally-based) and 
Gesellschaft (rational, self-interested) conceptions of human organization.  Discourse thus 
alternates between these two options rather than ever blending or developing in a qualitatively 
different direction.   
In another historical study, Shenhav (1995) tracked the prevalence of engineering-related 
discourse during the timeframe coincident with the development of organization theory, drawing 
connections from this pattern to the predominance of “systems” metaphors in early theories of 
organization.  Both Shenhav’s work and that of Barley & Kunda support the notion that 
contemporary events contribute their own stimuli to language development, thereby impacting 
concurrent choices for language in scientific fields.  However, their emphasis on building broad-
based, historical arguments minimizes attention to the interplay of individual scholarly actors in 
shaping the trends they identify.  While this by no means defeats their conclusions, it omits 
potential evidence for how exactly the historical patterns constrained or facilitated the arguments 
of scholarly actors.   
A significant study of construct evolution that does offer theoretical propositions about 
such activity is Hirsch & Levin (1999).  Working from an abbreviated case study and other 
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anecdotal examples, they offer a model of how differing participants negotiate usage and 
definition of what they term “umbrella constructs” in the field of organization studies.  While 
they do not therefore claim to present a general model of construct evolution, their definition of 
“umbrella construct” as “a broad concept or idea used loosely to encompass and account for a set 
of diverse phenomena” (Hirsch & Levin, 1999: 206) includes many possibilities.  They focus on 
the construct of “organizational effectiveness” but mention “learning,” “performance,” 
“strategy,” “culture,” “technology” and “capital” as other examples.  
The basic process described by Hirsch & Levin begins with the stage of excitement about 
an umbrella construct, during which its widespread usage in the field results in a multiplication 
of operationalized definitions.  In the second stage, an umbrella construct faces challenges on 
grounds of validity as lack of agreement or even correlation is observed among understandings 
or operationalizations of the construct.  A third stage of attempted organization of these varying 
definitions or subordinate measures then occurs within the field, characterized by the creation of 
typologies that argue for partitioning the definitions so that each is deemed appropriate, but for 
different subsets of cases.   
In a final stage, Hirsch & Levin suggest, the umbrella construct will face one of three 
different fates:  Survival in spite of its imprecision, due to strong support from external 
constituents; survival because scholars “agree to disagree” and accept the continued variety of 
definitions; or collapse of the umbrella construct, evidenced by a decline in use, with perhaps 
continued survival of one or more alternative or component constructs in its place.  Throughout 
this process they highlight the role of two distinctive sets of actors whom they label, 
respectively, as “umbrella advocates”—scholars who promote the use of broadly-defined 
terminology, perhaps to maximize perceived practical utility or impact of theory—and “validity 
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police”—scholars who focus on concerns for empirical measurement and testability, tending to 
narrow proposed definitions or perhaps subdivide umbrella constructs. 
In emphasizing the role of activities by groups of scholars to negotiate construct meaning, 
the Hirsch & Levin study does identify the element of struggle within a scientific field, similar to 
that found in Bourdieu’s definition.  However, their abbreviated case material offers minimal 
basis for understanding the kinds of characteristics that might prompt actors to play the role of 
“umbrella advocates” versus “validity police,” or what boundary conditions might exist for their 
theory.  In fact, Bartunek & Spreitzer (2006), the only study thus far to test any of Hirsch & 
Levin’s propositions, highlighted the role of academic disciplinary context in affecting construct 
meanings.  Rather than a contraction of meanings over time as predicted by Hirsch & Levin, they 
found a continued expansion of meanings for their umbrella construct of “empowerment” as it 
was used across a wider variety of disciplines.  Similarly, Lincoln, Travers, Ackers & Wilkinson 
(2002), also studying “empowerment,” traced variations of its meaning in usage across multiple 
disciplines such as education, social work and politics, and compared these with usage in the 
field of management.  
Both of these later empirical studies offered findings suggesting that diverse disciplinary 
affiliations could affect the negotiation and evolution of construct meaning in an interdisciplinary 
field.  Hirsch & Levin’s work, however, provided no identification of disciplinary affiliations or 
other information regarding specific actors to aid in understanding the differing tactics of these 
opposing camps in the development of umbrella constructs. 
Another aspect not considered in Hirsch & Levin’s model is how a construct in fact gains 
popularity for usage in research.  Their model begins with the assumption that a construct enjoys 
such popularity and that, based upon this popularity, meanings for it become more varied as an 
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increasing number of scholars attempt to define and operationalize it.  This, however, overlooks 
the possibility for constructs to be introduced and used by few, if any, later scholars.  Similarly, 
they suggest that an outcome of construct collapse may include the survival of an alternate, 
closely-related construct (their paper highlights the rise of “organizational performance” 
following the decline of “organizational effectiveness”), but they stop short of considering what 
might make a specific alternative construct more sustainable in field use than the original was.  
Exploration of the strategic motives of actors or the role of historical or cultural context might 
yield greater insights to such questions. 
Theorizing the Factors in Construct Evolution 
As the foregoing evidence suggests, research to date on the evolution of meaning for 
theoretical constructs in a scientific field has offered findings suggesting how “the play of 
opposing forces in a struggle for scientific stakes” (Bourdieu, 1975: 21) may help explain the 
observed movements.  Several studies highlight the role of actors in the field, although the 
relation of their efforts to specific scientific stakes remains somewhat less explored.  
Importantly, though, other studies suggest the impact of language and meaning, as well as 
historical context, in constraining or facilitating theoretical construct development.  The agency 
of actors in the scientific field, in other words, is embedded within a context that shapes not only 
their motivations and power but the resources of meaning at their disposal.  Deeper engagement 
with the sociology of knowledge literature offers the potential to extend the impact of these 
studies with theory related to this interaction between field actors and situational context. 
The classic “scientific stakes,” for example, are those of authority as a legitimate 
originator of knowledge (Bourdieu, 1975) and the associated autonomy for the field in directing 
its own actions (Gieryn, 1983).  These emerge clearly in studies such as Camic (1986), in which 
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Parsons’ effort to excise “habit” from sociological theory offers a vivid example of strategic 
action to protect the autonomy of his discipline.  Bartunek & Spreitzer (2006) present evidence 
of how different construct meanings can arise across multiple disciplines, also suggesting efforts 
of disciplinary autonomy.  Barley et al (1988) show convergence in language between the 
scientific field and the universe of practitioners engaging with similar knowledge.  Although they 
stop short of asserting the direction of influence, their undertones of concern regarding the 
possibility of practitioner influence on scholarly rhetoric suggest an anxiety to preserve 
autonomy for scientific actors in the field.   
Prior studies also reflect how the process of language development in scientific fields is 
essentially a “work of meaning” in institutionalization, described by Zilber (2008) as 
“interpretations, understandings and shared beliefs…produced and processed through social 
action…through the efforts of institutional actors engaged in power relations and political 
negotiations… all embedded within particular sociocultural and historical moments” (Zilber, 
2008: 163).  While Zilber’s definition stresses the political interplay of actors, similar to 
Bourdieu’s description of a scientific field, it also accentuates the importance of temporal and 
cultural context in shaping available language and meanings.  Indeed, the embeddedness of 
actors’ efforts within a specified “moment” provides the necessary corrective to over-
emphasizing their agency in assigning or redefining construct terminology.  The most clearly-
reasoned arguments by powerful actors may not suffice to overcome already-established 
conventions or connotations, while more modest arguments that mesh the right language with a 
key moment of opportunity may launch a whole new field of study. 
Incorporating the available resources of language meanings and the element of historical 
context as factors in construct evolution helps account for the important findings of Barley & 
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Kunda (1992) regarding the alternating prominence of rational and normative management 
rhetorics.  They suggest that interpretations of organization are constrained by the 
Gemeinschaft/Gesellschaft dichotomy and also that cycles of economic expansion and 
contraction trigger the shift between them.  Likewise, Shenhav (1995) highlighted the 
development of “systems” metaphors in management thought from its availability in 
contemporary engineering-related discourse and also its interaction with events of labor unrest.  
Camic (1986) stressed the accumulated associations of the word “habit” with biological 
phenomena in the late 19th century after Darwin’s repeated use of it in descriptions of animal 
evolution.  Connotations of genetically-determined behavior were problematic to sociologists 
aiming to separate their field from psychology, so the historical context affected both the word’s 
meaning and Parsons’ motivation to eliminate it as a construct. 
From this brief comparison and synthesis, I suggest that a richer understanding of 
construct evolution in a scientific field can result from integrating knowledge about actors and 
their strategic efforts to influence construct development with the language and meanings 
available to them and the historical context in which they operate.  Such an approach 
acknowledges the extent to which scientific field language conventions reflect an ongoing 
institutional project, one consistent with the exercise of “embedded agency” (Seo & Creed, 
2002).  In the context of questions such as those within organizational studies about the progress 
or development of new theory in the field (cf. Davis, 2010; Suddaby et al., 2011), investigation 
into not only the effectiveness of agents but also constraints on them is critical.  Evidence from 
efforts in construct development may reveal limits on scholarly activity imposed through already 
taken-for-granted aspects of the field.  Not just the “play of opposing forces” (Bourdieu, 1975) 
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but the “sociocultural and historical moments” (Zilber, 2008) behind such battles are of interest 
in sorting out the process of influence in construct evolution.   
Accordingly, I suggest that a full-orbed perspective on construct evolution needs to 
account for both actor-oriented and situational factors.  I describe below the actor-oriented 
factors of 1) actor characteristics and 2) strategies, and secondly, the situational factors of 1) 
available resources of language and meaning, and 2) historical context.  I briefly discuss each 
and comment on their potential operation and relationship in the process of construct evolution.    
Actor characteristics.  Building from Bourdieu’s core conceptualization of actors in a 
field invites consideration of the importance of differing positions held in the field by such 
actors.  For Bourdieu, a central characteristic distinguishing among actors was their relative 
possession of  “capital,”  defined as “a generalized ‘resource’ that can assume monetary and 
nonmonetary as well as tangible and intangible forms” (Anheier, Gerhards, & Romo, 1995: 862).  
Bourdieu himself suggested  social, economic and cultural capital as the primary types 
(Bourdieu, 1986).  Actors who command capital of whatever variety can draw upon this resource 
to strengthen their side in field-level struggles, such as those related to development of scientific 
language.   
Economic capital, directly associated with monetary and material resources, may be a 
source of construct control in the scientific field through access to research funding and grants.  
Actors on the faculties of more well-endowed colleges and universities, or those otherwise 
viewed favorably by funding agencies, will have a potential advantage in establishing standard 
language usage in scholarly discourse.  Increased funding generally can be translated to 
increased research activity, which is then likely to translate to an increased volume of associated 
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publications.  More publications increase the chances for such actors to standardize the language 
of field conversations with terms and meanings congenial to their research agendas.    
Cultural capital, gained largely in Bourdieu’s account through experiences of learning 
and skill acquisition, may be formally certified by degrees conferred to validate one’s status in 
the scientific field.  Actors in possession of such credentials, especially those from prestigious 
programs, could be expected to wield more influence in establishing language standards.  Even 
one publication in a top scholarly journal, provided it includes a contribution attracting interest 
and citations, offers some cultural capital, but the impact is compounded by multiple 
publications in similarly-prestigious outlets.  Those who publish regularly in such journals set the 
standards of language usage through repetition in their own work, while also prompting 
replication of that discourse in the work of others.  Similarly, accumulation of cultural capital 
through repeated publications tends to lead to more invitations to join journal editorial boards, 
multiplying opportunities to evaluate and control language usage by later scholars (cf. Crane, 
1967).   
Social capital, accruing through “a durable network of more or less institutionalized 
relationships of mutual acquaintance and recognition” (Bourdieu, 1986: 248), is likely to be 
possessed by scholars who train under or collaborate with already-influential scholars and have 
the benefit of credibility for their work through that association.  In turn, those who have the 
opportunities to socialize doctoral students with their preferred conventions of usage and 
meaning in scholarly constructs may sustain those preferences in the field more effectively.  In 
Camic (1986), the ability of Parsons, who served on Harvard’s faculty as part of one of the 
earliest and most influential U.S. sociology departments (cf. Camic, 1995), to have such wide-
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ranging influence on later usage of “habit” suggests impact from, at minimum, the social and 
cultural forms of capital. 
In addition to Bourdieu’s discussions of capital, research on institutional change has 
suggested that “multivocality,” or an identity that positions an actor to relate well to multiple 
possible constituencies, with a level of inscrutability about specific loyalties (cf. Maguire, Hardy, 
& Lawrence, 2004; Padgett & Ansell, 1993), will facilitate an actor’s ability to initiate new 
institutional orders.  As suggested, the metaphor of “embedded agency” (Seo & Creed, 2002), 
often applied to situations of institutional entrepreneurship, is also an apt description of the 
activity of field participants shaping theoretical construct language and meaning.  In 
interdisciplinary fields, the element of multivocality might facilitate influence by actors trained 
in or willing to engage with multiple related disciplinary perspectives.  As multiple associations 
make perceptions about the actor’s self-interest harder to confirm, this also minimizes potential 
sources of resistance to his or her ideas (Fligstein, 2001).    
The importance of disinterestedness in scientific influence is reinforced by Shapin 
(1994), who highlights trustworthiness in the eyes of the scientific community as essential for 
scholarly reputation.  In Shapin’s study of seventeenth-century England, key attributes for 
trustworthiness are epitomized by the gentleman-scientist, Robert Boyle.  Being perceived as a 
figure capable of “free action,” untainted by private interest, heightened Boyle’s credibility as a 
“truth-telling” scientist among his contemporaries.  With maintenance of autonomy for the 
scientific field being a central concern, figures tainted by associations or perceived obligations 
outside of the scientific field proper could be compromised in their ability to influence language 
use. 
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These relative levels of social, cultural and economic capital commanded by actors are 
likely to affect their success in influencing theoretical construct meanings.  Affiliation with 
specific schools, scholarly communities, or disciplines could present advantages—alignment 
with more than one may offer even greater advantages through creating an appearance of 
multivocality.  While the interests shaped by these affiliations may affect the strategies actors 
choose, overt appearance of such interest is likely to detract from their ability to influence the 
field.  Generally, actors with stronger resource positions would be anticipated to be more 
successful in establishing preferred construct terminology and meanings, while those lacking 
them might be less likely to sustain such influence.     
Actor strategies.  The specified characteristics provide field actors with resources in the 
struggle for scientific stakes while also inspiring strategies to develop and preserve such 
resources.  Those with greater accumulated social or cultural capital in a field, for example, have 
more to gain by preserving its authority.  Generally, strategies of action within scientific fields 
are geared toward these stakes of authority and autonomy, as suggested by the example of 
Parsons exercising agency to establish “academic autonomy” (Camic, 1986: 1072) for the 
formative discipline of sociology.   
An established label for such “strategic practical action” in scientific fields is “boundary-
work” (Gieryn, 1999: 23).  Through several case studies, Gieryn and colleagues have highlighted 
how scientists developed distinctions of “science” versus “non-science” in discourse between 
anatomists and phrenologists in 19th-century Scotland (Gieryn, 1983), and in U.S. trials pitting 
creationist versus evolutionist theories of origin (Gieryn, Bevins, & Zehr, 1985).  In each 
instance, scientific defenders highlighted distinctive characteristics of science that defined it so 
as to exclude the opposing “pseudoscientists” and thus preserve unique claims of the scientific 
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field to authority and other resources.  Gieryn identifies efforts to expand authority into new 
territory, monopolize authority against rivals and protect autonomy as particularly likely 
occasions for boundary-work (Gieryn, 1983: 791-792).  Disputes over language and construct 
definitions within the scientific field present a likely arena for this kind of boundary-work, as 
new theoretical language and definitions typically represent territory over which the victor gains 
authority.  Accordingly, arguments regarding language choices and definitions for constructs 
may be framed so as to classify opposing choices as “non-scientific” in some way.   
While Gieryn’s examples of boundary-work largely deal with the maintenance of 
boundaries between scientists and those perceived as outside their field, he and others (cf. 
Lamont & Molnar, 2002) also observe such tactics in the preservation of boundaries between 
professions and occupations.  The investigation by Barley et al (1988) suggests concern for 
preserving the boundary between scientific investigation of organizations and the influence of 
practitioners—analogous to the “non-scientists.”  Boundary-work may also occur between 
scientific disciplines, as illustrated in Camic (1986).  In interdisciplinary fields, boundary-work 
is likely to be evident in construct usage, as those trained in specific disciplines may take care to 
reflect preferences associated with their distinctive perspectives.  As Klein suggests, “[W]hen 
concepts circulate within a cultural field they stimulate cross-fertilization, but they also bear the 
traces of local disciplinary economies” (Klein, 1996: 50).   
The “cross-fertilization” is likely to shape theoretical constructs in interdisciplinary fields 
in distinctive ways so that scholarly conversation may continue across disciplinary boundaries.  
In such situations, Star & Griesemer (1989) have emphasized the importance of “boundary 
objects” that facilitate communication among representatives of distinctive fields:  “Intersections 
place particular demands on representations, and on the integrity of information arising from and 
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being used in more than one world. Because more than one world or set of concerns is using and 
making the representation, it has to satisfy more than one set of concerns” (Star & Griesemer, 
1989: 412).  In interdisciplinary fields, actors may strategically deploy construct language and 
meanings that conform to usages across several related disciplines, thereby maximizing their 
influence across a wider audience while also providing language that is more likely to be adopted 
in the interdisciplinary field.   
Strategies to influence construct development are likely to be shaped by actor 
characteristics as well as situational factors.  Boundary-work is likely to emerge during construct 
or field emergence, which offers an occasion to establish authority and defend it against rivals. 
Disciplinary affiliations may trigger defensive boundary-work within interdisciplinary fields, but 
such contexts also invite development of theoretical constructs congenial to multiple disciplines 
so that they may serve as “boundary objects” facilitating communication across the field.   
Resources of language and meaning.  The language to express theoretical constructs is 
itself drawn from common resources of language within the wider culture—a component of the 
“publicly available symbolic forms through which people experience and express meaning” 
(Swidler, 1986: 273).  As such, scientific actors are dependent on what Swidler (1986) likened to 
a “toolkit” of resources that supplies their efforts to establish terminology and definitions within 
the scientific field.  Language in this case provides the raw material turned to by actors as 
“resources for shaping strategies of action” (Swidler, 1986: 284).  This perspective encourages 
research on how such cultural resources can either constrain or facilitate actors—the toolkit 
offers a set of resources but not infinite possibilities. 
In the case of scientific language, actors must begin with the resources at hand, which 
include meanings evident from contemporary professional and even popular rhetoric.  This 
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echoes findings by Shenhav (1995) suggesting the contribution made by contemporary 
references to “systems” in engineering publications to the shaping of early management theory.  
Any word in one’s vocabulary is already a public product of collective meaning-shaping, 
carrying within it a history of associations and assumptions developed through prior use 
(Durkheim, 1915).  As an early sociologist noted, this particularly affects language in the social 
sciences, where terminology is not confined to a laboratory environment:  “One difficulty is that 
our terms belong for the most part to everyday speech so that they carry with them into the 
scientific sphere the varieties and ambiguities of popular usage” (MacIver, 1931: 5).  These prior 
associations may constrain the ability to employ language or fix distinctive meanings within the 
scientific field.   
Barley & Kunda (1992) suggest another form of constraint on available meanings, 
proposing that the cyclicality of management discourse between rational and normative framings 
reflects an incommensurability between the two basic concepts of Gemeinschaft versus 
Gesellschaft.    They argue that rhetoric continually retreats to one or the other of these 
established perspectives based on historical precedent.  Importantly, their findings also imply 
that a long-term view of the field’s history is essential to appreciating such trends.  Their study’s 
timeframe, ranging over more than a century, uncovered repeated shifts in rhetoric, while prior 
authors had largely only focused on the single shift evident from Scientific Management to 
Human Relations in the 1920s and 1930s. 
Each of these examples suggests how the available resources of language, varying over 
time, may offer possibilities to facilitate or constrain actors in shaping theoretical constructs and 
their meanings.  Words familiar from popular discourse may readily present themselves for 
adoption as constructs, but the sustainability of that application will depend upon previously-
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established connotations for the word, as well as aspects of historical context.  To the extent a 
term’s connotations threaten scientific authority or, as in Camic (1986), disciplinary autonomy, a 
construct may be abandoned altogether for strategic reasons.  By the same token, a construct 
with positive connotations for advancing the scientific authority of a field may be desirable 
enough to inspire contests for its control.  While certain actors within the field may be more 
skilled in strategies for deploying language, generally these resources are common to all within 
the field and as such may constrain even those with advantages in capital resources from 
influencing construct use in violation of previously-understood connotations.     
Historical context.  Findings such as those of Barley & Kunda (1992) and Shenhav 
(1995) offer suggestions of how the historical context can affect construct development in a 
scientific field through the availability of cultural resources in terms of language and meaning.  
Both, however, also point to the role of historical events as an important factor operating in an 
integrated fashion with these language resources.  Shenhav highlights the impact of growing 
labor unrest on concerns for rational control in industry.  Barley and Kunda posit a relationship 
between the capital investment accompanying economic expansions, the technological 
developments these help birth, and the ensuing “rationalization of production” that facilitates a 
managerial focus on language of process and procedure (cf. Barley & Kunda, 1992: 390-391).  
This emphasizes how historical context shapes not just resources of meaning but, through 
shifting economic cycles, that of specific capital stocks available.   
Much as Stinchcombe asserted that organizations formed at a particular time “must 
obtain the resources essential to their purpose by the devices developed at the time” 
(Stinchcombe, 1965: 164) and would therefore be marked by structures coincident with the 
resources available at their origin, language in scientific fields may be shaped in ways that 
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facilitate access to the economic resources of public and private research grants available to them 
at the time.  Stinchcombe also argues that organization types will tend to emerge “rapidly in a 
relatively short historical period, to grow and change slowly after that period” (Stinchcombe, 
1965: 168).  We might expect to see a similar pattern in construct development.  Once precedents 
of language and operationalization have been established in the field, further access to grant 
resources will likely be facilitated by conforming to the existing usage, sustaining those early 
patterns of meaning.   
Research in boundary-work has also highlighted how temporal context shapes these 
strategic actions.  Gieryn (1983) observed a plasticity in the characterizations of science versus 
“non-science”—arguments were adapted to the specific opponent and setting so as to best 
highlight distinctiveness in scientific claims of authority.  Similarly, Camic (1995) noted how the 
distinctive characteristics of early sociology departments at Harvard, Columbia and Chicago can 
be explained by reference to the context of other disciplines at the schools where they emerged.  
Formulating distinctive boundaries for sociology invited different tactics at each school, but this 
formative period also led to sustained qualities in focal aspects of research and methodology at 
these schools that affected development of the discipline at large.  In considering the impact of 
context on theoretical construct development, we might therefore expect to see language and 
definitions adopted so as to clarify boundaries in relation to specific competitors for scientific 
authority at the time, whether perceived “non-scientist” outsiders or alternate disciplinary 
specialists in an interdisciplinary field. 
Historical context thus emerges as an important situational factor in construct 
development that has the potential to affect actors’ resources and their motives to pursue 
different strategies.  The resources of language and meaning available to actors will also be a 
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product of the moment in social and cultural history.  Following the reasoning of Stinchcombe, a 
formative period that fixes the construct’s meaning in line with resources available at that time 
has the potential to provide an enduring structure that resists further change, making an 
understanding of the early history of the construct and field particularly important. 
Integrating the factors.  The foregoing description of factors offers a brief overview of 
empirical evidence for them, tying this with theoretical concepts from the sociology of 
knowledge literature.  Based on this existing research and theory, depiction of their likely 
interaction is presented in Figure 2.1. 
FIGURE 2.1 – Proposed Set of Factors Involved in Construct Evolution Process 
 
Although the depiction vastly simplifies what is an iterative and ongoing process, the 
basic factors suggested as relevant to construct evolution are all illustrated.  First, the resources 
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of language and meaning are shown at left in the diagram, upon which all actors in the field 
draw as they propose and deploy specific construct language and definitions.  The individual 
actors are depicted as differing shapes of varying sizes to capture the notion that each brings 
unequal resources of capital and other distinctive actor characteristics to these efforts at 
influencing the construct’s usage and meaning.   
Arrows across the diagram signify actor strategies, expressed in scholarly discourse, to 
influence field-level conventions for the construct’s use and definition.  The arrows include both 
efforts of change and repeated efforts to sustain existing meaning, symbolized by multiple 
arrows along the same trajectory.  Some arrows converge with those of other scholars, and some 
diverge, depicting the potential for collegial interaction in this process.  Some efforts result in 
sustained change of the construct in the field, and some do not, symbolized by the distinction at 
the right.  Actors C and D, for example, contribute distinct efforts that largely diverge from 
Actors A and B, and their more independent efforts are unsustained.  Though for simplicity’s 
sake this figure depicts an “either/or” outcome in sustained meaning, the real process seems 
likely to include more subtle ongoing shifts in meaning, and the results (both successes and 
failures) of influence efforts will affect strategies and meanings in future efforts.  Finally, the 
whole process is embedded in historical context (symbolized by the framing brackets in the 
drawing), which of course also shifts across time, with shifting temporal context producing 
comparable shifts in the meanings and resources available. 
As the challenges of depiction suggest, the potential interaction of these four general 
factors in the process of construct evolution is complex.  While research to date has helped 
identify each of them in turn, none has really provided the material to bring more clarity 
regarding their interrelationship.  To summarize the material available from existing studies of 
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construct evolution, Table 2.1 lists the key papers discussed and the different factors they 
identified or emphasized. 
  
TABLE 2.1 – Summary of Empirical Research on Factors in Construct Evolution 
Study Field of Study Focal 
Construct/ 
Concept 
Discuss 
Individual 
Actors? 
Actor 
Characteristics 
Described 
Actor Strategies 
Suggested/ 
Described 
Resources of 
Language 
Historical 
Context 
Barley & 
Kunda 
(1992) 
Management/ 
organizational 
theory 
None 
specific; 
general field 
language 
   Gemeinschaft
/Gesellschaft 
dichotomy 
Economic 
cycles 
Barley, Meyer 
& Gash 
(1988) 
Management/ 
organizational 
theory 
culture (its 
supporting 
rhetorics) 
  Implied through 
convergence 
between 
practitioners and 
academics 
  
Bartunek & 
Spreitzer 
(2006) 
Multiple 
disciplines, 
including 
management/ 
organizational 
theory 
empowerment   Implied through 
differences across 
disciplines 
  
Camic (1986) Sociology (and 
interaction with 
psychology) 
habit Only 
Parsons 
Detailed for 
Parsons 
Efforts at 
disciplinary 
autonomy by 
Parsons 
Connotations 
of “habit” 
Establishment 
of social 
science 
disciplines 
Hirsch & 
Levin (1999) 
Management/ 
organizational 
theory 
organizational 
effectiveness 
(others treated 
anecdotally) 
Only as 
groups 
As groups: 
“validity police” 
and “umbrella 
advocates” 
Suggested but not 
detailed 
  
Lincoln, 
Travers, 
Ackers & 
Wilkinson 
(2002) 
Multiple 
disciplines, 
including 
management/ 
organizational 
theory 
empowerment   Implied through 
differences across 
disciplines 
  
TABLE 2.1 – Summary of Empirical Research on Factors in Construct Evolution (continued) 
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Study Field of Study Focal 
Construct/ 
Concept 
Discuss 
Individual 
Actors? 
Actor 
Characteristics 
Described 
Actor Strategies 
Suggested/ 
Described 
Resources of 
Language 
Historical 
Context 
Mestrovic & 
Brown (1985) 
Sociology anomie      
Moore, 
Haines, Hawe 
and Sheill 
(2006) 
Public Health social capital Identified 
through 
citation 
analysis 
Limited 
information 
provided 
   
Shenhav 
(1995) 
Management/ 
organizational 
theory 
None specific; 
general field 
language 
Not really; 
discuss 
engineers 
as group 
 Efforts to establish 
engineering 
profession 
“Systems” 
metaphors 
Labor unrest, 
Progressive 
era 
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As shown, while each of these four factors appears relevant in more than one study, no study 
except Camic (1986) has integrated all four, and that paper focused on a specific, time-bounded 
incident dealing with a single construct in the field of sociology.  Studies have largely addressed 
either actor-focused or situational factors rather than combining them, and none in the field of 
organizational scholarship have addressed them together to a significant degree.  There is 
opportunity, in other words, to contribute to greater understanding of both construct evolution 
and the development of organizational scholarship through research that explores how these 
factors interact with each other over a longitudinal process of construct evolution.   
Research Setting and Construct Selection 
To build effectively on this prior work, my research focuses on the evolution of a 
matched pair of theoretical constructs over time in organizational scholarship, with an approach 
incorporating evidence on all four of these important factors.  For consistency within this study, I 
will apply the term “organizational scholarship” to the field, but I mean by this to include the 
range of theoretical interests in organizations and management reflected across the Academy of 
Management as a whole, generally identical with the group termed the “research community” of 
“organization studies” by Augier, March & Ni Sullivan (2005).  The field is consistently 
characterized as being interdisciplinary (Augier et al., 2005; Whitley, 2000), with citations from 
multiple social science disciplines such as economics, sociology and psychology regularly 
occurring in journals and other publications of organizational scholarship.  This positions my 
study to make a contribution to greater understanding of construct evolution in interdisciplinary 
fields as a whole, an increasingly-significant area for research in knowledge development and 
education (Klein, 1996).  To observe the dynamics of this interdisciplinarity, I incorporate 
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evidence not just from journals and books prominent in organizational scholarship but also 
scholarly writings in the social science disciplines from which the field has developed. 
Selection of theoretical constructs. I elected to focus my study on the theoretical 
constructs of 1) “cooperation” and 2) “purpose,” which I chose for considerations of theoretical 
interest, discussed in more detail below.  From this point forward in the document, I will employ 
the convention of referring to them as Cooperation and Purpose (capitalized) when I refer to 
them as “cases”—i.e., as instances of the social phenomenon I am researching (Keddle, 2006), 
which is the process of construct evolution.  When I discuss the meanings or other attributes of 
specific words employed for the construct during the process (initially “cooperation” and 
“purpose,” but later substitutes as well), I will designate them by quotation marks.   
Briefly, both of these constructs offer the advantage of having been introduced together 
very early in the developing stages of organizational theory as central constructs in a book 
widely acknowledged as influential to the field.  This suggests that their evolution will expose 
definitions and contentions of meaning important to the field as a whole, beginning from its 
formative stages.  Current scholarly use of the words reflects definitions different in emphasis 
from those assigned by the original author, and they presently enjoy differing levels of research 
popularity, as I discuss further later in the dissertation.  Given their introduction in the same book 
at the same time, such differences appear likely to be explained by the subsequent process of 
their development, meaning that detailed exploration and comparison of their respective 
processes of evolution should be worthwhile.    
For purposes of comparison with prior studies, these two constructs also conform 
generally to the definition of an “umbrella construct” as provided by Hirsch & Levin (1999): “a 
broad concept or idea used loosely to encompass and account for a set of diverse phenomena” (p. 
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206).  Within organizational scholarship, “cooperation” and “purpose” are relatively broad and 
inclusive concepts, similar in character to examples discussed by Hirsch & Levin such as 
“organizational effectiveness,” “learning,” “performance,” “strategy,” “culture,” “technology” 
and “capital.”    
 Initial source for constructs.  Both constructs were introduced into organizational 
scholarship in a central way in Chester Barnard’s Functions of the Executive (1938).  Functions 
of the Executive offers a solid vehicle for construct introduction due to its status as a highly-
influential book in the field, as regarded by current scholars (cf. Bedeian & Wren, 2001).  
Among such influential books, it also represents the earliest formulation of a comprehensive 
theoretical model of organizational function, contrasting it with other books such as Taylor (2008 
[1911]) or Roethlisberger & Dickson (1939), which tended to focus on analysis of specific 
management practices rather than theorizing about organizational function as a whole.   As an 
author, Barnard has been deemed highly influential by both historians of the field and theorists 
within it (cf. Wren & Hay, 1977).  As the book was published prior to the post-World-War-II 
boom in research on organizations that Augier et al (2005) associate with the expansion and 
formalization of the field of organizational scholarship, there is little hazard of “left-censoring” 
my findings through omitting data crucial to early stages of construct usage or 
institutionalization of definitions (cf. Aldrich & Fiol, 1994).   
Initial construct definitions.  Both “purpose” and “cooperation” were employed as 
central constructs in Chester Barnard’s Functions of the Executive (1938) (hereafter also 
abbreviated FOE), in which they were defined in a tightly interdependent way, with purpose 
essential to the cooperation which constitutes organization.  As Barnard writes, “[O]ut of the 
existence, or belief in the existence, of purposes of individuals and the experience of limitations 
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arises cooperation to accomplish purposes and overcome limitations” (FOE, p. 22).  The 
“cooperation of two or more persons” is a phrase he equates with “organization” (FOE, p. 65).  
For Barnard, “cooperation…that is conscious, deliberate, purposeful” is the essence of “formal 
organizations” (FOE, p. 4).  In his definition, a “cooperative system” encompasses the “physical, 
biological, personal and social components” interrelated by an instance of purposeful 
cooperation between two or more actors (FOE, p. 65).  Implicitly, then, “cooperation” as defined 
by Barnard entails the activity of two or more persons joined in a common purpose, and is also 
equated with “organization” and particularly “formal organization.”   
The purpose of a cooperative effort for Barnard is, quite simply, that which the group has 
been organized to accomplish.  For example, he states:  “In an industrial organization the 
purpose is the production of material goods, or services” (FOE, p. 154).   A “common purpose” 
is similarly one of the three essential elements of formal organization he identifies, with the 
others being 1) participants willing to serve the purpose and 2) viable communication ability 
among them (FOE, p. 82).  Following Barnard’s emphasis as a starting point, my study of these 
constructs focuses on their application in the context of human (as opposed to animal) behavior 
involving two or more persons. 
Current construct use.  Although the constructs were initially defined in this interrelated 
way, the use of these words in contemporary organizational research suggests shifts in their 
definition and usage and differing outcomes for each in research popularity.  Unquestionably, the 
topic of “cooperation” continues to be widely studied, but almost exclusively through laboratory 
experiments, including countless “prisoner’s dilemma” games and simulations (for recent 
examples, see Fischer, 2009; Kiyonari & Barclay, 2008; Klapwijk & Van Lange, 2009).  Studies 
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of “cooperation” as something occurring among persons in organizations, which was the focus of 
Barnard’s conceptualization, are however much harder to find.   
Study of “purpose” as a property of organizations is relatively limited in contemporary 
research and, where it is discussed, has taken on new dimensions.  A recent definition terms 
“purpose” as “the set of reasons for conducting business that resonates with people’s ideas about 
what is right or worthwhile” (Mourkogiannis, 2007: 38).  This personalized and subjective 
definition—which presents the possibility that some organizations but not others will possess 
such “purpose”—reflects a clear departure from Barnard’s definition of the construct as a basic 
element common to all organizations.   
In summary, “cooperation,” though widely-studied, does not appear prominently in 
research directly describing activity among people within organizations.  On the other hand, 
“purpose” appears very rarely as a theoretical term in organizational scholarship, and the most 
recent mentions describe it as a subjective, personally-determined property rather than a required 
component of any organization.  I found no recent work linking and interrelating the definitions 
of the terms “cooperation” and “purpose” in the way that Barnard did.  These varying outcomes 
offer promise that insights may emerge from comparing their process of evolution.  Likewise, the 
differing levels of popularity between constructs suggest this research will avoid the bias 
common to studies of institutional efforts where only successful projects are examined in 
retrospect (cf. Hardy & Maguire, 2008; Zilber, 2008). 
Timeframe of study.  To identify important factors of historical context and available 
resources of meaning and language at the point when the constructs were introduced required 
developing a perspective from evidence prior to their field introduction in 1938.  Accordingly, I 
divided the overall study into two phases of data collection:  A Preliminary Survey Phase (1848-
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1937), focused on building understanding of antecedent conditions in historical context and 
language resources available when the constructs were first introduced, and a Construct 
Evolution Phase (1938-2005), focused on gathering detailed information describing their process 
of development through scholarly discourse.   
The Preliminary Survey Phase was defined so as to provide a picture of the context 
within the developing social sciences that affected subsequent usage of the words “cooperation” 
and “purpose” in the formative community of organizational scholarship.  It begins with the 
earliest date of available social science academic journals in JSTOR, a comprehensive source of 
journals in organizational scholarship and the social sciences that offers flexible, full-text 
searching of these publications from their inception.  For these reasons, I chose this database as a 
primary resource for obtaining the bulk of my data on construct meanings and evolution.  This 
starting point for the Preliminary Survey also encompasses the emergence of formal disciplines 
of social science in the English-speaking academic world, a development generally dated to the 
middle or late 19th century (Haskell, 1977; Ross, 1979).  The 1937 ending date is the year before 
the publication of Functions of the Executive (Barnard, 1968 [1938]).   
This preliminary survey data is relevant to the later development of constructs in 
organizational scholarship due to strong evidence for influence from the social sciences on the 
earliest theorists in the field.  Mayo cites, for example, the work of the anthropologist 
Malinowski regarding western Pacific tribal mechanisms for social and economic exchange 
(Malinowski, 1922; cf. Mayo, 1945: 12).  In Management and the Worker, Roethlisberger & 
Dickson devote lengthy footnotes to a listing of writers and works in sociology, psychology and 
anthropology that formed the conceptual basis for their interviewing strategy during the 
Hawthorne Studies and their interpretation of results (cf. Roethlisberger & Dickson, 1939: 
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272,389).  Mayo & Roethlisberger, along with Chester Barnard, have also been linked with a 
circle of scholars assembled at Harvard in the 1930s for discussion of the works of sociologist 
Vilfredo Pareto (Heyl, 1968; Keller, 1984).   Indeed, Barnard  indicates familiarity with 
organizational theories from the social sciences, even while expressing a desire to improve upon 
them:  “[T]he social scientists—from whatever side they approached—just reached the edge of 
organization as I experienced it, and retreated” (1968 [1938]: xxix).  In short, early discourse in 
the social sciences provides an important context for the subsequent development of constructs 
in organizational scholarship, as authors built upon those conversations in scholarly writing on 
organizations.   
The beginning date of the Construct Evolution Phase (1938) marks the publication of 
Functions of the Executive, from which I then track development of both constructs in detail 
through scholarly articles and books, capturing data to uncover actor characteristics, evidence of 
the strategies employed by them in efforts to use and establish meaning for these constructs in 
research, and evidence of the meanings that are sustained or fail to be sustained throughout the 
field.  The end date for this phase (2005) was chosen to coincide with the latest year of journal 
availability at the time of my data collection for most publications in JSTOR.  
Study-Specific Research Questions 
In this specific context, my research question is: How have the respective theoretical 
constructs of 1) “cooperation” and 2) “purpose” evolved in usage and meaning in organizational 
scholarship over the period from 1938 to 2005? 
My work is designed to discover: 
a) How do actor strategies, language resources and historical context combine over time 
to explain which construct uses or meanings are sustained within the field?   
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b) How do actor characteristics, historical context and available language resources 
constrain or facilitate success for specific actors’ efforts to influence construct usage 
or meaning?  
c)  How does the existence of disciplinary boundaries within the interdisciplinary field 
of organizational scholarship affect actor strategies and occurrences of sustainable 
construct usage or meaning? 
By addressing these questions, I offer a contribution to the deeper understanding of 
construct evolution by considering four important factors in the process in an integrated way for 
the first time.  My approach attends to both the agency and embeddedness of individual actors, in 
a context observing both successful and unsuccessful efforts, thus giving it a strong platform to 
contribute to literature on the microfoundations of institutional meaning-work.  Conducting the 
study within the domain of organizational scholarship offers the potential to yield insights 
relevant to contemporary field-level questions about dynamics of theory development and 
research directions.  Finally, the interdisciplinary environment of the study allows it to contribute 
to broader literature on the dynamics of knowledge development across boundaries in other such 
fields.  
Chapter Summary 
In this chapter, I reviewed and integrated descriptive research on construct evolution with 
theory from the sociology of knowledge to inform my basic research question regarding the 
evolution of meaning for a theoretical construct in a scientific field.  From this review, I 
identified both actor-focused and situational factors apparent in the evolution of theoretical 
constructs, presenting a suggested depiction of their interaction.  Returning to prior research on 
construct development, I highlighted the absence of studies addressing these factors in an 
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integrated way and the opportunity to contribute through undertaking such a study.  Finally, I 
described my research setting of organizational scholarship and reasoning behind the choice of 
the initial constructs of “cooperation” and “purpose,” along with key aspects of my research 
design aimed at addressing identified gaps in prior research.  I closed with a statement of 
elaborated research questions and a summary of the contributions they offer.   
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CHAPTER 3:  RESEARCH METHODS 
In this chapter, I outline the methods I followed in data collection and analysis to address 
my research questions.  I first discuss the basic approach of dividing the study over two historical 
time periods, with differing goals for each, and data collection and analysis strategies adapted to 
those goals.  The goal for the Preliminary Survey Phase (1848 to 1937) was to develop a 
description of historical context and of meanings associated with the words “cooperation” and 
“purpose” in the social sciences, particularly regarding organizations and management, prior to 
1938.  The goal for the Construct Evolution Phase (1938 to 2005) was to gather details on 
relevant events of construct usage for both Cooperation and Purpose, building a narrative 
account of the evolution process for each construct during this period.  Data from these two 
phases were combined into overall findings and analyzed in comparison with extant theory to 
address the specified research questions.  I discuss the data collection and analysis processes for 
each phase, then summarize the process for analyzing the evolution of each construct and 
comparing the processes for constructs to one another, closing with a brief chapter summary. 
Overall Approach  
The overall approach of this study can be described as one of “sociohistorical research,” 
defined by Hill (1993) as “historical investigation informed by social scientific perspectives” (p. 
3).  My research questions on the interplay of multiple factors in construct evolution invite a 
historical approach, as one of the key characteristics of such research is that it is “conjunctural” 
(Schutt, 2006: 387), treating causes not in isolation but in combination as assessed through the 
assembly of an overall narrative (Abbott, 1994).   
Within the framework of historical research, my study focuses on a process unfolding 
through time rather than a single event.  I am seeking to understand “how things evolve over 
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time and why they evolve in this way” (Langley, 1999: 692).  Further, the work relies primarily 
on qualitative data collected from archival sources.  As such, my methods draw from precedents 
in not just historical research but other research employing archival data, process data, and 
qualitative data in general.  Within organizational scholarship, this kind of archival study has 
been carried on via a tradition of research termed the “historiographic approach” (Ventresca & 
Mohr, 2002). This approach “relies upon intensive note-taking and a carefully managed pattern 
of strategic reading” for data collection (Ventresca & Mohr, 2002: 815), with subsequent 
analysis producing detailed narrative accounts from which theoretical insights are developed, 
either for a single instance of the phenomenon studied or through comparison of several such 
accounts.  Exemplars include early, classic studies such as Selznick (1949) and Chandler (1962) 
but also more recent work such as DiMaggio (1991) and Hargadon & Douglas (2001). 
The initial steps of historical research, similar to those for most organizational research, 
involve establishing research questions from a review of relevant literature and identifying the 
data sources appropriate to answering these questions (Berg, 2009; Glass, 1989).  A customary 
distinction in historical methods is made between primary data sources (which originate from 
direct participants in the events under study) and secondary data sources (accounts of the events 
from anyone other than such direct participants) (Gottschalk, 1950).  Primary sources are the 
main target of formal data collection, while secondary sources are generally employed for 
supplementary explanations and information, both to shape the process of data collection and to 
address questions arising from the examination of primary data (Glass, 1989). 
One distinctive step in conducting historical research, since it deals with incidents in the 
past, is the assessment of the reliability of available data as evidence about the events in question 
(Berg, 2009).  Particular attention is paid to the level of inference required to assume details 
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about the events from available documents (Dibble, 1963).  For my study, the scholarly writings 
I employ to assess construct evolution qualify as “direct indicators,” where “all or part of the 
document itself...is the datum under investigation” (Dibble, 1963: 213).  This means no inference 
is required to assume they accurately represent the events.  On the other hand, book reviews or 
citations of other books or articles are a step removed from the materials themselves, requiring 
assumption of their accuracy.  To address this, I examined the reviewed or cited resources 
directly before relying on them for significant points of evidence; details on my principles for 
doing this are discussed in more detail by study phase. 
Gathering data on actor characteristics for my study required more inference, as I 
accepted the journal’s listing of an author’s affiliation with a college or academic department as 
definitive.  This information reflects “social bookkeeping” from an organizational source, 
considered to be increasingly more reliable in cases such as this where the organization is free to 
independently verify the information (e.g., by contacting the school) if desired (Dibble, 1963).  
Drawing on scholarly autobiographies for such evidence about actors and events requires greater 
degrees of caution in proportion to the length of time passing between the events and the 
testimony, plus the potential for bias in constructing the story for a public audience (Dibble, 
1963).  My study makes more limited use of such data, however, and available secondary 
accounts allowed me to “triangulate” significant points via evidence from multiple sources (Yin, 
2003).   My assessments regarding Herbert Simon and the dynamics of influence by the Carnegie 
School, for example, not only draw on Simon (1991) but on Khurana (2007), among others. 
To collect data suitable for addressing the research questions identified for my study, I 
structured the process in two phases, a Preliminary Survey Phase and Construct Evolution Phase.  
Data collected for both phases of this historical research was guided by a theoretical framework 
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(Lundy, 2008).  I generally employed the factors identified from prior studies and literature as 
“sensitizing concepts” (Blumer, 1954) to point to likely elements of interest in available 
empirical data that would address my research questions about construct evolution.  Table 3.1 
highlights the basic data collected by phase in relation to these concepts. 
TABLE 3.1 – Data Collected in Relation to Concepts from Research Questions 
Concepts from Research 
Questions 
Phases 
Addressed 
Data Collected to Support Analysis 
Resources of language and 
meaning  
Preliminary 
Survey & 
Construct 
Evolution 
Meanings for “cooperation” and “purpose” 
evident in social science literature prior to 1938; 
subsequent data from construct definitions and 
substitute terminology introduced during 
construct evolution 
Historical context Preliminary 
Survey & 
Construct 
Evolution 
Secondary sources on history of social sciences 
and U.S. political and social context prior to 
1938;  further reference to secondary sources to 
address questions on historical context during 
construct evolution 
Actor-specific characteristics 
(especially related to 
resources of social and 
cultural capital (Bourdieu, 
1986) in scientific field) 
Construct 
Evolution 
Institutional affiliations (e.g., school where they 
taught) of authors of articles and books; 
doctoral institutions and key scholarly 
associates, as identified through scholarly 
biographies, including “acknowledgements” 
sections in books 
Actor strategies  Construct 
Evolution 
Text of arguments employed to dispute or 
justify specific construct meanings and usage  
Construct meanings Construct 
Evolution 
Construct definitions provided formally, by 
typologies, by implication in context, and 
indirectly through operationalization 
Sustained 
meanings/Influential authors 
Construct 
Evolution 
Citations presented for construct meanings; 
general article citation frequencies within 
journal databases 
Disciplinary boundaries 
within organizational 
scholarship field 
Construct 
Evolution 
Disciplinary affiliations of authors (as listed 
with articles or in books); disciplinary focus of 
journals in which articles appeared   
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Both phases of research employed inductive processes of analysis to develop findings.  
The Preliminary Survey Phase aimed to describe the historical context and resources of language 
and meaning available at the start of the examined processes of construct evolution.  The 
Construct Evolution Phase had the initial goal of creating a detailed chronological narrative of 
the evolution process for each construct, developed from the evidence of construct usage events 
during that time period (Langley, 1999).  Conclusions from both phases were then integrated into 
a full set of findings for each construct.  This material was iteratively expanded through analysis 
comparing the findings with prior theory that helped to guide the study (cf. Selznick, 1949).  
Further, I compared the findings for each construct to one another (cf. Chandler, 1962) to deepen 
these insights and enhance generalizability (Miles & Huberman, 1994) of the answers to my 
research questions regarding construct evolution.  My efforts were generally consistent with a 
goal of theory elaboration (Vaughan, 1992), as I examined these instances of the evolution 
process for constructs not previously studied, comparing my findings with prior research and 
theory so as to reveal possible inadequacies in, to confirm, or to enhance the specificity of prior 
theory regarding the phenomenon.  Table 3.2 gives a top-level description of the phases, with 
details discussed in the remaining sections of this chapter. 
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TABLE 3.2 – Research Approach by Study Phases 
Study 
Phase Timeframe Objective Data Collection Process Data Sources Analysis Steps 
Preliminary 
Survey 
1848 - 
1937 
Description of 
historical context 
and resources of 
language and 
meanings for 
“cooperation” and 
“purpose” prior to 
1938 
Search computerized journal 
databases for articles and book 
reviews in social science 
journals using “cooperation” 
and also look for use of 
“purpose” in this context; 
examine additional books 
identified through this survey, 
plus other secondary resources 
for more information  
Primary: Social 
science journal 
articles; early 
textbooks in 
sociology; relevant 
books identified from 
journal book reviews 
 
Secondary: Books on 
historical context of 
period, particularly in 
relation to emergence 
of the social sciences 
Inductive derivation of basic 
themes and key historical 
events as relevant to usage 
of “cooperation” and 
“purpose” during 
timeframe.   
 
Production of interim 
summary consolidating 
findings and suggesting 
questions to inform next 
research phase. 
Construct 
Evolution 
1938 - 
2005 
Insight into 
construct evolution 
through 
theoretically-
informed data 
collection and 
inductive analysis 
process 
Search computerized journal 
databases for events of 
construct usage in scholarly 
articles and scholarly books 
cited for construct use; 
examine autobiographies and 
biographies of highly-cited 
scholars, plus other secondary 
resources, for more 
information on actor 
characteristics and historical 
context 
Primary: Social 
science and 
organizational journal 
articles; scholarly 
books and 
autobiography  
 
Secondary: Books 
and articles on 
development of 
business education 
and organizational 
scholarship; scholarly 
biographies 
Inductive development of 
detailed narrative of 
evolution process for each 
construct 
 
Analysis of narrative in 
conjunction with prior 
theory to identify impacts of 
actor characteristics, actor 
strategies, historical context 
and language resources in 
relation to research 
questions.   
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Preliminary Survey:  Historical Context and Meanings for “Cooperation” and “Purpose”  
 
The first time period of study, dating from 1848 through 1937, was geared to provide a 
description of the historical context and language meanings employed within the developing 
social sciences for the words “cooperation” and “purpose” during the time immediately prior to 
the 1938 publication of Functions of the Executive (Barnard, 1968 [1938]).    
Data collection.  To survey early meanings for these words within the social sciences, I 
focused on both academic journals and scholarly books.  The bulk of journal article searches 
were conducted in JSTOR, chosen for its strong and flexible full-text-searching capabilities, as 
well as its coverage of many major social science journals from their initial issues, starting in the 
mid-to-late 19th century.  I searched within seven JSTOR-defined disciplinary categories, 
selecting fields most closely aligned with the development of organizational theory, based on 
disciplines cited by or published in by early organizational scholars.  The set includes all the 
social sciences identified by Augier et al (2005) as being cited in later research handbooks on 
organizational scholarship.  JSTOR disciplines chosen were:  1) Anthropology; 2) Business; 3) 
Economics; 4) Political Science; 5) Psychology; 6) Public Policy & Administration and 7) 
Sociology.  Table 3.3 lists these categories and the date of the earliest journal within each—the 
earliest one appeared in 1848, but most categories were first represented during the 1880s.   
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TABLE 3.3 – Preliminary Survey: JSTOR Journal Categories Searched 
Category Earliest Journal(s) Available in JSTOR Date of First 
Journal(s) 
Anthropology Journal of the Ethnological Society of London 1848 
Business University Journal of Business (Chicago) (earliest 
journal exclusive to Business category; earlier ones 
cross-listed with Economics) 
1922 
Economics Quarterly Journal of Economics (MIT) and Publications 
of the American Economic Association (later the 
American Economic Review) 
1886 
Political 
Science 
Political Science Quarterly 1886 
Psychology American Journal of Psychology 1887 
Public Policy 
& 
Administration 
Town Planning Review 1910 
Sociology American Journal of Sociology (earliest journal 
exclusive to Sociology category; one prior journal cross-
listed in Economic and Political Science) 
1895 
 
In these JSTOR categories, I searched the full text of English-language articles or book 
reviews for uses of the word “cooperation” or the phrase “cooperative system,” including this 
latter phrase because of its explicit usage by Barnard and the possibility that using a more 
specific phrase might be a better way to identify relevant articles.  I included book reviews as 
well as articles so as to identify further instances of scholarly writing that might be relevant to 
shaping construct meaning.  During this period, spellings of “cooperation,” “co-operation” and 
“coöperation” all occurred.  I found no examples of authors articulating any distinct definition or 
reason for their choice of one spelling versus another.  Accordingly, I searched for and treated all 
spellings as of equivalent interest.  I also discovered that irregularities in computerized scanning 
of the printed word “coöperation” sometimes yielded variations in JSTOR’s searchable text data.  
Upon identifying commonly-occurring variations, I added the words “cobperation,” 
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“co6peration” and “coiperation” to my searches.  All these spelling variants were likewise 
incorporated in searches for the word “cooperative” in “cooperative system.”   
Due to the extremely common usage of the word “purpose,” however, searching for it by 
itself, as I did for “cooperation,” yielded a preponderance of trivial matches (e.g., “the purpose of 
this study is…”).  Since my focus was on the understanding of “purpose” as it was used in 
relation to “cooperation” (given Barnard’s intertwined definition of the two), I instead focused 
on examining the usage of “cooperation” to highlight connections between this concept and 
“purpose,” particularly in suggestions of “shared purpose” as part of the “cooperation” construct.  
This is consistent with Barnard’s 1938 definition of “purpose” as an essential element of 
“cooperation.”  During this period I therefore did not search journal articles for “purpose” 
independently, but only searched for “cooperation” and “cooperative system” (and variants, as 
specified above), examining instances of “purpose” that occurred in this context and leveraging 
these and references to relevant books, as discussed further below, to help flesh out 
understanding of the meanings associated with “purpose.” 
I supplemented JSTOR’s journal coverage with additional searches in the areas of 
psychology and business.  First, as journals published by the American Psychological 
Association (APA) were among the earliest and most central to the discipline (e.g., 
Psychological Review (published starting in 1894), Psychological Bulletin (1904) and Journal of 
Applied Psychology (1917)), but are not available in JSTOR, I conducted searches of them in the 
PsycARTICLES database.  Following principles of theoretical sampling (Strauss & Corbin, 
1998) to emphasize opportunities for variations and distinctiveness to enrich my description, I 
focused these searches only on articles rather than book reviews so as to highlight material 
unique from that already identified in JSTOR.  Due to limited initial matches from 
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PsycARTICLES on the word “cooperation” (or “co-operation,” as in JSTOR searches), I added 
keywords of “social” and “sociology” to early searches in hopes of identifying relevant material.  
From 1912 forward, however, I searched on “cooperation” only, as the term began to appear 
more regularly.   
Finally, due to linkage of several early management writers (e.g., Mayo, Roethlisberger, 
Barnard) with Harvard University, I searched the Harvard Business Review, a key management-
related publication dating from 1922, in EBSCO’s Business Source Complete.  I searched for 
occurrences of “cooperation” or “co-operation” in the full text of articles in this publication 
through 1937. 
Article examination process.  In JSTOR, I examined all matching items identified by the 
specified searches through 1913.  Due to the proliferation of academic journals over the period, I 
shifted to examining matches in odd-numbered years only from 1915 through 1937 to make it 
feasible to cover the full timeframe.  Approximately 8,700 total articles were examined in 
JSTOR, focusing on the page or pages where “cooperation” or “cooperative system” appeared.  I 
treated matches in PsycARTICLES similarly to those in JSTOR, identifying and examining 
approximately 540 articles from these searches.  In EBSCO, a total of 216 items from Harvard 
Business Review were identified and reviewed.  The total of articles reviewed from all three 
database sources during this process was thus approximately 9,500.   
For all journal articles, my intent was to see the use of “cooperation” in context—how it 
was described or defined, how utilized, etc.  Incidental usages (e.g., thanking persons for 
cooperation in a study) were ignored.  I also attended to use of “purpose” in context with the 
word “cooperation,” noting how the two were linked.  I focused on conceptual discussions, 
definitions or categorizations of the words, while also attending to apparent relationships with 
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contemporary U.S. and global events.  The overall approach thus focused on capturing the 
description of both historical context and word meanings through this Preliminary Survey.  
Examples of “cooperation” and “purpose” in social science discourse as captured through this 
preliminary survey are presented in Table 3.4. 
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TABLE 3.4 – Preliminary Survey: Sample Uses of “Cooperation” and “Purpose” 
Cooperation 
“We may be quite sure, however, that the Almighty did not create man without giving him the power of 
self-preservation. Man is gregarious, and by numbers, and the faculty, not possessed by the lower 
animals, of cooperation, he would make up for individual weakness” (Crawfurd, 1861: 155-156)  
“Society arises where a man in his contact with his physical environment finds co-operation with his 
fellows useful in enabling him to satisfy his primary economic wants” (Lindsay, 1899: 87) 
“Is co-operation the ‘coming’ industrial system, as many thinkers are beginning to recognize?” (Yarros, 
1904: 780)  
“While not in the least denying the existence of the tendency to co-operation in business, it is the belief 
of the writer that the fundamental basis upon which it rests is unreasonable restraint of trade” (Stevens, 
1912: 642) 
“Co-operation, that is to say, association, permits a maximum of vital intensity; association is 
accordingly life” (Novicow, Otis, & Ellwood, 1917: 321 1917)  
“This is becoming essentially an age of cooperation, and the value of it is evidenced by concrete 
achievement and improvement in every avenue of human endeavor in which there has been an 
accommodation to the forces that make for harmony and progress” (Davis, 1929: 114) 
“Cooperation follows a recognition on the part of individuals of their dependence each upon the other. 
Cooperation is good for individuals. It heightens the spiritual value of life” (Stalcup, 1931: 31) 
Purpose 
“It follows that in studying volitional association we have to do especially with the connection between 
social forms and various sorts of co-operation and the purposes that they fulfil [sic]” (Giddings, 1891: 
648) 
“Wherever the realization of an objective purpose is concerned, the personal cooperation of the 
elements which are to produce the result will take place for the most part in the form of a stratified 
numerously articulated superiority and inferiority” (Simmel, 1896: 396) 
“Nations, after all, are only groups of individuals associated together for the purpose of the most 
effective co-operation for common ends” (Cleveland, 1900: 36) 
“I have thus demonstrated that all natural and conventional or human organization is inspired by 
purpose….What purpose?...the betterment of condition…Until mind was organized in the animal 
world, this was accomplished by spontaneous choice on instantaneous occasion; but when mind was 
organized with memory, purpose was developed into design, or predetermined purpose. The purpose 
was betterment and the agency for betterment has always been cooperation” (Powell, 1901: 428) 
“the business [fire insurance] is based on co-operation for a given purpose and mutuality in sharing the 
costs and benefits” (Johnson, 1907: 158) 
“The sense of presence may be negative as well as positive. It may mean a stimulus to fight or flight 
instead of to co-operation. In order to have a social mind there must be a sense of reciprocal or 
sympathetic response to the situation. On the lower levels this means the abandon to a common 
impulse, on the higher levels it means the leading of a common purpose” (Boodin, 1913: 21) 
“According to Col. Munson morale is ‘the measure of determination to succeed in the purpose for 
which the individual is trained, or for which the group exists. It describes the nature and degree of 
cooperation, confidence, and unity of understanding, sympathy, and purpose existing between the 
individuals composing the group’” (Bradshaw, 1923: 494) 
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Inductive analysis during article searches.  As is advised for research employing 
qualitative data (Miles & Huberman, 1994), my process of data collection during this phase was 
interwoven with analysis.  From searches in all three databases, I copied the text of relevant uses 
of the words, pasting them into a cumulative Microsoft Word document, often adding 
explanatory or bracketed “reflective remarks” (Miles & Huberman, 1994: 66-67) in the midst of 
or at the end of quotations, and bolding phrases or passages with notable ideas related to 
“cooperation,” “purpose,” or emergent themes.   This sample entry from the original document 
illustrates the incorporation of bolding, and explanatory/reflective comments:  
(Yarros, 1913: 315) “The idea of co-operation and profit-sharing is clearly in the air. Men 
in all classes and conditions are turning to it as affording a practical as well as scientific 
solution of the bitter and burning problem.” [cites Albion Small among supporters]  Cites 
support from Mill and from Spencer, from chapter in Principles of Sociology on 
Cooperation [p. 318 of Yarros]: “In co-operation, he writes, “the transition from the 
compulsory co-operations of militancy to the voluntary co-operation of 
industrialism is completed.”” Title of Yarros’ piece “What Labor Wants” could be 
construed in part as an objection to Taylorism as the answer, yet he does not mention 
this specifically] 
 
Initially, I began by simply compiling the quotations in time sequence.  However, as I 
encountered repeated quotations with similar themes, I began organizing them under headings, 
retaining the chronological sequence under each heading while reducing the large amount of data 
into smaller analytic units, a process generally similar to what Miles & Huberman (1994) term 
“pattern coding.”  Examples of themes that emerged early on were repeated references to 
“cooperation” as an explicit form of organization (as with the Christian Socialism of Robert 
Owen).  This led to a theme heading of “Cooperation as Organizational Form.”  Other themes 
were linked more to historical context, as I encountered, for example, numerous references to 
“cooperation” in relation to World War I and its aftermath with the formation of the League of 
Nations.  This led to a theme heading of “World War Implications.”  In addition to adding 
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sections, I sometimes retitled them or added subheadings during further data collection, trying to 
work with “loosely held chunks of meaning…[and] to unfreeze and reconfigure them as the data 
shape up otherwise” (Miles & Huberman, 1994: 70).  One major category that wound up 
including quite a few sub-heads was “Applications of Cooperation in Society/Social Science,” 
which had sub-heads for topics such as “Charities” and “Census and Statistics” that occurred in 
multiple articles.  For the major categories, I created bracketed ending markers in all caps (e.g., 
“SOCIAL APPLICATIONS”) to enable me to search within the Word document and easily find 
the endpoint of that section to paste the latest entry in chronological order.  I did not do this for 
sub-heads, however, so my utilization of them for organization was somewhat less consistent.  
However, the bolding I had done for sub-heads helped highlight them for further analysis. 
As the process of data collection went along, I employed principles consistent with 
theoretical sampling (Strauss & Corbin, 1998), capturing quotations for the document with an 
emphasis on those displaying contrast versus prior findings.  If I encountered examples that 
offered meanings repetitive to prior ones (e.g., that business trusts were characterized as 
exhibiting “cooperation”), I captured the reference only without a quote, entering it alongside a 
similar quote already identified.  Some statements, however, were so straightforward and 
common (e.g., that economic production reflects the “cooperation of labor and capital”), that 
after I had captured a few such references I did not continue to do so unless the article also made 
a more distinctive point about the word’s meaning.    
Through this overall process, I annotated information on about 900 pertinent examples 
from articles out of the set of approximately 9,500 examined, compiling 218 single-spaced pages 
of quotations and notes.  The 21 thematic headings that emerged from inductive analysis during 
data collection, with sample items from each, are provided as Appendix A. 
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Identification of supplementary primary and secondary data sources.  Based largely on 
articles and book reviews examined in JSTOR, I also identified additional primary and secondary 
data resources for documenting the historical context and meanings associated with 
“cooperation” and “purpose” in the social sciences prior to 1938.  This is consistent with the 
expectation that examination of primary sources in historical research will lead to questions 
pointing toward the need for other primary and secondary data sources for more information 
(Glass, 1989).   
A key example of this came through my observation of several book reviews in 
sociological journals that highlighted the treatment of “cooperation” in specific sociological 
textbooks (e.g., Small, 1899).  Textbooks seemed a valuable resource for understanding the 
consensus of meaning for a term in the field, and those being used in colleges at that time would 
provide initial impressions of meaning for scholars whose careers matured during my period of 
study for construct evolution.  For these reasons, and consistent with a preference toward 
employing documents that could be “direct indicators” (Dibble, 1963) of meaning rather than 
book reviews that required inference as to their accuracy about the sources described, I chose to 
examine a selection of sociological textbooks.  To bound this collection, I focused on authors 
considered significant by a contemporary source, drawing upon the list of textbooks examined by 
Eubank (1927) in a survey of sociological concepts.  I examined editions of these available in the 
Boston College library from dates as close as possible to the version referenced by Eubank.  
While not all were original editions, all were issued within the time period of my Preliminary 
Survey.  Works reviewed included Case (1924), Giddings (1907, 1921), Gillin & Blackmar 
(1930), Small & Vincent (1894), Ellwood (1921), Ward (1883), Cooley (1926), Dealey (1920), 
Hayes (1915), Park & Burgess (1924), Sumner (1907), and Ross (1919, 1920).   
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Due to similar desires not to rely on secondary accounts regarding texts that might be 
informative primary data sources, I obtained several other relevant books identified through book 
reviews and articles for direct examination.  For example, I encountered multiple references to 
early sociologist Herbert Spencer for statements and theories related to “cooperation” (cf. 
Howerth, 1906; Seligman, 1886; Yarros, 1913) but no articles authored by him.  I therefore 
examined a collection of his writings, The Man versus the State (Spencer, 2000), which included 
the title essay quoted in several journal articles (e.g., Adams, 1887; Welling, 1882).  Other data 
sources thus identified included The Principles of Scientific Management (Taylor, 2008 [1911]), 
a survey of research on competition and cooperation (May & Doob, 1937), early works in 
“personnel administration” such as Tead (1933) and Metcalf (1926), and early books in 
administrative science such as Gulick & Urwick (1937).  Given its timeliness as source of 
summarized descriptions of concepts in the social sciences during the early 1930s, I also 
reviewed entries in Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences (Seligman & Johnson, 1930) on 
“Cooperation,” “Bureaucracy,” “Business Administration,” “Administrative Organization,” 
“Economic Organization,” “Personnel Administration,” “Social Organization” and “Social 
Organism.”   
During this stage of research, I also identified a nearby library that offered computer 
searchable access to some of the earliest journals related to personnel administration (e.g., 
Personnel Journal).  Opportunistically, I visited it to identify possible relevant primary source 
material and did a full-text and title search for “cooperation” in these journals.  I uncovered only 
one relevant article (Courtis, 1940), but it fell outside the period of my Preliminary Survey.  Due 
to its use of “cooperation” in the title and emphasis on the construct in an organizational setting 
(both of these unique features among any articles encountered to this point), I retained it as 
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primary data for later inclusion in the Construct Evolution Phase.  While this specific step fell 
outside the boundaries of my designed plan for data collection, it is consistent with the 
expectations that archival research will entail some innovation and creativity dependent on data 
availability (Hill, 1993). 
Finally, in addition to these supplementary primary sources, I utilized secondary 
resources to inform this Preliminary Survey, especially to deepen my understanding of historical 
context.  For further background on Herbert Spencer, I reviewed two biographical works (Peel, 
1971; Wiltshire, 1978).  I also reviewed key works on U.S. history during the late 19th and early 
20th centuries (Hofstadter, 1955; Wiebe, 1967) and on the formation of the social sciences during 
the same timeframe (Haskell, 1977; Ross, 1979).  
Data collection and preliminary analysis of supplementary resources.  Owing to the 
lack of easy transfer of text from the books into a computerized format, my collection and 
analysis of both primary and secondary source information from books relied primarily on 
reading and extensive note-taking (Ventresca & Mohr, 2002).  For Taylor (2008 [1911]) I found 
text available through the Internet in searchable form, so was able to examine each usage of 
“cooperation” individually, similar to the process for journal articles.  However, for all other 
books treated as primary sources, I employed the table of contents and index to identify pages or 
sections of interest dealing with “cooperation” or “purpose.”  Although I did copy or scan some 
book sections for ease of later reference, my core data collection process was to take notes on 
these books and resources, writing out significant quotes verbatim with page references, in 
spiral-bound notebooks dedicated to my research project.  These notebooks provided a consistent 
method of data organization for the overall project, mirroring practices encouraged by Yin 
(2003) for the organization of case study notes.    
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To construct a preliminary analysis of meanings of “cooperation” in sociological 
textbooks and of “purpose” in Tead (1933), both of which constituted the most significant set of 
definitional examples for the terms that I had found up to that point, I leveraged matrix data 
display methods (Miles & Huberman, 1994).  I pulled out 59 brief examples or quotes from these 
books that stressed particular definitional points about “cooperation” or “purpose,” transferring 
the data from my notes by typing these individually into an Excel spreadsheet, where I could sort 
and organize them by themes to examine them for patterns.  Although this step was a useful way 
of consolidating key definitional data from the books and identifying themes, the data entry 
process was time consuming.  I therefore elected not to attempt a complete incorporation of all 
data from books examined into such a spreadsheet but rather continued to work with handwritten 
notes as my dominant method of recording and reviewing the evidence from books. 
Analysis of Preliminary Survey data.  To consolidate the learning from this Preliminary 
Survey, I combined material from the study to this point.  I began with my 218 pages of 
compiled quotations, which were already organized in general chronological order within the 
categories developed through inductive analysis during my data collection from journal articles, 
as described above.  I integrated this data with patterns observed in the previously-mentioned 
matrix display of definitions from selected books, as well as with information from other notes 
on books and from memos (Strauss & Corbin, 1998) I had made during data collection to 
summarize overall observations.  I compiled such memos throughout the study in the same 
spiral-bound notebooks used for note-taking on sources.   
While combining insights from so much material was a daunting task, my first step was 
to print out and review the 218-page document in full, highlighting items, making marginal notes 
(Miles & Huberman, 1994), and creating separate pages of notes and memos as I went through 
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the document to begin sketching out an overall outline of my findings to this point.  I reviewed 
but also reworked and consolidated the original 21 provisional categories, organizing them into 
broader categories to help integrate understandings (cf. Pratt, Rockmann, & Kaufmann, 2006), 
and also adding categories or subcategories that had been identified through my examination of 
books.  For example, the initial categories related to Scientific Management, Trusts and 
Economics became subtopics under a theme of the Relationship of Cooperation to Business.  
This theme also included a new subtopic related to the emergent contemporary research on 
Personnel Administration, which had been identified more clearly through the examination of 
books.  I also created a topic heading to address the meanings and use identified for “purpose” up 
to this point, which had been minimally specified during the process of journal article 
examination but better defined through integration with the data from books. 
The product of this analysis was a 12-page summary outline describing key takeaways 
from this Preliminary Survey regarding historical context and meanings for both “cooperation” 
and “purpose” prior to 1938.  While the document thus in part reflected a completed summary of 
analysis for this phase, its features also largely corresponded with those of an “interim case 
summary” (Miles & Huberman, 1994: 79), as it offered a compilation of what had been 
uncovered by my overall research process to that point and what remained to be found out.  In 
functioning as an interim document, the summary concluded with tentative questions for 
consideration in the next phase of data collection and analysis.  One example: “How does the 
pursuit of research funding (as reflected in the stated motives for the May & Doob work by 
Social Science Research Council) or institutional involvements (e.g., Institute of Human 
Relations at Yale, Institute of Public Administration at Columbia, President’s Committee on 
Administrative Management) shape meanings of or research on ‘cooperation’?”  After 
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completing this document, I initiated the next phase of data collection for my study, bearing 
these potential areas of interest in mind.   
Construct Evolution Phase: From 1938 to 2005 
The substance of process theorizing centers on events (Langley, 1999), and for my study 
of construct evolution, these events are the instances of construct usage in scholarly literature.  
Accordingly, my focus for data collection during the Construct Evolution Phase was the 
identification of such events of construct usage in relation to Cooperation and/or Purpose.  An 
example of relevant construct usage (which includes both constructs) is:  
“By ‘cooperation’ is meant here the bringing together or joint use of personnel or the 
bringing together or joint use of equipment or supplies (other forms of cooperation are, I 
trust, adequately dealt with under other headings). The questions that are posed are these: 
Irrespective of whether two organizational units have a ‘common purpose’ is there an 
advantage in bringing their personnel together for consultation or a joint effort?” (Waldo, 
1947: 242).   
 
The core of my data collection process for such events focused on scholarly journal 
articles.  Consistent with Danto (2008), I designed a formal data capture instrument to ensure 
consistency in the information gathered from each relevant article, storing the data in Microsoft 
Excel.  The items identified for data capture are noted in Table 3.5, with a column that highlights 
particular relationships with the concepts from research questions as previously listed in Table 
3.1.  The items not explicitly related to research questions served basic purposes of identification 
and tracking for the article and the method by which it was located.  The Comments field 
allowed for incorporation of reflective remarks (Miles & Huberman, 1994), facilitating 
preliminary data analysis in conjunction with the data collection process. 
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TABLE 3.5 – Construct Evolution: Journal Article Data Capture Template 
Data Captured Research Question 
Component Addressed 
Article Title  
Journal Title  
Journal Disciplinary Focus (coding detailed later in chapter) Disciplinary boundaries 
Publication Year  
Journal Volume, Issue  
Author Name (this and all “Author” variables captured for all listed authors, 
also noting who is first author listed) 
Actor characteristics 
Author’s Professional title provided, if any (e.g., “assistant professor,” 
“director”) 
Actor characteristics 
Author’s Institutional affiliation given, if any (e.g., Boston College, Harvard 
University) 
Actor characteristics 
Author’s Disciplinary affiliation given, if any (e.g., professor of:  
“sociology,” “psychology,” etc.; if not provided explicitly, sometimes 
inferred from context of the article’s prior presentation (i.e., at a specified 
disciplinary conference)) 
Actor characteristics; 
disciplinary boundaries 
Construct definition provided, if any (text captured from article to illustrate) Resources of language and 
meaning 
Citation for Construct Definition, if any (data about the cited item captured 
for possible examination, if not previously identified) 
Sustained 
meanings/influential authors 
Construct used to define other constructs?  If so, which ones? Resources of language and 
meaning 
Objection raised about construct, if any Actor strategies 
Substitute or alternative terminology introduced for construct?  If so, what 
and how justified? (note this new term for possible inclusion in further 
searches) 
Resources of language and 
meaning; actor strategies 
Construct used in hypotheses? If so, how? (text captured from article to 
illustrate) 
Resources of language and 
meaning 
Construct operationalized? If so, how? (text captured from article to 
illustrate) 
Resources of language and 
meaning 
Construct incorporated in typology? If so, how? (text captured from article 
to illustrate) 
Resources of language and 
meaning 
How was this article identified? (i.e., search query employed, cited by 
another article, appeared in special issue) 
 
What database was this article referenced on? (i.e., JSTOR, 
PsycARTICLES, Business Source Complete or other such source; or paper 
journal/publication) 
 
Times article cited by others within its relevant database (e.g., JSTOR, 
PsycARTICLES, Business Source Complete) 
Sustained 
meanings/influential authors 
Comments:  Other general observations, interesting quotes or comparative 
notes regarding article 
Various, depending on 
article 
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As shown, key aspects of this data collection process included identifying in journal 
articles how 1) constructs were defined; 2) substitute language was introduced for the construct; 
3) construct meanings were disputed; and 4) previous authors were cited for definition or use of 
the constructs.  In the next few sections I offer explanations and examples of how I identified and 
captured such data for specific construct usage events, followed by explanation of how the 
journal articles and other scholarly writings illustrating such events were selected and examined. 
Identifying construct definitions.  I identified definitions for constructs where they were 
presented formally and also where they were implied by context or operationalization of the 
construct.  The previous example (Waldo, 1947: 242) included a formal definition for 
“cooperation” (“the bringing together or joint use of personnel or the bringing together or joint 
use of equipment or supplies”) but also implied the possibility of other definitions (i.e., in 
mentioning “other forms of cooperation”).  There is no formal definition provided for 
“purpose”—this author implies that it is commonly understood to relate to “cooperation” but also 
questions whether a “common purpose” is necessary for “cooperation” as he defines it.  A 
sample usage of “purpose” with a definition is:  “The members of a group must accept an 
enterprise purpose, i.e., they must be contributing their specialized services toward the 
attainment of an end which is specified for them.” (Tannenbaum, 1949: 225-226).  The formal 
definition suggested here for “purpose” would be understood to be “an end which is specified for 
[the members of a group].” 
Formal definitions also included typological classifications.  These were comparatively 
rare, but one example is that of Eaton (1948) who presents a detailed typology of “cooperation” 
including dimensions such as “Social Values” (Means/End), “Contact” (Direct/Indirect), 
“Activities” (Few/Many); “Time” (Defined/Undefined), “Structure” (Consumer/Producer); 
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“Cultural Setting” (Competitive/Individualistic/Co-operative); and “Status” (Hierarchical, Equal 
and Equitable). 
I also captured definitions from the operationalization of a construct, such as this 
description of choices in the Prisoner’s Dilemma game in an article regarding “cooperation”: 
“One of these choices may be considered cooperative, since it favors gains for both the 
participants, while the other may be considered competitive because it favors high personal gains 
at the other player’s expense” (Harrison & McClintock, 1965: 671-672).  Here, “gains for both 
the participants” is defined as “cooperative” activity, thus a condition of “cooperation.”  
Operationalization may also imply a definition through the measurement chosen (cf. Shenhav et 
al., 1994).  For example, when the determination of a company’s “organizational purpose” is 
made via SIC codes for various industry sectors (Guthrie, 1999), the implication follows that the 
“organizational purpose” is the industry in which the company participates. 
Identifying substitute language for constructs.  Efforts to introduce substitute 
terminology for a construct were sometimes quite explicit, such as in this example:  “It is thus 
assumed that in the case of all organizations there is something analogous to a ‘market’ for the 
output which constitutes the attainment of its goal (what Chester I. Barnard calls ‘organization 
purpose’)” (Parsons, 1956b: 65).  Here the author directly links his usage of “goal” with 
Barnard’s “purpose” and identifies the two as equivalent, but consistently employs the word 
“goal” in his own theoretical discussion.   
Substitutions may also be implied, as in Tannenbaum (1949: 226) which describes 
“purpose” as “the formal objective of all members of the group,” suggesting “objective” as a 
possible substitute term.  Reinforcing that signal, the author subsequently states:  “The function 
of organization begins with the objective of the enterprise, i.e., with the good or service to be 
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produced” (Tannenbaum, 1949: 234), here equating “objective” with the way that Barnard (1968 
[1938]) defined “purpose” (i.e., that the “purpose” of a shoe-manufacturing organization is to 
make shoes).  Less formally, an author’s listing of terms separated only by commas, without any 
conjunctions (such as “and” or “or”) between them to suggest their distinctiveness, implies they 
are different words for the same thing.  An example is this reference to a function of executive 
leadership “to formulate and define the purposes, objectives, ends of the organization” 
(Tannenbaum, 1949: 231).  Here both “objectives” and “ends” are implied by the author’s usage 
to be equivalents for “purpose.” 
Identifying objections to construct meanings.  Objections were often definitional, such 
as this objection to the idea of a singular organizational purpose, which is how the construct was 
initially used and defined by Barnard (1968 [1938]): “In truth no organizational unit, no matter 
how small and rudimentary, is single purpose” (Waldo, 1947: 241).  There may also be 
objections to the terminology itself, such as: “Strictly speaking, organizations do not have goals 
or ends or purposes.  These are subjective concepts properly attributable only to individuals” 
(Moore, 1962: 23).  Objections could also be raised to the application of a construct, signaling 
apparent meanings, such as this criticism of the use of “cooperation” in reference to labor and 
management relations: “Because management retains ultimate control of participative 
management experiments, these efforts are inherently inconsistent with the spirit of genuine 
cooperation” (Levitan & Johnson, 1983: 9).   
Identifying citations for construct meaning.  Given my focus on the evolution of 
specific constructs, I did not track all citations within articles but only those citations related to 
an author’s definition, usage or operationalization of a construct.  Such citations might include a 
direct quote, such as: “Etzioni defines an organizational goal as ‘a desired state of affairs which 
 74 
 
the organization attempts to realize’” (Gross, 1969: 278). Here the author cites Etzioni (1964: 6) 
as the source for his quotation, offering evidence of influence from that author and book.  An 
example of a similarly-explicit citation without a quotation is: “Following social psychologist 
Deutsch (1949:131-132), a cooperative social situation is one in which a person can attain his or 
her goal if, and only if, others do as well” (Gatewood, 1984: 350).   
I also captured citations without a direct quote that occurred in the context of definitional 
statements, such as:  “In most organizations there is a coherence of, a direction to, and an order 
in activities such that the organizations are or appear to be explicable in terms of some goal. 
Organizational purpose is postulated as the phenomenon that provides this order, direction, and 
coherence” (Warriner, 1965: 139).  This statement was followed immediately by a footnote 
including references to Etzioni (1960) and Selznick (1948), which I captured as a citation of the 
two articles in relation to Purpose. 
Identifying journal articles for construct usage events.  My searches for journal articles 
focused on the same databases as used for the Preliminary Survey, but I omitted book reviews 
from searches in this phase to focus only on theoretical and empirical research articles which 
offered primary source evidence of scientific construct use.  (For this time period I identified 
relevant books to examine based on citations of them for construct usage or definition within the 
journal articles, a process discussed in more detail below.)  Within JSTOR, in addition to the 
seven previously-identified disciplinary categories, I added the category of “Management and 
Organizational Behavior.”  JSTOR’s earliest journal classified in this category is the Public 
Administration Review, which was first published in 1940.  The category thus was unpopulated 
during the Preliminary Survey timeframe but is definitely relevant to my focus on the field of 
organizational scholarship.   
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I continued to include social science discipline publications during the period from 1938 
to 2005 based on evidence from Augier et al (2005) of ongoing citations of sources from these 
disciplines in late-20th-century and even early-21st-century research handbooks for organizational 
scholarship.  As in the Preliminary Survey, I supplemented JSTOR searches with searches in the 
PsycARTICLES database to cover APA publications and used the EBSCO database to search the 
Harvard Business Review.  Although many journals of interest in organizational scholarship 
(e.g., Academy of Management publications) were available in both JSTOR and EBSCO, I used 
JSTOR as the resource for searching them, due to its greater flexibility and precision in search 
options.  This allowed for a consistent approach in searching across the broadest possible reach 
of journals, as well as ability for full-text searching and easy data capture through cutting and 
pasting of text from article PDFs (OCR-quality scanning was often not available on the EBSCO 
PDFs).   
Journal article searches.  Finding relevant events of construct usage in the Construct 
Evolution Phase required a different search approach than for the Preliminary Survey.  As my 
aim was to capture the evolution of both Cooperation and Purpose as constructs, I had to develop 
a relatively efficient approach for identifying relevant usages for each of the initial terms, plus 
substitutes as they were introduced.  As noted, the search for “purpose” without a modifier 
would produce too many trivial matches.  To identify phrases or word combinations which might 
be helpful in targeting my searches, I conducted a series of searches in JSTOR across the eight 
journal disciplines to get counts of the distributions of specific words and phrases (e.g., 
“cooperation,” “organizational purpose,” “organizational goal”) or names that would suggest 
citations of significant works from the Preliminary Survey phase (e.g. Gulick & Urwick (1937), 
May & Doob (1937)).  Counting citations of those works directly through the Social Science 
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Citation Index (SSCI) was not helpful for informing this initial targeting, due to its lack of 
coverage prior to 1956, and I desired an approach that could produce consistent counts 
throughout the period of study.  I did several such text-based searches decade by decade from 
1938 through 2005.  Generally, the searches showed that the frequency of different phrases 
varied over time.  Figure 3.1 maps a selection of the search terms for illustration. 
FIGURE 3.1 – Construct Evolution Phase: Data for Preliminary Searches on Key Phrases 
Average number of articles per year during time periods 
  
As the figure shows, articles with full-text occurrences of “organizational purpose” were 
much less common than those mentioning “organizational goal,” and both rose in frequency 
from very low early levels toward a peak in the 1971-1980 timeframe.  Articles with 
“cooperation” (or variants) in their titles, by contrast, generally occurred more frequently than 
those with full-text occurrences of either of the other phrases, and rose steadily in numbers over 
the period.  Results of these searches for all phrases are provided as Appendix B. 
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These shifting counts suggested that I needed to allow for variation in the words or 
phrases that might be important over time, and that creating break points to allow for modifying 
and adding searches in later time periods based on construct evolution would be helpful.  This 
led to my strategy of breaking down the full period into sub-periods: 1938 to 1950; 1951 to 
1965; 1966 to 1985; 1986 to 2005.  Using somewhat shorter time periods earlier in the study 
allowed for closer attention to detail on construct evolution during this stage, consistent with 
recommendations that the emergent period of an institutional field warrants particularly close 
study (cf. Aldrich & Fiol, 1994).  These earlier periods were also not addressed by several prior 
studies of construct evolution (cf. Barley et al., 1988; Bartunek & Spreitzer, 2006; Shenhav et 
al., 1994), meaning that less is known about construct development during this time, so the 
breaking down of finer details could be valuable.  After the first two periods of 13 and 15 years 
respectively, I divided the remaining time of 40 years into two equal 20-year periods.  This 
allowed me to leverage the time investment required for initial article searches and selection over 
a slightly longer timeframe, offering relative consistency in length and still allowing for an 
adjustment in selection phrases before the final period of data capture. 
Steps in journal article selection.  For each time period, my selection of articles for 
examination and data capture involved several steps:   
1) Search for specific words and/or phrases occurring in the article’s title and/or full text 
(examples: “cooperation,” “organizational purpose”).  As in the Preliminary Survey, I allowed 
for variant spellings of “cooperation” and “cooperative,” this time employing the JSTOR 
capability for wildcard characters, as well as its flexibility to generate multiple words from a root 
(i.e., “cooperate#” will match with “cooperation,” “cooperative,” “cooperating,” etc.).  
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2) Examine matching articles by title to determine those to save for further review.  In 
this process, I focused on articles whose titles suggested their focus was on scholarly 
consideration of human activity within an organizational context (e.g., not international 
cooperation, not cooperation among animals), was not exclusively on the practice of 
“cooperation” as a form of enterprise (very common in the earliest periods), and, with “purpose” 
(or substitute terms), that the construct was employed primarily at an organizational level (versus 
individual).   
I also focused on saving articles that appeared in well-established journals (e.g., those 
commonly represented in the earlier survey such as American Journal of Sociology, American 
Sociological Review, Quarterly Journal of Economics, or Journal of Applied Psychology) and 
journals central to the emerging field of management scholarship, as suggested by their use in 
similar prior studies of theoretical development in the field (e.g., Lounsbury & Carberry, 2005; 
Shenhav et al., 1994; Walsh et al., 2003).  In JSTOR, this included special attention to articles 
appearing in Administrative Science Quarterly (ASQ), Academy of Management Journal (AMJ) 
(and its predecessor title, The Journal of the Academy of Management), Academy of 
Management Review (AMR), Organization Science and Strategic Management Journal (SMJ). 
In PsycARTICLES, the information about how many times an article was cited also 
appears in the screen with titles of search matches, and I generally saved the more highly-cited 
articles that appeared likely to be relevant.   
All saved article references were added to a database in the Endnote reference software 
with a comment stating what search had led to their identification, documenting this aspect of my 
methods for potential re-creation or verification if needed (Glass, 1989).  For purposes of 
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illustrating this process, Appendix C provides a comparative listing of items saved and a 
sampling of those not saved from two JSTOR searches. 
3)  If needed, filter saved articles for further examination.  From 1938 to 1950, all saved 
articles were examined.  In later periods, as journals and associated articles proliferated, filtering 
was applied to some search categories to winnow the articles to a reasonable number for detailed 
examination.  I adopted a target of examining an average of at least 10 articles per year during 
the search periods (i.e., at least 150 articles for the period from 1951 to 1965; at least 200 for 
each of the periods from 1966 to 1985 and 1986 to 2005).  I did not apply this year by year 
(some years yielded fewer than 10 articles even if all those saved were examined) but developed 
it as a baseline rule to allow a reasonable level of data coverage over all time periods while also 
making it feasible to complete the survey through 2005 as efficiently as possible.  My choice of 
10 reflected a round number (making the math to define the target simple) that allowed for close 
to a monthly frequency of article representation (i.e., 12 per year).  As most academic journals 
are quarterly or bi-monthly in frequency, it amounts to allowing for the possibility of, for 
example, two articles per quarter plus two additional articles.  This seemed to me a reasonable 
density to capture the discourse, especially since I followed additional procedures (discussed 
further below) to try to ensure complete capture of significantly-influential articles.   
I filtered articles based on likely theoretical interest and value in illustrating construct 
evolution.  Preference was given to those found through searches on a more specific phrase (e.g., 
“organizational purpose”) or to ones with key words in the title (versus only full-text), and to 
searches that had yielded the greatest proportion of relevant or distinctive articles in prior periods 
of examination.  The guidelines generally conform to principles for theoretical sampling (Strauss 
& Corbin, 1998) to seek sources providing variations that will enrich and deepen understanding 
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of concepts.  For those searches that had previously tended to yield repetitive or less-relevant 
articles, I filtered the saved articles by taking every second or third one from a list arranged in 
chronological sequence by year, so as to spread the filtering over the time period.  For example, 
as the usage of “cooperation” in the context of “prisoner’s dilemma” studies was largely 
repetitive and consistent, yielding little new information per article examined, every third article 
with this focus (from a list sorted in chronological order) was examined. 
4) Examine full text of remaining saved articles.  This process involved searching within 
the articles in PDF format for usage of “cooperation,” “purpose,” and prominent substitute terms.  
The within-article text searching was done independent of the match that caused the article to be 
selected (e.g., articles matched on “cooperation” were also searched for their usage of 
“purpose”), so that relevant usage of more than one construct could be identified. 
Articles that used the terms only sparsely or superficially (e.g., just one mention in 
passing, with no ability to discern the author’s intended meaning of the term from either 
discussions or usage in hypotheses or experimental study), were largely descriptions or 
discussions of other sources without original theoretical development (particularly if the only 
usage of the constructs of interest were in quotes from other sources), were extraneous items 
(e.g., letters to the editor or very brief, journalistic articles) or used the term primarily in ways 
other than the focus of interest (e.g., using “goals” primarily of individuals rather than of 
organizations) were excluded from further analysis.   
Some examples of articles excluded from further analysis after examination include:  
Devine (1964), which was largely a descriptive review of Cyert & March (1963); Milton & 
Montgomery (1969), which dealt with “technical cooperation” as a form of international aid; 
Pruitt (1980) which was a letter to the editor; and Locke, Latham & Erez (1988), which dealt 
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primarily with individual goals and goal-setting.   Just under 30% of examined articles were 
excluded from further analysis after examination.  Remaining articles, which all displayed 
meaningful usage of one or more of the constructs of interest, were on that basis categorized as 
relevant to Cooperation, Purpose or Both. 
Table 3.6 provides summary counts of articles from all time periods that were identified 
and retained from each step of this searching, saving and examination process.  A detailed 
breakdown listing every search for every database (i.e., JSTOR, PsycARTICLES, EBSCO), with 
similar counts and information about which searches were filtered and how, is provided as 
Appendix D. 
TABLE 3.6 – Construct Evolution: Summary Statistics on Searches by Time Period 
Period 1938 through 
1950 
1951 through 
1965 
1966 through 
1985 
1986 through 
2005 
Number of 
Searches 
Conducted 
26 27 32 24 
Articles Found 1079 1353 1758 1381 
Saved after 
Title-Scanning 
for Further 
Examination 
67 239 357 303 
Full-text 
Examined 
67 155 217 237 
Retained as 
Relevant to 
Construct(s) 
60 119 153 154 
 
Additional journal articles identified.  As the principles for analysis of process data 
(Langley, 1999) place a premium on completeness of collection of relevant events for study, I 
added steps to identify significant articles that might have been overlooked through my basic 
search process.  In the earliest search phase (1938-1950), when the number of articles overall 
was smaller, I examined within JSTOR the list of articles that cited ones identified by my search, 
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especially when the number of such citations was relatively high or the initial article particularly 
relevant (e.g., providing a clear definition).  Consistent with my use of titles to select initial 
articles for search, I made note of the references for articles whose titles seemed particularly 
likely to be relevant and kept them for later review, when they were examined by the same 
process as articles identified through regular searches.  Only those displaying meaningful usage 
of one or more of the constructs of interest were retained, and they were then categorized as 
relevant to Cooperation, Purpose or Both.  I discovered this process to be relatively inefficient in 
finding additional relevant articles, however, as the citations were rarely related to use of the 
constructs of interest, and I generally discontinued this step after the earliest search phase. 
As my focus was on identifying articles that were significant in the process of construct 
evolution, a more fruitful source for identifying those that had been overlooked by my basic 
search routine was the examination of articles cited by other articles for core definitions or 
operationalization of the constructs.  Here, I focused on examining articles cited frequently (e.g., 
Deutsch (1949b), Perrow (1961)) or those cited for distinctive points (e.g., Granger (1964) which 
was the first I saw with “objectives” in the title, and Hildreth (1994), which offered a rare 
example of the use of “purpose” in the 1990s).  This corresponds with my interests in identifying 
influential authors (through the frequency of citation) and in identifying significant events in the 
chronology of construct evolution (e.g., the “first” or “latest” occurrences).  Again, these articles 
were examined through the same process as those identified through regular searches, and those 
displaying meaningful usage of one or more of the constructs of interest were retained were then 
categorized as relevant to Cooperation, Purpose or Both.   
Finally, in addition to additional articles identified from citations, a search of the 
publication Personnel Journal conducted as part of the Preliminary Survey had identified an 
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article published in 1940 with “cooperation” in the title, having unique interest as the earliest 
such article focusing on the subject of “cooperation” in organizational context, and this was also 
included with the Construct Evolution data.   
Overall, twelve additional articles were added to the Construct Evolution data due to 
citations of or by other identified articles, and eight articles were restored on this basis that had 
been found and saved in searches but subsequently filtered out from detailed examination.  The 
final set of articles from which full data was captured included 262 relevant to Cooperation and 
304 relevant to Purpose, with 67 articles overlapping between streams (i.e., in the Both 
category).   Table 3.7 lists totals for each by the data periods of searching. 
TABLE 3.7 – Construct Evolution:  Articles Identified for Each Construct by Time Period 
Spreadsheet Totals Reviewed* Cooperation Purpose Both 
1938-1950 73 34 18 13 
1951-1965 157 31 63 27 
1966-1985 222 49 90 18 
1986-2005 239 81 66 9 
TOTALS 691 195 237 67 
Totals for each 
Construct including 
“Both” items 262 304 
* Includes not only articles identified through basic searching but those found through citations. 
Data captured on events of construct usage.  For those articles that included relevant 
events of construct usage, specific data elements were captured as previously specified in Table 
3.5.  All data were stored in Microsoft Excel spreadsheets.  A sampling of five articles from each 
of the categories of Cooperation, Purpose and Both, with the full set of data elements captured 
for each, is provided as Appendix E.  
Coding of journals by discipline.  Most of the data described was captured directly, 
without additional coding being required.  For example, construct definitions were copied 
verbatim, cited sources were copied by name, and names of the author’s institution of 
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employment or departmental discipline were taken down as listed within the article.  To group 
the journals into disciplinary categories, however, some additional coding was required.  All 
APA journals (articles found through the PsycARTICLES database) were classified as 
“Psychology” and the Harvard Business Review (searched through EBSCO) was classified as 
“Business.”  JSTOR journals were coded based upon a system developed from JSTOR’s own 
disciplinary classifications.  When the journal was assigned by JSTOR to only one of the eight 
categories selected for searching (Anthropology, Business, Economics, Management and 
Organizational Behavior, Political Science, Psychology, Public Policy & Administration and 
Sociology), or to only one of these plus one or more categories from outside this list (e.g., 
Religion or Education), the journal was coded with the corresponding category among these 
eight.   
In cases where JSTOR assigned journals to more than one category among these eight, I 
applied a hierarchy of categories to provide unique codes in my study.  Given my focus on 
organizational scholarship, I gave first priority to the “Management and Organizational 
Behavior” category—all journals assigned by JSTOR to this category were coded as such, 
regardless of other categories also associated with them.  After this filter had been applied, I gave 
similar priority to the “Public Policy & Administration” category, which was the next most 
closely-aligned with organizational scholarship.  I accordingly coded remaining journals 
assigned by JSTOR to this category to the same category in my study.  Turning to the rest of the 
journals, I coded those assigned to two or more core social science disciplines (i.e., Economics & 
Sociology, Economics & Political Science, or Sociology & Psychology) as “Blended Social 
Science.”  This left a remaining set of journals all coded as both “Business” and “Economics” in 
JSTOR.  Believing that the choice of title is an important signal of a journal’s focus, similar to 
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the important signaling conveyed by organizational names (cf. Glynn & Abzug, 2002), I 
assigned each journal to the category that was reflected in its title:  Where the journal title 
included the word “economic,” I coded the journal as “Economics,” and where the journal title 
included the word “business,” I coded the journal as “Business.”  As none of these journals had 
both “business” and “economic” in their titles, this resolved all remaining overlaps. 
Finally, there were two journals represented by articles that had been identified outside of 
the database searches—Human Relations and Personnel Journal.  To categorize these, I looked 
up statements regarding the current or founding intent of that journal.  On the website for Human 
Relations (www.tavinstitute.org/humanrelations/about_journal/aims.html), I found a statement 
emphasizing that the journal was founded “in the belief that social scientists should work 
together to combine their disciplinary knowledge in an attempt to understand the character and 
complexity of human problems.”  Due to this and other similar emphases of the journal’s focus 
on interdisciplinary work in the social sciences, I coded it in the “Blended Social Science” 
category.  For Personnel Journal, this journal continues under the name Workforce Management. 
On its website (www.workforce.com), I found the statement that its features “often focus on how 
organizations manage a major asset—the company’s people—to maximize contribution to the 
bottom line.”  Based on this emphasis, I coded this journal in the “Management and 
Organizational Behavior” category.  Table 3.8 provides a list of the nine resulting categories, 
with a listing of key journals within each and a count of the articles coded by category. 
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TABLE 3.8 – Construct Evolution:  Codings for Journal Disciplines  
Journal Discipline Number of 
Articles 
Coded 
Top Three Journals in Category (based on 
Number of Articles Captured for Study) 
Anthropology 5 American Anthropologist, American Ethnologist, 
Man 
Blended Social 
Sciences 
28 Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 
Sociometry, Social Psychology Quarterly 
Business 41 Harvard Business Review, Journal of Business 
Ethics, Journal of Business (U. of Chicago) 
Economics 22 Southern Economic Journal, The American 
Economic Review, The Quarterly Journal of 
Economics 
Management & 
Organizational 
Behavior 
180 Administrative Science Quarterly, Academy of 
Management Journal, Strategic Management 
Journal 
Political Science 51 The Journal of Conflict Resolution, American 
Political Science Review, Review of Politics 
Psychology 91 Journal of Personality & Social Psychology, 
Journal of Applied Psychology, Journal of 
Abnormal and Social Psychology 
Public 
Administration 
8 Journal of Public Administration Research and 
Theory: J-PART, Journal of Public Policy, Policy 
Sciences 
Sociology 78 American Sociological Review, The American 
Journal of Sociology, Social Forces 
Total 504   
 
Identifying construct usage events in books and other resources.  In addition to articles, 
books and some additional resources (e.g., Perrow (1968), an entry in the International 
Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences) were examined to add to the data on construct usage.  
Similar to the principles for selecting cited articles for further review, the books examined were 
drawn from those cited by articles for core definitions or operationalization of the constructs.  
Again, I focused on examining books cited frequently (e.g., Cyert & March (1963), Axelrod 
(1984)) or those of interest for their distinctiveness (e.g., Moore (1962) which was the first I saw 
cited for the concept of “mission,” and Van Vugt et al (2000b), which was the latest cited 
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resource with “cooperation” in its title).  Two books so identified were originally published prior 
to 1938 but were examined based on citations by authors during the Construct Evolution period 
and their potential for interest due to associations with significant authors (Lewin (1935) due to 
the author’s association as a mentor of Morton Deutsch, later widely cited for his definition of 
“cooperation,”  and MacIver (1931), cited both in the Construct Evolution period and by May & 
Doob (1937)) .  Although I did not apply a strict rule of examining books with a set minimum 
number of citations, when I assembled the list of highly-cited authors at a later stage of analysis I 
observed that all authors cited three or more times in journal articles were represented by at least 
one book or article examined, with the exception of Argyle (1991).  As this book was cited just 
four times and without reference to what appeared to be any distinctive definitional points, I 
elected not to take the time to examine it for incorporation in the study at that stage, but do 
acknowledge the omission as a possible limitation of my work.    
My process of data collection for events of construct usage from books during this phase 
was very similar to that used to review texts for meanings during the Preliminary Survey.  I 
employed the table of contents and index to identify pages or sections of interest dealing with 
“cooperation” or “purpose,” but during the Construct Evolution phase I also looked for uses of 
substitute terms (e.g., “goal,” “mission,” “objective” for “purpose”).  My core data collection 
process continued to be taking notes on these books and resources, writing out significant quotes 
verbatim with page references, in spiral-bound notebooks dedicated to my research project.  
Table 3.9 lists the books examined with this focus. 
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TABLE 3.9 – Construct Evolution:  Books examined for Construct Usage Events  
Andrews, K. R. 1971. The concept of corporate strategy. Homewood, Ill.: Dow Jones-Irwin, Inc. 
Argyris, C. 1957. Personality and organization; the conflict between system and the individual. New 
York: Harper. 
Axelrod, R. M. 1984. The evolution of cooperation. New York: Basic Books. 
Barnard, C. I. 1968 [1938]. The functions of the executive (30th anniversary ed.). Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press. 
Blau, P. M. & Scott, W. R. 1962. Formal organizations: A comparative approach. San Francisco: 
Chandler Pub. Co. 
Cyert, R. M. & March, J. G. 1963. A behavioral theory of the firm. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall. 
Drucker, P. F. 1954. The practice of management. New York: Harper. 
Drucker, P. F. 1974. Management: Tasks, responsibilities, practices. New York: Harper & Row. 
Etzioni, A. (ed.) 1961. Complex organizations: A sociological reader. New York: Holt, Rinehart and 
Winston 
Etzioni, A. 1964. Modern organizations. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall. 
Hoslett, S. 1951. Human factors in management (2nd ed.). New York: Harper & Brothers. 
Johnson, D. W. & Johnson, R. T. 1989. Cooperation and competition: Theory and research. Edina, 
Minn.: Interaction Book Co. 
Lewin, K. 1935. A dynamic theory of personality; selected papers (D. K. Adams & K. E. Zener, Trans.). 
New York and London: McGraw-Hill. 
Luce, R. D. & Raiffa, H. 1957. Games and decisions: Introduction and critical survey. New York: Wiley. 
MacIver, R. M. 1931. Society; its structure and changes. New York: R. Long & R. R. Smith, inc. 
March, J. G. & Simon, H. A. 1958. Organizations. New York: Wiley. 
Marwell, G. & Schmitt, D. R. 1975. Cooperation: An experimental analysis. New York: Academic Press. 
Mayo, E. 1933. Human problems of an industrial civilization. New York: Macmillan Co. 
Mayo, E. 1945. The social problems of an industrial civilization. Andover, Mass.: Andover Press. 
Moore, W. E. 1962. The conduct of the corporation. New York: Random House. 
Organ, D. W. 1988. Organizational citizenship behavior: The good soldier syndrome. Lexington, Mass.: 
Lexington Books. 
Perrow, C. 1979. Complex organizations:  A critical essay (2nd ed.). Glenview, Ill.: Scott, Foresman and 
Co. 
Roethlisberger, F. J. & Dickson, W. J. 1939. Management and the worker; an account of a research 
program conducted by the western electric company, Hawthorne works, Chicago. Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press. 
Roethlisberger, F. J. 1941. Management and morale. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 
Simon, H. A., Smithburg, D. W., & Thompson, V. A. 1950. Public administration. New York: Knopf. 
Simon, H. A. 1976 [1947]. Administrative behavior (3rd ed.). New York: Free Press. 
Snyder, R. C., Bruck, H. W., & Sapin, B. M. 1954. Decision-making as an approach to the study of 
international politics. [Princeton]: Organizational Behavior Section, Princeton University. 
Thompson, J. D. 2006 [1967]. Organizations in action. New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Publishers. 
Urwick, L. F. 1952. Notes on the theory of organization. New York: American Management Association. 
Van Vugt, M., Snyder, M., Tyler, T. R., & Biel, A. (Eds.). 2000. Cooperation in modern society: 
Promoting the welfare of communities, states, and organizations. London; New York: Routledge. 
 
 89 
 
Additional primary and secondary sources consulted.  For additional background on 
author characteristics and historical context, I consulted additional primary and secondary 
resources.  Unlike in the Preliminary Survey period, however, I did not review each resource and 
take detailed notes but rather consulted them to address specific questions (e.g., “What scholars 
were prominent in Columbia’s sociology department at or before Etzioni’s arrival?” – addressed 
by consulting Haveman (2009); or “When did linear programming emerge as a significant 
econometric decision tool?” – addressed by consulting Cooper & Charnes (1953) and related 
references).  Among such resources consulted were documents of scholarly biography or 
autobiography (e.g., Deutsch, 1999; Simon, 1991; Wolf, 1974), prior studies of the evolution of 
organizational and management theory and university-based business education (e.g., Gillespie, 
1991; Guillen, 1994; Khurana, 2007), and initial issues of key journals (to identify early journal 
direction and scholars notably involved with establishing the journal).   
Analysis of Construct Evolution Process 
As with the Preliminary Survey phase, my process of data collection during the Construct 
Evolution phase was interwoven with preliminary data analysis steps, including the recording of 
reflective remarks (Miles & Huberman, 1994) as part of the data capture spreadsheet and the 
ongoing practice of memoing (Strauss & Corbin, 1998) in my spiral-bound notebooks which 
were also used for note-taking on books employing the constructs.  Upon completion of data 
collection, however, I shifted to a more formal analysis phase to begin developing the 
“construction of a detailed story from the raw data” (Langley, 1999: 695), characteristic of the 
“narrative strategy” for analyzing process data, and consistent with the historiographic approach 
(Ventresca & Mohr, 2002) of organizational researchers such as Chandler (1962).   
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My first step was to create matrix displays (Miles & Huberman, 1994) on printed sheets 
reflecting key elements from the data capture template.  I focused on representing key columns 
from the data capture instrument (author, year, article name, journal, author’s school, discipline, 
construct definition, citations (by article and of article), operationalization and comments) that 
could be legibly represented on front and back of an 8.5 x 11 sheet of paper, making a visual 
review possible to help identify patterns.  I created two printouts—one that included a complete 
stream of the Cooperation/Both articles, and one that included Purpose/Both articles—consistent 
with the advice to develop understanding of separate cases (in the sense that each construct 
offered a “case” or instance of construct evolution) individually before attempting to integrate 
findings (Miles & Huberman, 1994).   
I began with the Cooperation/Both printout, reading through the spreadsheets 
chronologically and highlighting and taking notes to identify key events—such as those that 
“cause new events, or move the process forward into a new phase” (Miles & Huberman, 1994: 
111).  For my study, due to an interest in distinguishing sustained from unsustained meanings, I 
was identifying not just events that led to change but attempts to introduce a particular meaning 
or operationalization for a construct, introduction or usage of a substitute term for it, or objection 
to prior term or usage of construct, whether or not they were successful.  I captured observations 
of such events through highlights and marginal notes on the printouts and through creating a 
handwritten chronological listing of key articles and their significance as I moved through the 
charts. 
These handwritten notes became the skeleton of a preliminary outline, which I filled in 
through integration of the journal article material with dates and material from published books 
utilizing the construct.  I combined the findings from the Preliminary Survey regarding 
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Cooperation with this narrative outline, expanding it into an initial, largely descriptive, written 
draft of the process of construct evolution for Cooperation, with an introductory section devoted 
to the Preliminary Survey and a narrative of the Construct Evolution Phase.  The basic process 
coheres with the steps of building from an “event listing” to “focused narrative” to gain a “first 
basic grasp of what happened” (Miles & Huberman, 1994: 114), while remaining open to adding 
and subtracting events later as the relative significance to the story becomes clearer.  I repeated a 
similar process with the Purpose/Both printouts, reviewing the chronological spreadsheets, 
taking notes to build an outline, and then combining it with introductory data from the 
Preliminary Survey to expand it into a similarly-descriptive written draft. 
After the initial narratives for the separate constructs had been drafted, I began to take 
steps of cross-case analysis (Miles & Huberman, 1994) through comparison between 
Cooperation and Purpose.  The step of cross-case analysis is recommended to help strengthen the 
findings for a “narrative strategy” beyond the insights suggested by a single case (Chandler, 
1962; Langley, 1999).  Since attempting to compare narratives is complex, I supplemented this 
comparison through selective use of a “quantification strategy” (Langley, 1999), drawing 
primarily from journal article data.  This allowed me to compare key characteristics for the two 
constructs visually side-by-side to help identify points of contrast and potential explanatory 
variables related to my research questions.  Displays associated with these quantification 
strategies are incorporated in the comparative findings of Chapter Six. 
I created charts mapping the trends in quantities of analyzed articles related to each 
construct over time, the proportions of articles appearing in different journal categories, and the 
percentage of articles where the constructs were operationalized.  As my theoretical sampling 
approach for journal articles was oriented toward generalization for theory rather than 
 92 
 
generalization about the characteristics of the population of journal articles as a whole (Yin, 
2003), these trends had to be viewed with caution.  In particular, the filtering I did on articles 
regarding “prisoner’s dilemma” would have reduced the overall volume of articles more for 
Cooperation than for Purpose, so the total quantities are definitely not suitable for comparison 
(i.e., a higher article count for Purpose than for Cooperation does not mean that it generated 
more interest in absolute terms).   
As a corrective against relying on these trends alone as indicative of patterns of increase 
or decrease in journal article publications related to the constructs, I attempted to triangulate this 
limited evidence with data from other sources (Yin, 2003), examining these trends in comparison 
with dates and specific events identified in the narratives regarding construct usage and historical 
context (e.g., the initial introduction of organizational journals, which expanded opportunities for 
publication on organizational theory, or the opportunity for operationalization of “cooperation” 
that emerged through initial “prisoner’s dilemma” studies).  Another data source was the 
searches of word occurrences in JSTOR articles that I had conducted as a preliminary step during 
data collection (see prior discussion and illustration in Figure 3.1), which displayed similar 
trends.  The general correspondences among these data sources helped support use of these 
trends as comparable indicators of rising and falling research activity for these constructs within 
the context of my study.   
I further quantified data about authors and specific articles or books cited in relation to 
each construct.  This was of particular importance for my research questions concerning the 
factors related to sustained meanings and influential authors, as these were primarily identified 
through citations.  Here again I leveraged visual displays for comparison (Miles & Huberman, 
1994), placing the data for highly-cited authors side-by-side in columns for each construct, as 
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well as comparing it with patterns of citation in articles related to both constructs.  This allowed 
me to spot patterns of comparison and contrast in characteristics of highly-cited authors.  I also 
compared the characteristics of these cited authors and sustained meanings with incidents in the 
narrative where efforts to influence construct meaning were not cited by later authors.  While 
anecdotal, this evidence suggested some potential distinguishing factors between instances 
between sustained versus unsustained meanings and influential versus non-influential actors, 
informed by comparison with anticipated characteristics of interest from the theoretical factors 
such as resources of social and cultural capital (Bourdieu, 1986) or actor strategies such as 
boundary-work (Gieryn, 1983). 
Sharpening the insights from the initial drafts of findings for each construct and for the 
comparison of them came through the production of successive drafts that incorporated further 
review and integration of theory.  The chronological narrative, for example, allowed me to 
compare my observations of the unfolding process for each construct with the process model of 
construct evolution previously created by Hirsch & Levin (1999), offering me the opportunity to 
observe confirming incidents as well as anomalies by comparison to this chronological model 
(Yin, 2003).  I could also compare the contrasting rhetorical cycles from Barley & Kunda (1992) 
with the characteristics of sustained and unsustained meanings that I observed and their relative 
occurrence in time.  Strategically embellishing the story involved additional exploration of 
primary and secondary sources to verify details or answer clarifying questions about authors and 
historical context that arose during the construction of the narrative (e.g., “When was the first 
issue of the Journal of Conflict Resolution published?”).   
During analysis I also continuously returned to the original data capture documents from 
both the Preliminary Survey Phase and the Construct Evolution phase, using word searches or 
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the “filtering” feature within Excel to identify specific text examples or sets of records to 
examine to help flesh out a point of interest.  For example, due to the focus of the Preliminary 
Survey word searches on “cooperation,” I found my understanding of meanings of “purpose” to 
be less fully-developed and returned to the original document while drafting the findings on 
Purpose to do more word searches for its occurrences and help refresh and confirm for me the 
patterns of its usage. 
This process of successive narrative drafts in rotation (repeating through several cycles in 
the original order of Cooperation, Purpose, then Comparison) was accompanied by ongoing 
memoing (Strauss & Corbin, 1998) and continually deepening levels of understanding through 
comparison between theory and cases, culminating in the Findings chapters (Chapters Four, Five 
and Six) currently included in this dissertation and the summarized discussion provided. 
Chapter Summary 
 In this chapter, I described my overall research methods for addressing my research 
questions regarding the evolution in meaning and usage of the theoretical constructs of 
Cooperation and Purpose in organizational scholarship.  I detailed my process of data collection 
for the Preliminary Survey and Construct Evolution Phases, providing steps and illustration of 
data collection and coding.  Finally, I summarized my analysis process.
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CHAPTER 4:  FINDINGS - COOPERATION 
 In this chapter I review findings regarding the construct evolution process for 
Cooperation.  To develop understanding of the historical context and meanings associated with 
the word “cooperation” immediately prior to 1938, I begin with a preliminary survey focused on 
its usage in the social sciences through 1937.  I illustrate how “cooperation” became a significant 
ideal in proposed solutions to both U.S. and international concerns during this period.  Linkage 
of “cooperation” with the Christian Socialist organizational philosophy and with sociological 
models of evolutionary societal development caused the term to become strongly associated with 
voluntarism, altruism and egalitarian principles.  Applications of it to capitalist, hierarchical or 
coercive settings were thus often contested by social scientists as illegitimate. By 1937, 
“cooperation” had become a central term in efforts to create fundable social science research, 
and the discipline of psychology gained authority over defining the construct for scientific study.  
Tracking the construct’s development from 1938 through 2005, I illustrate how attempts by 
Barnard and others to apply “cooperation” in hierarchical or capitalistic settings, violating prior 
assumptions about its meaning among social scientists, largely failed to be sustained.  Instead, a 
definition conforming to theoretical and experimental frameworks from psychology, and 
congenial with contemporary interests in research on conflict resolution, became dominant.  
Definitions of “cooperation” that incorporated shared task dimensions or applied it to 
organizational work were largely restricted to instances conforming to the term’s prior 
associations with voluntarism, altruism or absence of hierarchy. 
Preliminary Survey:  “Cooperation” through 1937 
“Cooperation” an ideal from Progressive Era through the New Deal.  The historical 
context of the late 19th and early 20th centuries saw “cooperation” operating as a central public 
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and social ideal in the U.S.  One scholar referred to cooperation as “spirit of the times” 
(Melendy, 1901: 462).  Another observed, “In times like the present the idea of consolidation or 
cooperation to secure any purpose is rampant” (Pfahler, 1903: 188).  The Annals of the American 
Academy of Political and Social Science offered issue after issue in the early 1900s stressing 
benefits to be gained through “cooperation” in an astonishing range of activities–from charities 
(Carstens, 1907; Mangold, 1907) to eliminating houseflies (Hatch, 1911), river improvements 
(Harts, 1911), park development (Nolen, 1910) and garbage collection (Lovejoy, 1912).  
Urbanization and its attendant social ills offered a focal arena for the prescribed remedy of 
“cooperation,” a concept almost synonymous in the period with “progress” and thus quite at the 
heart of Progressive rhetoric.    
Cooperation moved from a national to international ideal as the conclusion of World War 
I brought the formation of the League of Nations, with “international cooperation” central among 
its stated aims (cf. Snow, 1919: 473).  The U.S.’s failure to join the League brought 
disappointment to many Progressives, and the decision was framed as a failure to cooperate:  
“America…must either cooperate with the nations of the world and build up a new world 
founded upon law and order, or she must compete in the old mad way in building up armaments 
which leads to universal disaster.” (Tuttle, 1923: 213).  Despite this setback, however, the ideal 
remained strong, with proponents still claiming, “This is becoming essentially an age of 
cooperation, and the value of it is evidenced by concrete achievement and improvement in every 
avenue of human endeavor” (Davis, 1929: 114).   
With the Great Depression came “New Deal” policies emphasizing “cooperation” at the 
industrial and national level as essential to U.S. economic recovery.  Some suggested this should 
be achieved by compulsion if necessary:  “Cooperation has been advocated at meetings of 
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associations as the only vehicle which can get the industry out of the mire. Within the industry an 
opinion is crystallizing to the effect that non-cooperators must be dealt with vigorously” 
(Kendall, 1931: 141).  More and more, advocates of “cooperation” as a panacea for social and 
economic ills faced the reality of non-cooperators and struggled, in the context of ideals 
surrounding the word, to address this in acceptable terms.  The voluntarism that had historically 
been associated with cooperation might no longer be sufficient:  “[I]n the solving of the 
problems of democracy and the elimination of conflicts of society, types of planned cooperation 
shall be substituted for spontaneous cooperation that has passed with the simple pioneer life of 
the older order” (Stalcup, 1931: 31). Signaling the conflicts emerging between idealized 
meanings and pragmatic application of the term, Potter (1935) created an amazingly broad 
definition of “international cooperation” for his research that included both voluntary and 
involuntary, conscious and unconscious, organized and unorganized, and even partially coercive 
forms of coordinated activity.    
These developments illustrate a historical context in which “cooperation” was the 
hallmark ideal of important national and international social agendas.  To be on the side of 
“cooperation” was to be on the side of progress and peace, while to oppose it was to be 
reactionary.  Its status as an ideal, however, also made its meaning the subject of contention, with 
an early focal point being the question of whether voluntarism was essential to genuine 
cooperation. 
“Cooperation” in organizations:  Socialistic or capitalistic?  During this period, 
“cooperation” (and especially “co-operation”) was commonly used to refer to a socialistic form 
of industrial organization.  Indeed, this meaning was readily assumed if the word was used on its 
own – a book or article entitled “A History of Cooperation” would deal with cooperative 
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industrial practices.  Several of the initial issues of Publications of the American Economic 
Association are monographs of this sort (Bemis, 1886; Shaw, 1886; Warner, 1887).  Even more 
significantly, usage of “cooperative system,” though much less frequent, was predominantly 
associated with such organizational concepts (cf. Brown & Hinrichs, 1931; Clarke, 1863; 
Landheer, 1933; Pratt, 1912; Yarros, 1919).  Showing the prominence of this contemporary 
usage of “cooperation,”  the definition of “Cooperation” in the Encyclopaedia of Social Sciences 
(Seligman & Johnson, 1930) was exclusively concerned with this notion, describing attempts at 
such organized “cooperation” in more than 15 different countries around the world. 
The origin for this use of the term was typically traced to Robert Owen and the Christian 
Socialists, who in the early 19th century named “cooperation” as the organizing principle for a 
planned community of mutual sharing in economic life (cf. Harrison, 1894; Podmore, 1905).  As 
described in the Encyclopaedia of Social Sciences, Owen advocated “cooperation as the basis of 
a new social and economic order…far more purposive and conscious than the involuntary and 
formless cooperation which is coextensive with society itself,” casting his ideal of cooperation in 
explicit opposition to “the principles of laissez-faire and competition” (Gluck, 1930: 359-360).  
By the late 19th century, however, variations had emerged in the specific practices considered to 
qualify as “cooperation” in this sense.  While some even considered employer profit-sharing 
plans as a form of or step toward cooperation, others still stressed the movement’s original, anti-
capitalist zeal: “Cooperation aims at abolishing, not economic rent, but industrial competition, 
and it has positively no vision of anything beyond ownership by cooperative groups” (Webb, 
1889: 52).   
Indeed, one writer alleged that opportunistic businesses were exploiting the positive 
associations of “cooperation” by using the terminology in their firm’s name without adopting 
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any of its core concepts (Tousley, 1913: 237).  According to another:  “Cooperation as a word or 
term is much abused.  Demagogues have learned its power, and are using it in various ways to 
deceive the people for the purpose of financial gain” (Stickney, 1913a: 203).  Triumphant 
pronouncements (“[C]ooperation will win out. It is winning everywhere” (Stickney, 1913b: 
227)) were giving way to pessimistic assessments of its failure (“[C]ooperation is becoming a 
dead letter” (Stockton, 1931: 270)), along with differing assessments of the importance of 
maintaining integrity to original egalitarian and socialistic ideals for “cooperation.” 
Complicating the picture of how “cooperation” in an organizational sense should be 
defined, or if it was a desirable solution for societal needs, were widely-publicized 
implementations of “cooperation” in Soviet Russia and Mussolini’s Italy.  Stated one writer 
regarding Soviet collective farming:  “Certainly the kolkhoz is not a co-operative form in the 
meaning of co-operation which is understood in the Western world” (Meyendorff, 1931: 453).  A 
writer reviewing a book on Mussolini’s purported advances of “cooperation” in Italy through 
statewide organization of the industrial system offered cautious and decidedly ambivalent 
assessments: “There was a great co-operative movement in pre-Fascist Italy; there is a greater 
now. And by all the accepted tests of co-operation, saving only the freedom, if it so desires, to 
enter into politics, the co-operation (our author contends) is genuine” (Fay, 1935: 360).   Again, 
the question of how much voluntarism was essential to “real” cooperation clouded the issue of 
what might otherwise have been touted as successful application of the ideal.  
Despite such strong associations with socialist movements, “cooperation” was also being 
applied in capitalist business contexts.  The phrase “cooperation of labor and capital” was almost 
proverbial during this period as a definition of the operation of industrial economy, repeatedly 
used without citation as though it were regarded as common knowledge.  Moreover, the business 
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corporation was characterized as enabling cooperation:  “The corporation is an association of 
persons combined for common ends. The primary principle of economic and social advantage in 
corporate organization is to be found in the broader co-operation made possible thereby” 
(Cleveland, 1905: 53).  
In the Progressive era, “cooperation” was also used to describe industrial alliances more 
pejoratively called “trusts” or “combinations.”  Defending such arrangements, some argued that 
they were indeed a reflection of natural societal progress: “The industrial combine is the product 
of evolution and not the creature of invention, as is widely though erroneously 
supposed…Unrestricted competition had proven a deceptive mirage, and … it was perfectly 
natural that the idea of rational co-operation in lieu of cut-throat competition should suggest 
itself” (Gwynn, 1912: 126).  This led in turn to the argument that legislation to curb such 
“cooperation” was short-sighted:  “Monopoly in private hands, if unrestrained, produces greater 
evils than competition itself. But if it has come in pursuance to a natural law, as inevitable as 
gravitation, how can it be annihilated without crippling or annihilating the industry in which it 
exists?” (Foulke, 1912: 408).  Whether socialist, Marxist, fascist or capitalist, all of the era’s 
economic and political philosophies sought to present themselves as legitimate embodiments of 
“cooperation,” reinforcing the importance attached to the term. 
Under these circumstances, it is no surprise that Frederick Taylor made repeated usage of 
the word in his book laying out the key principles of Scientific Management.  He specified, for 
example, that “close, intimate, personal cooperation between the management and the men is of 
the essence of modern scientific…management” (Taylor, 2008 [1911]: 14).  Given the 
precedents of the word’s usage as a socialist and egalitarian ideal, Taylor’s language also 
sparked predictable resistance.  As one writer put it:  “No one denies that government with the 
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consent of the governed, consultation with employees on questions related to their welfare, in 
short all efforts made to enlist the sympathy and co-operation of the working force, promote 
efficiency.  But this is far from ‘industrial democracy’” (Flexner, 1923: 78).  While early writers 
on Scientific Management echoed the emphasis on cooperation and the human element from 
Taylor (Carlton, 1912; Cooke, 1913), within a few years “technique” and “system” took the 
more central place in descriptions (Beyer & Dunn, 1919; Hathaway, 1919).  As desirability of 
“cooperation” as an ideal remained high at this time, abandonment of the term suggests that its 
application within a capitalist setting was simply unsustainable. 
Outside of Taylor, contemporary authors in the field of “personnel administration” also 
invoked “cooperation” in business.  Responding to a call for business-related studies in the new 
Journal of Applied Psychology (JAP), an essay in its second issue suggested an urgent need “to 
develop growth in the capacity for, and to establish the machinery for practice in the habits of co-
operation” (Metcalf, 1917: 176).   The author, Henry Metcalf, was himself a writer and editor, 
along with Ordway Tead, of several books in “personnel administration,” a field defined in part 
as aiming to foster within organizations “an animating spirit of cooperation” (Tead & Metcalf, 
1933: 2).  The area gained enough credibility to merit an entry (authored by Tead) in the 
Encyclopaedia of Social Sciences (Seligman & Johnson, 1930).  While their use of “scientific” 
language resembled Taylorism, Metcalf and Tead emphasized motivational concepts instead of 
time studies, suggesting, for example, that “a genuinely cooperative attitude gradually develops 
only where there are in progress wisely conceived experiments and procedures which look to a 
greater harmonizing of purposes and objectives” (1933: 12).  However, Metcalf’s brief 
conceptual essay in the JAP sparked no immediate flow of journal articles on this research 
agenda for “cooperation” in a business context. 
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Yet one more contemporary attempt to apply “cooperation” in business was the practice 
of “labor-management cooperation.”  The phrase began to be touted by the American Federation 
of Labor in the early 1920s (Tead, 1935; Trepp, 1933), seemingly a face-saving response to 
characterizations of union activity as impeding post-war recovery or obstructing the advance of 
“cooperation” as prescribed by Scientific Management:  “Following the union debacle and the 
disappearance of progressivism, union-management co-operation was elevated to a cardinal 
principle, and was substituted for belligerency as the program of voluntarism” (Saposs, 1935: 
243).  Here again, the link to “voluntarism” is emphasized.  A partnership for workplace 
improvements between the B&O Railroad and its union workers gained publicity for its success 
(Wood, 1931), leading to more books discussing “union-management cooperation.” 
While application of “cooperation” to socialistic organizational forms came first and was 
still a prominent aspect of its meaning in the 1930s, its positive associations were being drawn 
upon in capitalist organizational applications as well.  Generally, however, the efforts to apply 
the term in such settings were contested, often facing objections related to the voluntaristic and 
egalitarian ideals associated with the word.  In this era, to term something “cooperation” was 
equivalent to giving it social endorsement, and self-applications of the honorific were 
controversial, whether by Fascists in Italy or Taylorists in America. 
Sociology:  “Cooperation” as natural evolutionary phenomenon or imposed social 
control?  Scholarly writing of the mid-to-late 19th century, the period when social science 
disciplines generally emerged (Ross, 1979), was increasingly dominated by principles of 
evolution and Darwinian natural selection.  These became the ultimate scientific tools, keys to 
the demystification of biological life and human development.  Early sociologists such as 
Auguste Comte and Herbert Spencer presented process models to explain the evolution of human 
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society, and Spencer’s theory of societal evolution, explored and extended in several 19th-century 
textbooks, became particularly popular in the U.S. (Wiltshire, 1978). Though later scholars 
deemphasized Spencer’s explicit physical analogies (e.g., of society as an “organism”), the 
evolutionary ideas remained prominent, with Spencer being repeatedly cited.  A contemporary 
survey of sources mentioned in American texts and collegiate syllabi on social theory (Hart, 
1927) shows Spencer scoring 90 percent out of a possible 100, the top author and slightly ahead 
of Comte (who scored 83 percent).   
The impact of Spencer’s work is notable for his reinforcement of voluntarism as an 
essential element of true or ideal cooperation.  His writings emphasized a distinction between 
“voluntary” cooperation and “coercive” or “compulsory” cooperation (cf. Spencer, 2000: 5-8).  
Actions enforced by government, characteristic of what Spencer labeled “military” types of 
societies, were considered “coercive” or “compulsory” cooperation.  By contrast, “voluntary” 
cooperation was a product of free contract between individuals in “industrial” types of societies, 
a later and higher societal manifestation in Spencer’s evolutionary scheme.  This distinction of 
Spencer’s continued to resonate and became essentially a colloquialism, repeated without 
citation:  For example, the classification of “military” versus “industrial” societies, paired with 
the ideas of coercion versus voluntarism in cooperation, was used to distinguish Russian (and 
German) cooperation from that of Anglo-Americans during World War I (Mussey, 1917).  
“Voluntary cooperation” became important enough as a concept to warrant its own listing in a 
contemporary compilation of sociological vocabulary (Eubank, 1931).   
Spencer’s evolutionary perspective was echoed by leading U.S. sociologists.  The 
presumption of natural selection required that human social phenomena, just like the variety 
observed in biological forms, must have similarly emerged from random processes and survival 
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instinct, without the intervention of supernatural authority.  “Cooperation,” along with other 
human behavior, was explained on this naturalistic basis.  Giddings, for example, suggested that 
initial, instinctive joint behaviors arose simply because of physical proximity and the simple 
occurrence of “like response” to the stimulus of a situation, a condition that “shades so gradually 
into cooperation that it is often difficult to discover at what point the cooperation begins” 
(Giddings, 1907: 80).  Any appearance of purpose or plan in this “unintentional adaptation” 
toward cooperation was a mere artifact of the prominence of the will in one’s own consciousness 
(Cooley, 1926: 21).  Difficulties in harmonizing this “natural” emergence of cooperative 
behavior with a Darwinian “survival of the fittest” process, which appears to have competition as 
its basic principle, were often resolved by claiming that cooperation’s initial benefit was realized 
through the joining of tribes for war, thus enhancing the survival chances of societies skilled in 
cooperation (cf. Gillin & Blackmar, 1930: 344; Ross, 1920: 238).  Cooley suggested that 
cooperation itself was the even-fitter outcome that resulted from competitive struggle, citing the 
Civil War as an example in which “the way to unity lay through blood” (Cooley, 1926: 40).   
Contending with this purely instinctual view of cooperation, however, were writers such 
as Ross, who stressed the theme of “social control.”  Ross argued that the force of group norms 
and opinion in fact holds sway over reluctant individuals in a cooperative process.  Differing 
bluntly from Giddings, he asserted that “unlike bees and ants, we cooperate not from instinct but 
from reason” and as such “cooperation for common ends a little dim or remote cannot be 
effected without some compulsion” (Ross, 1920: 242).  Another challenge to the theorized 
primacy of instinctive “likemindedness” in cooperation was that not just similarity but in fact 
differentiation is inherent to cooperation: “The division of labor, in making possible an ever 
larger and wider co-operation among men, has indirectly multiplied individual diversities” (Park, 
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1921: 20).  Differentiation not just in function but in power among the parties involved could be 
regarded as just one more factor in the “great inclusive process of social co-operation” (Case, 
1924: 550). 
Tensions among these perspectives were accommodated through the definition of 
different types or “levels” of “cooperation,” often with implicit assessments of their relative 
moral value.  Such classifications included Spencer’s distinction between “coercive” and 
“voluntary” cooperation, where the latter was associated with a later and higher stage of societal 
development.  Others were: spontaneous versus rational (Giddings, 1904); natural versus 
artificial (Ross, 1901); hereditary versus plastic (Baldwin, 1910); and simple (“direct,” or 
through performance of like actions) versus complex (a combination of direct and “indirect” or 
unlike activities, in exchange) (Giddings, 1907).   Common themes in this series of pairings are 
the contrast of instinctive/spontaneous or perhaps familial (hence naturally-occurring) 
cooperation versus cooperation in broader societal systems.  “Cooperation” arising around an 
aim or purpose (sometimes explicitly labeled “organization”) was associated with the 
rational/artificial/plastic type.   
These dichotomies parallel the Gemeinschaft/Gesellschaft distinction defined during this 
era by the German writer Tönnies—a distinction that Barley & Kunda (1992) emphasize as being 
cyclically reiterated through the development of organizational theory.  A summary of these 
concepts from Tönnies (Thon, 1897: 730-732) had appeared in AJS prior to the publication of 
works referenced above, but the writers did not cite him directly in discussing their 
classifications.  Unlike Spencer and most of these U.S. sociologists, Tönnies’ name is also absent 
from the list of social theorists identified as sources in early U.S. sociology textbooks (Hart, 
1927).  This by no means negates his importance but does suggest that the ideas emanated from 
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assumptions common to multiple theorists during the period, strengthening the likelihood of their 
further influence.  Contemporary classifications of the social order repeatedly distinguished 
“natural” communal activities from those imposed through industrial society, often implying a 
moral superiority for the former. 
Typically, “higher” forms of cooperation were those characterized by “altruism” or 
similar sympathetic feelings (cf. also Ellwood, 1921: 255-256; Small & Vincent, 1894: 363).  
Likewise, despite the use of the phrase “voluntary cooperation” as a label for one of many 
presumed types of “cooperation,” there were continued implications that voluntarism was 
essential to the meaning of “real” or “ideal” cooperation.  Thus, despite the inclusion of 
hierarchical purposive or industrial organizations in certain categories of “cooperation,” 
sociological views tended to negatively differentiate these, generally reinforcing socialistic rather 
than capitalistic organizational applications as closer to the true spirit of the word. 
Interest in promoting “cooperation” spawns psychological research agenda.  Though 
the evolutionary perspective of Spencer and early sociologists had optimistically portrayed 
“cooperation” as an inevitable endpoint of social progress, the period during and immediately 
after World War I brought interest in how cooperation could be taught.  This shift seems to 
reflect the damage done to Progressivist, utopian visions by the war; its ugly reality prompted 
conclusions that intervention was necessary for the anticipated evolution toward peaceful 
civilization to be completed.  While mentions of this concern did occur in sociological literature 
(cf. Howerth, 1925), appearing as a core motivation for the Journal of Educational Sociology, 
first published in 1927, questions of how to educate individuals for enhanced cooperation 
ultimately served to invite the behavioral perspective of psychological study.  Prior to this time, 
virtually no studies or definitions of “cooperation” as human behavior had appeared in 
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psychology journals.  Although dealt with occasionally under the framework of “social 
psychology,” with emphases similar to the sociological discussions of cooperation (cf. Baldwin, 
1897; Ellwood, 1921), the word was otherwise used in psychology almost exclusively to 
describe “cooperation” either of research subjects or of human organs (e.g., eyes or hands) or 
senses in a physiological process (cf. Robinson, 1896; Swift, 1903).   
By 1937, however, interest in the production of “cooperation” motivated a concerted, 
multi-publication effort by the Social Science Research Council (SSRC), with the centerpiece 
being a book outlining a suitable research agenda (May & Doob, 1937).  This formal 
inauguration of research into motives for cooperation necessitated a departure from sociological 
theories regarding its “natural” or instinctive evolutionary development.  While some 
psychologists were now asserting that human nature must in fact be transformed to enhance 
cooperation (Yerkes, 1937: 270), May & Doob proposed what they claimed to be a middle 
ground.  They argued that while striving “for goals” was instinctive, to pursue such goals either 
“with others” (cooperation) or “against others” (competition) equally reflected “learned forms of 
behavior” (May & Doob, 1937: 23).  The “behavioral” presumption, however, tipped the scales 
in favor of psychology. 
The nod toward interdisciplinarity failed to placate sociologists, whose reviews of May & 
Doob’s book complained bitterly at its assertion that there was lamentably little knowledge of 
why people cooperate (e.g., “[T]he authors failed to use or even to list and comment on many of 
the most important contributions—both American and European” (Manheim, 1937: 481)).  May 
& Doob, however, dismissed the usefulness of prior sociological theories due to their failure to 
focus on the “subjective” perspective of individual motive in cooperation.  They wrote: “An 
adequate conception of competition and cooperation…requires that the behavior…be understood 
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in the light of the psychology of the individuals who are behaving” (May & Doob, 1937: 6).  The 
shift toward psychology as the dominant approach was accompanied by a preference for research 
via experimental study which, despite an avowal of openness to engagement with all methods, 
the authors exalted as the “highest and purest of all scientific procedures” (May & Doob, 1937: 
20).   
Prominent among the book’s stated aims was that of facilitating grant-fundable research, 
signaling the emerging importance of economic stakes in gaining legitimacy for social science 
disciplines.  This object, particularly in an era when such funding was still rare for the social 
sciences (Bulmer & Bulmer, 1981; Fisher, 1993), demanded the authority of science behind it.  
In this instance, psychologists staked a disciplinary claim to offer the appropriate theory and 
methods for the task.  While May & Doob did not directly brand sociology as “non-science,” 
their advocacy for the experimental method and a focus on individual behavioral motives 
amounted to a boundary-work (Gieryn, 1983) argument for these hallmarks of psychological 
study as prerequisites for adequate “scientific” research.  The discipline that retained authority to 
advance the understanding and development of “cooperation” would be in prime position to 
receive any funds available for this emergent research agenda of high public interest, inspiring 
psychologists to make an effort to claim the new territory.  Notably, 1937 was also the year that 
The Structure of Social Action was published, the work in which Camic (1986) identifies Talcott 
Parsons’ effort to define a sociological understanding of behavior that excluded psychological 
notions.  The timing reinforces the active territorial rivalry then occurring between the 
disciplines, inspiring parallel boundary-work efforts. 
Defining propositions to guide research on “cooperation” required May & Doob to 
develop operational definitions aligned with the book’s presentation of “competition” as its 
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implied opposite.  While they acknowledged how the behaviors could occur jointly (as when 
team members cooperate to compete with another team), their agenda demanded a definition that 
created a clear distinction for the purpose of measurement.  Concerns for commensuration 
(Stinchcombe, 2002) are thus apparent, having a recognizable impact on meaning in this 
situation.  Their solution was to differentiate “cooperation” from “competition” on the basis of 
the shareability of the desired “goal”—if parties orient their behavior such that a “goal” is 
attainable by all or almost all parties involved, they engage in “cooperation,” but if the behavior 
aims at a “goal” obtainable by only one or a few parties seeking it, this is “competition” (May & 
Doob, 1937: 6).   
In a departure from looser conceptions of “cooperation” that had been employed in early 
psychological studies of children (cf. Graves, 1937), May & Doob also attempted to distinguish 
“cooperation” from merely “helpful” behavior, insisting that “cooperation” required that the 
person’s individual goal be identical or complementary to the goal sought in conjunction with 
others—helping someone attain a goal not explicitly one’s own is not “cooperating” (1937: 18n).  
This definition actually ruled out pure altruism, or disinterested behavior (a presumed 
“goallessness”), as “cooperation.”  Further, by creating a distinction between cooperation and 
competition based on the shareability of a “goal” (suggested as potentially being of two types – 
material goods or prestige) the definition made the nature of activity engaged in by participants 
irrelevant as a further qualifier on cooperation.  It didn’t matter what, if anything, participants 
accomplished together, so long as their potential “goal” was something they could share or 
equally obtain.   
Public interest in promoting “cooperation” and desires by social scientists to define 
fundable research agendas thus combined to bring psychology to the fore as a discipline claiming 
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to offer theory and methods best suited for such studies.  Moreover, in developing a framework 
for scientific research on the problem, May & Doob arrived at a construct definition that cast 
“cooperation” in contrast with “competition,” directing the focus toward goals and away from 
shared activity as central to “cooperation.” 
Summary: “Cooperation” through 1937.  Events from the mid-19th century through 
1937 in the U.S. and abroad had firmly established “cooperation” as a societal ideal whose 
increase was to be promoted through public education and scientific research.  At the same time, 
its initial associations with Owen-ite socialist “cooperation” tied it to egalitarian and altruistic 
meanings that made efforts to apply the construct within capitalistic settings controversial.  
Similar presumptions regarding the word’s true or ideal meaning were apparent in sociological 
views of “cooperation” that distinguished “voluntary,” altruistic and instinctive or “natural” 
forms of “cooperation” from “rational” or “artificial” ones in service of organizational, and 
particularly economic, aims.  By the end of the period, however, desires to construct and control 
a research agenda on “cooperation” had resulted in a new definition crafted within theoretical 
and methodological boundaries congenial to psychologists.  Under this emphasis, the nature of 
an activity’s goal (shareable versus non-shareable) rather than the nature of the shared activity 
performed became the distinguishing mark of “cooperation.”   
The preliminary survey thus reveals a historical context giving rise to strongly positive 
and idealized meanings for the word “cooperation”—meanings that made its application within 
capitalist or hierarchical settings particularly problematic.  At the same time, the promise of 
economic resources associated with research funding on the construct had prompted an 
operational definition of “cooperation” that implied a narrower meaning, focused on the goals of 
common activity rather than the activities themselves. 
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Evolution of Cooperation from 1938 through 2005 
In discussing the evolution of Cooperation as a construct from 1938 through 2005, I will 
treat the process roughly in chronological order, but some developments occurred in parallel with 
one another.  To provide an overall context, Table 4.1 offers a timeline of several key events and 
publications mentioned in the sequence of construct development. 
TABLE 4.1 – Timeline of Key Publications/Events 
 Key Publications/Events in Evolution Process for Cooperation 
1937 Competition and Cooperation (May & Doob)  
1938 Functions of the Executive (Barnard)  
1939 Management and the Worker (Roethlisberger & Dickson)  
1941 Management and Morale (Roethlisberger) 
1945 Social Problems of an Industrial Civilization (Mayo) 
1947 Kurt Lewin dies; first issue of Human Relations published 
1948 Morton Deutsch receives Ph.D. from MIT, joins NYU faculty 
1949 Deutsch study/definition of cooperation published in Human Relations 
1957 Games & Decisions (Luce & Raiffa) describes Prisoner’s Dilemma Game; first issue of 
Journal of Conflict Resolution: A Quarterly for Research Related to War and Peace 
published 
1958 Deutsch publishes initial prisoner’s dilemma study in Journal of Conflict Resolution; 
Sherif publishes intergroup cooperation study in American Journal of Sociology; 
Thompson & McEwen article in American Sociological Review describes 
interorganizational cooperation strategies 
1965 Gallo & McClintock review article in Journal of Conflict Resolution catalogs more 
than 20 prisoner’s dilemma studies of cooperation  
1975 Cooperation (Marwell & Schmitt) attempts to reassert multidimensional definition of 
cooperation 
1978 First of Keeley’s articles renewing perspective of cooperation in organizations, with 
citations of Barnard, appears in Administrative Science Quarterly 
1981 Axelrod’s computer-based prisoner’s dilemma study on “emergence of cooperation” 
appears in American Political Science Review 
1983 Smith, Organ & Near article launching Organizational Citizenship Behavior construct 
appears in Journal of Applied Psychology 
1984 Evolution of Cooperation (Axelrod) 
1989 Organizational Citizenship Behavior (Organ); Cooperation and Competition (Johnson 
& Johnson) 
1991 Cooperation (Argyle) 
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 Key Publications/Events in Evolution Process for Cooperation 
1993 Academy of Management Journal issues call for papers for special research forum on 
“Intra- and Interorganizational Cooperation” 
1995 Academy of Management Journal research forum on cooperation appears - Editors note 
that bulk of submissions were on interorganizational cooperation 
2000 Cooperation in Modern Society (Van Vugt et al) 
 
Barnard and other early authors on “cooperation.”  Chester Barnard’s work, The 
Functions of the Executive, presented the “cooperative system” at the heart of his theoretical 
framework for the operation of formal organization.   Barnard described the genesis of 
cooperative activity as the starting point for formal organization: “[O]ut of the existence, or 
belief in the existence, of purposes of individuals and the experience of limitations arises 
cooperation to accomplish purposes and overcome limitations” (1968 [1938]: 22).  The emphasis 
of his definition is on “cooperation” as the shared, purposeful activity of participants in an 
organizational context.  Nowhere in Barnard’s work are there references to prior definitions or 
usage of “cooperation” or “cooperative system” or any acknowledgement of how an application 
of the term to organizations in private industry might be controversial, although in the context of 
meanings evident from the preliminary survey, it seems this would have been the case.   
While his theoretical model of cooperation within organizations was explicitly developed 
to be generalizable beyond profit-based enterprises, Barnard’s examples often invoked this 
context, drawing from his own experiences as an executive in the Bell Telephone organization.  
Though the book was published by Harvard University Press and originated as a series of public 
lectures delivered at the invitation of Harvard’s president (Wolf, 1974), Barnard was also 
primarily identified not as an academic but as a business leader, and early reviews of his work in 
academic journals recognize him as such.  Most praised the book’s practical insights but 
disparaged its efforts at theoretical development, expressing a wish that Barnard had stuck to 
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recounting examples from his experience as a manager (cf. Anderson, 1939; Ascher, 1940; 
Stene, 1939).  None of them explicitly object to his usage of “cooperation,” but it is clear that 
from the start his business background affected how his writing was received by scholars.     
Closely on the heels of Barnard’s description of “cooperation” occurred application of the 
term in regard to industrial settings by Harvard-based academics Elton Mayo and Fritz 
Roethlisberger.  Drawing on the now-famous data from workplace observations at the 
Hawthorne plant to shine the light on “cooperative phenomena,” Roethlisberger asserted such 
activities to be “a class of phenomena which can clearly be segregated…and studied for its own 
sake” (Roethlisberger, 1941: 159).  Both Mayo’s & Roethlisberger’s work, however, showed 
close affinity with prior sociological conceptions of the word.  Although the “cooperation” 
studied was situated in the workplace, it was explicitly not the product of purpose or economic 
incentive.  Mayo termed “the need to cooperate continuously” as “vital to the communal life” 
(1945: 54).  From his perspective, however, a focus on economic incentives has corrupted this 
innate desire, such that “social skill” for pursuing shared aims, once prevalent in human cultures, 
has now been lost.   
In support of such assertions, Mayo cited, for example, work among tribal groups in New 
Guinea by anthropologist Bronislaw Malinowski (Malinowski, 1922; cf. Mayo, 1945: 12).  
Significantly, Mayo claimed that “[i]t is the modern tragedy that the very strength of this 
consistent desire [for social association in work with others] makes against rather than for 
effective cooperation” (1941: xxi).    The innate human desire for “cooperation” that Mayo 
specifies is thus not a purposeful one but rather something that must be somehow overcome or 
channeled for any formal organization to operate.  This distinction means, importantly given the 
controversies of the prior era, that “cooperation” in Mayo’s and Roethlisberger’s usage, even if 
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they claimed it to exist in industrial organizations, actively contends with the aims inherent to 
that setting.  On the other hand, Barnard defines “cooperation” as something occurring in service 
of the aims of formal organizations, including for-profit enterprises.  His definition therefore 
violates more directly than Mayo’s or Roethlisberger’s the prior presumptions against the 
possibility of “cooperation” in capitalist endeavor.  This stronger conflict with prior meanings, 
coupled with Barnard’s lower cultural capital (Bourdieu, 1986) as an academic due to his 
business background, seem to reduce the likelihood that his distinctive use of “cooperation” 
would have sustained influence on the field.  
Over the late 1930s through the 1940s, neither Barnard’s nor Mayo and Roethlisberger’s 
usage of “cooperation” took definite hold in the social sciences, and usage of the construct 
overall remained unfocused.  One author cited Roethlisberger and Dickson for a conceptual 
understanding of cooperation (Rogers, 1946), but Selznick (1948) heavily cited Barnard for the 
concept of a “cooperative system” made up of “individuals interacting as wholes in relation to a 
formal system of coordination” (p. 28).  More commonly, though, authors either created their 
own definition for “cooperation,” treated the term as one of common meaning, or cited a unique 
source.  Dodd (1939) states, without citation, his usage of “what commonly is meant by 
cooperating, the working together towards a common goal” (p. 66, emphasis in original).  A 
similar basic definition of “working together” is presented by Courtis (1940), but he also offers 
an elaborate multi-level set of categories of cooperation, based on their “sequence of appearance 
in life,” where the highest form is one of spontaneous cooperation requiring no leadership or 
authority to maintain it.  The only citation in the article is of Giddings, and Courtis’ 
categorizations resemble hierarchies previously produced in sociology, where spontaneity and 
pure voluntarism were likewise associated with higher or more authentic “cooperation.”   
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Variety in definition is also apparent from Klugman (1944), who states that cooperation 
“describes a joint coordinated effort by two or more individuals,” a definition for which he cites 
a chapter on social psychology in a psychology textbook.  However, he also cites some 
describing cooperation as “a kind of group competition or rivalry,” others who consider it “social 
facilitation in which individuals are stimulated to do better work simply because of the presence 
of other workers,” and still others who “have thought of cooperation as pooled independent 
judgment” (p. 91).  Lewis (1944), following reasoning similar to Barnard’s relation of 
cooperation and purpose (though without citation of his work), stated subordination to a 
“common objective” as key to cooperation:  “In truly cooperative work, personal needs can 
function only as they are relevant to the objective situation; the common objective, in other 
words, is more important than any personal objective” (p. 115).  In her experiment, one of the 
earliest in studies of cooperation to involve adults rather than children, she also compared 
“cooperative” with “isolated” work rather than employing the more common juxtaposition of 
“cooperation” with “competition.”   
Eaton (1948), a sociologist writing in AJS, objected to the loose definitions for the term:  
“[I]n its popular and scientific usage, [co-operation] is a catch-all for many types of activity. The 
concept is used in too inclusive a manner. It combines significant differences in social actions 
that should be noted rather than ignored” (p. 126).  He presented a classification or typology of 
cooperation along several dimensions such as “Social Values” (Means/End), “Contact” 
(Direct/Indirect), “Activities” (Few/Many), “Time” (Defined/Undefined), “Structure” 
(Consumer/Producer), “Cultural Setting” (Competitive/Individualistic/Co-operative), and 
“Status” (Hierarchical, Equal and Equitable).  Interestingly, the introduction of typologies to 
clarify the meanings of “umbrella constructs” comes relatively late in the stages of construct 
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evolution suggested by Hirsch & Levin (1999).  Its appearance at this stage of the process for 
“cooperation” would seem to point to the construct’s longer history within the discipline of 
sociology.  The late 19th and early 20th centuries had already seen several classification schemes 
of “cooperation” presented by Giddings and others in attempts to capture the term’s nuances.  
Now, however, Eaton’s work apparently did not succeed in spurring further definitional 
refinement, as the JSTOR database showed no citations of this article. 
Deutsch’s definition takes hold.  The lack of attention to Eaton did not necessarily mean 
the definition of “cooperation” was no longer of interest—what it may have signaled, though, 
was that sociologists had ceased to focus attention on a construct that psychological research was 
poised to dominate.  In 1949, a journal article in Human Relations by Morton Deutsch 
established a definition for “cooperation” in terms of shareable goal structure that tied very 
closely to the proposal of May & Doob (1937).  By his definition, a “cooperative situation” is 
one where “the goals for the individuals or sub-units in the situation under consideration have the 
following characteristic:  the goal regions for each of the individuals or sub-units in the situation 
are defined so that a goal-region can be entered (to some degree) by any given individual or sub-
unit only if all the individuals or sub-units under consideration can also enter their respective 
goal-regions (to some degree)” (p. 131-2).  Deutsch specified this condition of a “cooperative 
situation” in an experimental sense as being independent of the subject’s conscious perception of 
cooperation (cf. Deutsch, 1949b: 136); this disjunction between perceptions and the situation of 
cooperation separates it from a conscious choice to engage or participate with others.  This tends 
to distance the definition from organizational settings where such a choice may commonly, 
though not always, be part of the process of cooperation.  At the least, it clearly departs from 
Barnard’s conception of the cooperative system in formal organization, for which active 
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“willingness to cooperate” on the part of participants was stressed as necessary for the 
organization’s existence.   
Importantly, Deutsch’s article also separately defined “co-operation of efforts” in a group 
as “working together, interrelation of activities” (p. 141), something that is suggested to be 
possible in either the cooperative or competitive goal structure condition.  His goal-structure-
based definition, however, was cited within five years of publication in psychology journals (cf. 
Grossack, 1954) and quickly became a common reference in studies of the concept, with the 
second part of his definition (on interrelation of activities) generally ignored.  The emphasis on 
goal conditions—separated from activities, and even from the consciousness of cooperating—
allowed a research program on “cooperation” to develop independent of the consideration of 
shared activities or any connection to a group or organizational context, and this definition was 
the one that drew attention. 
The impact of Deutsch’s work on the field seems remarkable—a recently-graduated 
doctoral student, he was not yet 30 when his article appeared in the sixth issue of Human 
Relations, a journal that began publication just two years before.   Notably, his 1949 paper is one 
of the first encountered since May & Doob (1937) to offer a systematic review of literature 
related to “cooperation,” and the first to cite those authors.  He also cites Mead (1937), whose 
compilation of anthropological work on “cooperation” was published as part of the SSRC effort 
in conjunction with May & Doob’s book.  Interestingly, Deutsch also cites and quotes Barnard 
(1968 [1938]) on “co-operative systems,” as well as Lewis (1944), whose empirical study on 
cooperation emphasized the role of a “common objective” in cooperation and stressed the 
differences inherent to performing a task together versus alone.   
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In conclusion, however, Deutsch asserts that a shared notion of all these writers is that 
“the crux of the difference between co-operation and competition lies in the difference in the 
nature of the goal-regions in the two social situations” (Deutsch, 1949b: 131).  With this choice 
he most closely approximates the language and emphasis of May & Doob, wedding his concept 
to their precedent and to a situation-based view of “cooperation.” Indeed, it might seem that the 
ready acceptance of his definition resulted from legitimacy inherited from May & Doob’s work.  
The general absence of citations of May & Doob in psychology journals, however, suggests that 
their book’s definition had less impact on the field independently than it did via Deutsch’s 
adaptation.  Kuhn (1996 [1969]) emphasizes that the paradigms of normal science generally 
develop through the stream of empirical work in journal articles rather than books, and this may 
be one respect in which Deutsch’s theoretical development in a journal article, coupled with an 
empirical study, was better positioned to influence the discipline of psychology.    
Another resource strengthening Deutsch’s influence, however, may have been his 
academic background and connections.  He had been a doctoral student at MIT under Kurt 
Lewin, a prominent figure in the early development of social psychology whose recent death by 
heart attack at age 56 was memorialized in the first issue of Human Relations (Likert, 1947).  
Indeed, an article by Lewin appeared in that premiere issue, signaling the centrality of his 
influence.  Deutsch’s lineage as a young scholar thus had already linked him to prominent 
figures in psychological research; he commanded social and cultural capital resources (Bourdieu, 
1986) through association with this noted and now-deceased mentor, whose mantle of authority 
might be seen as falling in some measure on him.  This combination of resources may help 
explain the ready adoption and influence of his construct definition. 
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Prisoner’s dilemma studies instititutionalized.  The impact of Deutsch’s definition for 
“cooperation” was dramatically amplified when in the late 1950s it became wedded with a 
specific empirical approach—the “prisoner’s dilemma” game format described by Luce & Raiffa 
(1957).  The scenario initially envisioned by the game is one of two suspects arrested for the 
joint commission of a major crime, who are then separated by law-enforcement officials (Luce & 
Raiffa, 1957: 95).  Each is told that he or she has two options:  To confess to the major crime or 
not to confess.  If neither confesses, both will only receive punishment for a minor crime.  If both 
confess, both will receive a moderate sentence for the major crime.  If one confesses and the 
other does not, the confessor will receive a very lenient sentence, even less than for the minor 
crime, while the other will get a maximum sentence for the major crime.  Each must make an 
independent choice, receiving an outcome dependent on the partner’s choice. 
As implemented in experiments, the game was commonly framed in terms of payoffs 
rather than punishments:  One choice brings modest rewards to both, provided they both choose 
it—an alternative choice brings lesser rewards if they both choose it, but a higher reward if only 
one takes that option, rewarding that player at the expense of his or her partner.  In subsequent 
research, making the choice that offers modest rewards to both one’s-self and one’s partner 
(rather than the alternative offering a greater potential reward at his or her expense) became 
widely viewed as an operationalized measure of “cooperation.” 
Though Luce & Raiffa were Harvard-affiliated, the project leading to their book’s 
publication originated through work with the Bureau of Applied Social Research at Columbia 
University (Luce & Raiffa, 1957: x), inaugurated in 1952.  Deutsch was likewise employed in 
the New York area subsequent to his graduation from MIT—first in the psychology department 
at NYU, then at Bell Labs, where he started a research group in psychology in 1956.  He had 
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been introduced to Raiffa through a connection at NYU and recalls that he was “probably the 
first psychologist” to use the prisoner’s dilemma game in research (Deutsch, 1999: 14).  Despite 
the prominence of Deutsch’s goal-structure-based definition, in fact, experimental 
operationalizations of “cooperation” before 1957 had often been multifaceted, capturing the 
interplay of distinct dimensions such as “procedure, goals and rewards” (Gottheil, 1955)  or 
requiring aspects of shared behavior and mutual response as part of cooperative activity (Azrin & 
Lindsley, 1956).  
The rapid proliferation of the new research approach seems related to several factors.  
First, the prisoner’s dilemma format conformed to experimental methods favored by psychology, 
reinforcing that discipline’s prior boundary-work (Gieryn, 1983), as initiated through May & 
Doob (1937), to control research in “cooperation.”  Studies could also be easily and rapidly 
assembled using student volunteers, minimizing resource requirements for adoption.  Historical 
context, however, provided yet another important factor helping propel and solidify this use of 
the construct.  International politics during the Cold War inspired concerns for world peace that, 
much as occurred following World War I, translated into interest in research on “cooperation.”  
The growth of game-theoretic study of “cooperation” thus suited not just the interests of 
psychology but contemporary concerns of political scientists, giving rise to new journal outlets 
oriented toward publishing such research with a view toward international and political 
implications.  Deutsch (1958), his first study to employ the approach and the earliest published 
prisoner’s dilemma study identified through my research, appeared in the Journal of Conflict 
Resolution (JCR), a political science journal first published in 1957 and subtitled, “A Quarterly 
for Research Related to War and Peace.”   
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The combination of established scientific experimental methods and strong contemporary 
political interest helped the approach draw research funding from both government and private 
foundations.  Early study sponsorships came from sources such as the Office of Naval Research 
(Deutsch, 1958; Solomon, 1960), the United States Air Force (Lutzker, 1961), the National 
Institute of Mental Health (Bixenstine, Potash, & Wilson, 1963; Radlow, 1965) and the Carnegie 
Foundation (Komorita, 1965), among others.  In essence, all these factors of resource availability 
helped shape the structure of research on “cooperation,” contributing to its institutionalization in 
this form much as resource availability at origins can imprint the structure of organizations in a 
given field (Stinchcombe, 1965). 
Interestingly enough, the prisoner’s dilemma game was among those classified by Luce 
& Raiffa themselves as “non-cooperative” in nature, because it allowed no pre-play 
communication between the members and involved a mixed set of motives (Luce & Raiffa, 
1957: 89).  Further, Deutsch’s initial article did not characterize the game itself as involving 
“cooperation” but rather defined three different experimental conditions under which it was 
played by subjects, depending on what motivations they were primed to expect and employ:  In 
the “co-operative” condition, “each subject was led to feel that the welfare of the other person as 
well as his own welfare was of concern to him and that the other person felt the same way,” 
while subjects in the “individualistic” and “competitive” conditions were primed with 
suggestions of different “motivational orientations” (Deutsch, 1958: 270).   
The identification of the prisoner’s dilemma game with cooperation was advanced, 
however, by Solomon (1960), whose comments in the article indicate that his research was 
conducted under Deutsch’s supervision at NYU.  Solomon explicitly applies the label of 
“cooperative” to one of the prisoner’s dilemma choice-boxes:  The “Cooperative Strategy” 
 122 
 
(capitalized in the original) is defined as one “wherein O’s choice pattern promotes the 
maximum mutual gain,” versus “the Noncooperative Strategy wherein O blocks the attainment 
of maximal mutual gain” (Solomon, 1960: 224).  Just one year later, Lutzker (1961) used the 
prisoner’s dilemma game without formality of citation, designating the respective choices in the 
game as “cooperative” versus “competitive” with no explanation as to why.  This pattern seems a 
classic example of the “compression” of language suggested by Colyvas & Powell (2006) as an 
indication of the institutionalization of a concept in discourse.  Almost immediately, the 
prisoner’s dilemma game format had become taken for granted as the way to study 
“cooperation.”  Such was the multiplication of studies that within seven years a survey article 
(Gallo & McClintock, 1965) reviewed the findings from more than 20 different game-based 
experiments regarding “cooperative and competitive behavior.” 
The finding is also interesting for its apparent contradiction of the contention by Hirsch & 
Levin (1999) that meanings of an umbrella construct will multiply during an initial stage of 
popularity and greater use.  In this instance, rather, use of the construct multiplied rapidly 
following the fixture of an operationalized meaning.  Part of the answer may be that, although 
the word “cooperation” remained, its meaning had already been partitioned and narrowed 
through adoption of the definition from Deutsch (building upon May & Doob) that isolated goal 
structure features as the distinguishing element of the construct, paring off concerns for the 
context of shared activities.  That is, the “umbrella” had already to some degree “collapsed,” 
even though the word used for it had not changed.  
As the Peace Movement emerged in the 1960s, with much of its activity situated on 
campuses, scholarly interest in “peace research” strengthened (cf. Conroy, 1969), and conflict 
resolution remained a topic of keen interest.  By the 1970s, studies that incorporated 
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communication in the prisoner’s dilemma tested a proposed international relations approach 
termed the “GRIT strategy” (Lindskold, 1978), reinforcing the application of such research to 
situations such as the nuclear arms race.  Deutsch, who in 1963 took a post in psychology at 
Teachers College in Columbia University, would there in the mid-1980s establish the 
International Center for Cooperation and Conflict Resolution, cementing both his place in the 
study of cooperation and its connection with international concerns and peaceful human relations 
(Deutsch, 1999).   
The historical context thus tied not just one but two social science disciplines—
psychology and political science—to the prisoner’s dilemma approach to research on 
“cooperation.”  Starting from the 1950s, this linkage helped channel economic resources into 
research in a manner that also influenced the definition of the “cooperation” construct.  The 
prisoner’s dilemma format spawned a seemingly unending array of variations on the basic theme, 
but all these studies reinforced the definition of “cooperation” central to their approach, 
highlighting goal structure and deemphasizing the construct’s connection with shared tasks or an 
organizational context.   
Controversy regarding organizational application continues.  The rapid proliferation of 
studies of “cooperation” outside of an organizational context was paralleled by continued 
disputes surrounding the appropriateness of the construct’s application in businesses.  Resistance 
to the idea that “cooperation” could ever be appropriately applied in a typical capitalist 
enterprise, shows up, for example, in Bendix (1947), where he cites Marx on the subject:  “As is 
well known, Marx did not believe that it was possible to incorporate the worker’s initiative, his 
pride and whole-hearted co-operation in a common task of production as long as he was subject 
to the necessities of an organization whose operation and purpose were planned and conducted 
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without his participation” (p. 501).  Similarly, Dubin (1949), discussing “union-management 
cooperation,” asserts, “No amount of ‘co-operation’ will change the differences between the 
economic goals of company and union” (p. 206).  His usage of quotation marks around the term 
seems to imply that he employs “co-operation” ironically or artificially here, resisting the 
legitimacy of its application to a situation of divergent economic interests, and one where power 
between the parties is unequal.   
Similar objections appear in French, Kornhauser & Marrow (1951), a collaborative piece 
on labor-management cooperation by two scholars and an industry representative.  In their main 
essay, the sentiment is expressed: “Genuine cooperation occurs only between equals” (p. 198).  
This, it is implied, does not exist between the parties of labor and management due to their 
unequal power levels.  The meanings presumed from prior egalitarian connotations of 
cooperation thus appear to persist.  In an addendum of personal remarks, however, Marrow, the 
co-author with industrial affiliation, expresses “sharp disagreement” with that sentiment, arguing 
that “[g]enuine cooperation in any situation, while it calls for mutual respect, necessarily 
involves clarity of roles and differentials in levels of authority and responsibility” (p. 203-4).  
Between them, the opposing views highlight the same difficulties faced by early sociologists 
who attached positive meaning to social “cooperation” but viewed hierarchical control in 
industrial society negatively.  This had led to earlier attempts at distinction via categorization 
(e.g., “natural” versus “rational” cooperation), but here the writers employ the same phrase 
(“genuine cooperation”) while expressing fundamentally contradictory understandings of what is 
essential to it. 
More evidence of such conflict is apparent in Knowles (1952), who indicts “scientific” 
work by not only Taylor but Mayo, railing against “[i]ndustrial relations experts with a 
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management bias, designated as the ‘scientists’ in this paper, [who] seek techniques to make 
people do what they want them to do and call this cooperation” (p. 350 – emphasis in original).  
He favors rather those he calls “institutionalists” who “use the term [cooperation] in the special 
sense of free men and free groups voluntarily giving their consent to work together.”  In this 
instance, the typical boundary-work claim for “science” as a source of authority (Gieryn, 1983) 
is actually subordinated to the legitimacy assumed in the assertion of voluntarism as essential to 
the definition of “cooperation.”  Knowles implies that even a “scientist” is wrong if he defines 
“cooperation” in any situation other than that of voluntary involvement, essentially staking his 
own claim to authority on the self-evidence of that meaning for the word. 
The few early studies that do present examples of organizationally-situated cooperation 
(Blau, 1954; Medalia & Miller, 1955) stress, similarly to Mayo, Roethlisberger and early 
sociologists, a “spontaneous” or “voluntary” cooperation as the ultimate hope or ideal for the 
organizational setting.  Another scholar, Horowitz (1962), attempted to resurrect idealist 
concepts of “cooperation” by proposing an alternative concept of “consensus,” where the latter 
term is what he considers applicable to a typical industrial setting.  He argues for “a more 
adequate sociological theory of cooperation…[that] would insist on the need for maintaining life 
although leaving open the question of what to do with it” (Horowitz, 1962: 187).  His definition 
of “cooperation” is implied to be independent of considerations about ends or purpose—i.e., not 
purposive in focus—while “consensus” demands agreement upon ends.  Creating this alternative 
term that could apply in formal organizational contexts reflects yet another effort to restrict 
“cooperation” to describing circumstances of complete freedom and voluntary, uncoerced 
participation. 
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There is no evidence that Horowitz’ effort at creating the alternative construct of 
“consensus” took hold, leaving “cooperation” as the primary word employed in the social 
sciences, but with continued contention over the legitimacy of its application in capitalist 
enterprises or situations of hierarchical control.  Without the modifying adjectives used in prior 
categorizations to distinguish “natural” from “rational” cooperation, the resolution of negative 
feelings toward the latter practices could now only be achieved by restricting the term entirely 
from such application.  As suggested by Barley & Kunda (1992), the tensions embodied in the 
Gemeinschaft/Gesellschaft dichotomy persist, evidenced again and again as dimensions of 
egalitarianism and voluntarism for “cooperation” are resurrected, particularly by sociologists, to 
argue against its validity for use in a business context.   
Bringing the task back into “cooperation.”  Around the same time that prisoner’s 
dilemma studies of cooperation were taking flight, Sherif (1958) appeared, the first article in an 
influential stream of research emphasizing the impact of shared task activities in “cooperation” 
as a means for the reduction of intergroup conflict.  The task emphasis in these studies contrasts 
noticeably with the prisoner’s dilemma operationalization of “cooperation” as a choice in a game 
where participants might not even see, let alone communicate with, each other.  Though Sherif 
never focused on this disparity in definition, by the 1970s other authors were challenging the pre-
eminence of goal structure in research on “cooperation” and arguing for a multidimensional 
approach that incorporated interdependence of activity.   
Marwell, Schmitt & Shotola (1971) presented a study that stressed consideration of 
“cooperation” as not just entailing shared rewards (a definition for which Deutsch is cited) but 
rather also “coordinated acts which are truly ‘social,’ in that at least one of the actors must 
respond to the behavior of another” (p. 11).  Marwell, a sociology professor, and one of his co-
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authors also published a book compiling similar studies of “cooperation” that involved 
interdependent activities (Marwell & Schmitt, 1975).  In essence, these efforts seem pointed at 
recovering the “umbrella construct” (Hirsch & Levin, 1999)—re-emphasizing components of 
meaning for “cooperation” that have been overlooked through a focus on the goal-structure-
based definition and the prisoner’s dilemma operationalization.  Notably, this particular attempt 
to influence the construct was launched by a sociologist, bringing a voice that championed views 
on the construct closer to his own discipline’s perspective, implying that it, too, had a valid claim 
on researching the topic. 
Similarly, Scott & Cherrington (1974), researchers with business school affiliations, 
objected that social scientists have defined “cooperation” in the purely situational sense, 
following Deutsch.  They suggested instead (through citation of a piece in a sociology journal) 
that “cooperation and competition involve at least two orthogonal, and possibly interacting, 
dimensions; namely, differential rewarding and degree of task interdependence” (p. 748).   
Likewise, Australian researchers Kabanoff & O’Brien (1979) identified a classification of 
“types” of cooperation: “collaboration” and “coordination.”  As they defined these,  
Collaboration reflects the degree to which group members have to work simultaneously 
with one another on each aspect of the task. Coordination depends on the extent to which 
group members have different subtasks to perform, and these subtasks are arranged in an 
order of precedence. The distinction between these two types of cooperation has been 
shown to have distinct consequences for groups carrying out both intellective- and 
manipulative-type tasks. (Kabanoff & O’Brien, 1979: 529) 
 
This article makes no reference to Deutsch or other usage of “cooperation” in the field 
while focusing on this shared-task-oriented view of cooperation, and the attempted shift, despite 
publication in the prestigious JAP, gained no particular traction.  Neither their work nor that of 
Marwell or Scott & Cherrington is notably cited by later authors.  At this point, the 
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operationalized, goal-structure-based definition of “cooperation” seems to have been too strong 
to be shaken by efforts to reintroduce dimensionality or complexity to the basic construct. 
Continued studies in the intergroup tradition (cf. Sherif, Harvey, White, Hood, & Sherif, 
1988), however, did maintain the understanding that “cooperation” is something that involves 
“sharing both the labor and the fruits of the labor” (Worchel, Wong, & Scheltema, 1989: 213) or 
is “a complex process that usually involves several features, including interaction, common 
problems or goals, and common fate between the memberships [of cooperating groups]” 
(Gaertner, Mann, Dovidio, Murrell, & Pomare, 1990: 693).  Highlighting this dimensionality in 
“cooperation,” Gaertner et al referenced research suggesting that common fate alone without 
interaction is insufficient to produce the desired result of reducing prejudice.  Research in 
cooperative methods of learning (e.g., Johnson, Maruyama, Johnson, Nelson, & Skon, 1981; 
Laughlin & Adamopoulos, 1980), which employed various educational approaches involving 
differing levels of reward and task interdependence (Johnson, Johnson, & Stanne, 1985), 
similarly succeeded in retaining a multi-faceted meaning for “cooperation.”   
In fact, cooperative learning was a focal point of Deutsch’s dissertation study (Deutsch, 
1949a), and one of his students, David Johnson, was central in continuing this agenda (Deutsch, 
1999; Johnson & Johnson, 1989).  In addition to early ties with influential scholars (Sherif and 
Deutsch, respectively), what the intergroup and cooperative learning research traditions shared 
that may have facilitated the retention of a task component in “cooperation” is their application 
of the construct to serve socially-desirable ends of ending group prejudice or advancing 
education.  Both are associated with non-profit organizational goals, avoiding the controversies 
inherent to application of “cooperation” in a capitalist context.  Also, the dynamic of unequal 
power regarded as inconsistent with “cooperation” in industrial organizations is muted in 
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intergroup or cooperative learning research, where leadership or division of labor is typically 
only introduced in temporary contexts of dyads or small groups.  By presenting a relatively low 
level of conflict with prior connotations of construct meaning, plus applying the construct toward 
socially-desirable aims, this usage thus avoids the objections that arose against defining shared, 
purposive tasks within industrial settings as “cooperation.” 
Prisoner’s dilemma format defines “cooperation.”  The difficulty faced by scholars in 
establishing multidimensional perspectives on cooperation beyond intergroup or cooperative 
learning contexts may also reflect the increasingly-formidable bond forged between 
“cooperation” and the prisoner’s dilemma studies.  The operationalization was by now almost 
defining the construct, rather than the other way around.   This is evidenced by Morrison et al 
(1971), where prior boundaries on usage of “cooperation” are notably suspended.  These 
researchers found no paradox in their statement that “this experiment obtained a clear increase in 
cooperativeness from a bilateral possession of power and the ability to punish” (p. 107), whereas 
in other contexts the presence of coercive force would have been considered completely 
antithetical to the idea of “cooperation.”  This is a strong indication of how the “umbrella 
construct” (Hirsch & Levin, 1999) meaning of “cooperation” had collapsed even while the word 
remained the same.  More and more, “cooperation” seemed to be employed in prisoner’s 
dilemma studies as a symbol for the sake of continuity rather than a meaningful description of 
behavior. 
Examples of this pattern include:  Conrath (1972) using “cooperation” in quotes in an 
article title; Molm (1980) commenting that the field “traditionally” refers to a certain choice in 
the prisoner’s dilemma game as “cooperation”; and Boone & Macy (1999) placing quotation 
marks around the choices to “cooperate” or “defect.”  The punctuation shifts offer an intriguing 
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contrast with findings by Colyvas & Powell (2006) in their research on written communication 
during the process of institutionalization.  They regard the transition from presence to absence of 
quotation marks around a word as a sign that the term has attained taken-for-grantedness in the 
ongoing discourse, but here the return to use of quotation marks on words previously 
unpunctuated may reflect acknowledgement that the term has become more a label or a symbol 
than a word with otherwise-understood meanings.   
Reinforcing these notions, researchers had long ceased providing any justification or 
definition for why the choice in question exhibited “cooperation.” In fact, they often changed the 
label on the opposing choice from “compete” or “competition” to “defect/defection” or 
“individualistic,” signaling some recognition of its ambiguity, while the 
“cooperation/cooperative” label remained intact.  The continuing usage of “cooperation” in 
prisoner’s dilemma studies was important as a way of connecting with prior research, even if 
convictions about its appropriateness had weakened.  Berkowitz, Hylander & Bakaitis (1973), 
though basing their study on a different mixed-motive game, explained: “The word ‘cooperation’ 
is used throughout this paper for the sake of consistency with the literature” (p. 403).  These 
authors asserted the conviction that in their study “coexistence” was the more appropriate term to 
describe the interpersonal behavior they measured.  While they make no further explanation, the 
unusual footnote implies some other party, perhaps a journal editor or reviewer, provided the 
impetus for the change in language.   
As an aim of the initial research program dating back to May & Doob (1937) was to build 
understanding of “cooperation,” and funding for the project was inspired by the ideal meanings 
associated with this word, it is not surprising that the word “cooperation” remained a critical link 
for situating research in the stream of studies employing the prisoner’s dilemma and other 
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mixed-motive games.  While retention of the language is therefore understandable, what is 
perhaps more revealing is that the construct language persists despite a narrowing of its meaning 
to a specific operational approach—as noted before, the “umbrella construct” (Hirsch & Levin, 
1999) has collapsed in meaning while the word used remains unchanged. 
Starting in the 1980s and increasingly in the 1990s, the symbolic usage of “cooperation” 
in describing game-theoretic studies seemingly attained its full realization, as such research 
ceased to involve human participants at all, relying instead on computerized simulations as in the 
work of political scientist Robert Axelrod (1981; 1984).  Axelrod demonstrated that a “TIT for 
TAT” strategy—an exchange approach of alternating maximization for each participant, rather 
than continued attempts to exploit the opponent—ultimately proved superior to other strategies 
in generating returns.  This finding allowed him to posit an explanation for the “evolution of 
cooperation,” providing the evidence longed for by earlier sociologists to account for the natural 
development of altruistic, “cooperative” behavior out of presumably-instinctive self-interest.  
The implications of Axelrod’s modeling were quickly embraced by the field (cf. comprehensive 
citations by Bartholdi, Butler, & Trick, 1986) and computer-based simulations or econometric 
models became rampant in prisoner’s dilemma studies within a few years (cf. Hill, 1990; 
Kollock, 1993; Komorita, Hilty, & Parks, 1991; Kondo, 1990; Orbell & Dawes, 1991).   
As “cooperation” had become narrowed in meaning in the prisoner’s dilemma context 
through identification with a particular choice made within the structure of the game, 
computerized models offered a more efficient way of understanding the consequences of 
different patterns of choices—the choice process and theoretical assumptions about its rationale, 
all of which could be simulated, had become the focus of research.  Thus the device for 
measuring “cooperation” had the ultimate effect of diverting attention away from live human 
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interactions, illustrating the classic operation of a scientific paradigm as discussed by Kuhn 
(1996 [1969]) in exposing a specific set of problems to be solved while removing others from 
consideration. 
Efforts to resurrect organizational “cooperation.”  In the late 1970s there appeared the 
first of several solo-authored articles in ASQ by Michael Keeley (1978a), an assistant professor 
of organizational behavior at Loyola University in Chicago.  Keeley’s stream of five related 
articles in prestigious journals within six years (3 in ASQ and 1 each in AMJ and AMR) 
advocated in part for a renewed understanding of “cooperation” as inherent to organizational 
functioning, similar to the view offered by Barnard, whom Keeley cited prominently.  Consistent 
with Barnard’s framework, Keeley stated, for example, that “an organization will remain viable 
as long as benefits to the diverse participants are satisfactory or good enough to induce continued 
cooperation” (Keeley, 1978a: 281).  His overall emphasis was not on the “cooperation” 
terminology, centering instead on “justice” concepts (as in his first article, entitled “A Social-
Justice Approach to Organizational Evaluation”), however his renewed application of 
“cooperation” gained no wide citation or adoption.   
Evidence for continued reluctance to apply “cooperation” in an organizational setting 
extends over the decades as Levitan & Johnson (1983) refer to the “illusion” of cooperation 
between labor and management and Pondy (1992) argues that organizations are engines of 
conflict rather than, or at least in addition to, being cooperative in nature.  He cites Barnard 
disapprovingly for the view that organizations are “cooperative,” suggesting this is the 
perspective of organizational elites (with whom Barnard, by virtue of his corporate office, was 
identified).  Decades later, Barnard’s perceived violation of disinterestedness was being raised to 
discredit his views, reinforcing how such an identity interferes with the trustworthiness of 
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“scientific” actors (Shapin, 1994) and illustrating how Barnard’s influence in defining this 
particular construct was likely hindered. 
In 1983, however, a journal article introducing the construct of “Organizational 
Citizenship Behavior” (OCB) (Smith, Organ, & Near, 1983) did succeed in partially reviving 
discussion of “cooperation” in organizational contexts.  Notably, this article and subsequent 
scholarship, primarily by Dennis Organ (cf. Organ, 1988, 1997; Organ & Konovsky, 1989), 
linked initial inspiration for the OCB concept with use of “cooperation” in the work of Barnard, 
Mayo and Roethlisberger, stressing what was claimed to be their shared emphasis on the 
behaviors now defined as OCB.  Much as Parsons had done in writing The Structure of Social 
Action, Organ and colleagues reframed the history of their field to enlist earlier writers in support 
of their own revised perspective (Camic, 1986).  This strategy allowed the novel terminology to 
gain legitimacy while preserving a sense of field continuity and authority.   
Notably, however, the OCB construct was defined as “extrarole behavior,” going above 
and beyond the work that was expected or formally rewarded in an organizational context.  It 
thus retained notions of voluntarism and altruism—such “cooperation” was neither inherent to 
ordinary organizational participation nor a response to economic reward.  This “cooperation” 
aligned closely with the emphasis on spontaneous and voluntary activity from Mayo & 
Roethlisberger, while shifting away from Barnard’s usage of the term to describe the overall 
activity of formal organization.  As such, OCB’s idea of “cooperation” presented less friction 
with prior assumptions about the word’s appropriate meaning. 
The introduction of new terminology, however, also may have helped smooth acceptance 
of OCB.  Employing the term “citizenship,” especially in a North American context, invites 
connotations of free and unconstrained democratic participation.  The presumption of 
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responsibility under public, governmental authority is also accepted even in socialistic models 
where private, industrial authority is contested.  The ready contraction of the title into an 
acronym (OCB) further neutralized any connotations of its wording.  The change in language, in 
other words, was perhaps at least as important as the shift in meaning for making this construct 
sustainable.  While OCB became a widely studied concept (at 442 citations in PsycARTICLES 
alone, Smith et al (1983) was the most-cited article among all those examined for this study), 
explicit linkage of it with the term “cooperation,” except in Organ’s writing, remained rare.   
Meanwhile, research on “cooperation” by organizations or organizational units proceeded 
widely without controversy.  This notion goes at least as far back as Thompson & McEwen 
(1958), who introduced the category of “cooperative” as the label for a series of possible 
strategies for organizational interaction including “bargaining” (negotiation of an agreement), 
“co-optation” (averting threats by absorbing opponents and engaging them in leadership) and 
“coalition” (the combination of multiple organizations in a common purpose).  This 
classification was repeated by Thompson in his later book, with some slight changes in labeling 
but a continued description of “cooperative strategies” as entailing “achievement of power 
resting on an exchange of commitments” (Thompson, 2006 [1967]: 34).   
Relaxation here of the reluctance otherwise to apply “cooperation” within capitalist 
contexts may relate to the fact that organizations as collective actors, and particularly as 
comparable capitalistic entities, do not invite the same concerns regarding hierarchy and power 
inequality as when the situation is observed among individuals.  This usage also had precedent in 
the early-20th-century application of “cooperation” to the activities of business trusts.  Between 
organizations, however, “cooperation” was rarely formally defined and was predominantly 
operationalized through the counting of alliance relationships (cf. Ludwig, 1993; Singh, 1997), 
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leaving it also largely disconnected with notions of shared task performance.  Not dissimilar to 
the association of “cooperation” with prisoner’s dilemma experiments, this definition of 
“cooperation” therefore had a straightforward operationalization that was easily imitated and 
generally uncontroversial.  Much as occurred with the prisoner’s dilemma games, ready 
consensus on measurement of the construct superseded concerns about nuances of the word’s 
meaning, allowing a narrowed understanding to prevail. 
For whatever reason, “cooperation” between organizations or subunits within them 
remained the kind most readily addressed by organizational scholars as the decades passed.  The 
editors of a 1995 special research forum in the AMJ on “Intra- and Interorganizational 
Cooperation” acknowledged that only 21% of submissions for the forum concerned cooperation 
between individuals—62% focused on cooperation between companies and the remainder on 
that between groups or departments (Smith, Carroll, & Ashford, 1995: 11).  They suggested that 
“research on organizational cooperation was dominant because this topic has only recently been 
viewed as important, although research on cooperation between individuals and groups has a 
long history in psychology and sociology” (p. 11).  One of the articles in the issue (Wagner, 
1995) did cite Barnard for being “one of the first modern organization theorists” to recognize 
cooperation as essential to an organizational context and suggests that others “influenced by 
him” (among whom the author names March, Simon and Thompson) incorporated “similar 
ideas.”  None of those later writers, however, employed the word “cooperation” prominently in 
their formal theories of organization—Thompson used it most, but in describing 
interorganizational “cooperation” strategies.  If the ideas continued in some fashion, the specific 
term had largely not been applied in describing worker activities within organizations. 
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Wagner goes on to note, in fact, that “[d]espite the conceptual importance of cooperation, 
one must look outside the organization sciences to find long streams of theory and research 
concerning cooperation in the kinds of groups found in current-day organizations” (p. 152).  His 
own study, performed with students in a team-based class project, focused on the effect of 
individualistic versus collectivist orientation on their performance in group efforts.  Other studies 
in the forum focused on trust among managerial-level or professional staff (Korsgaard, 
Schweiger, & Sapienza, 1995; McAllister, 1995) or on inter-organizational cooperation 
(Browning, Beyer, & Shetler, 1995; Gulati, 1995).  None of the studies presented workers under 
managerial direction, so whether deliberately or not, the problematic application of 
“cooperation” to situations between individuals of evidently-unequal power in organizations was 
avoided.  The earlier connotations of meaning for the construct seem to have had sustained 
impact in preserving boundaries around the use of “cooperation.” 
Earlier patterns continue as period ends.  In 1995, the editors of AMJ’s special research 
forum on cooperation had noted:  “One difficulty in interpreting the theory and research on 
cooperation stems from the numerous definitions of cooperation scholars have offered without 
making much attempt to reference other usages of the term” (Smith et al., 1995: 10).  In 
subsequent years, it was not clear that their efforts to coalesce a research program in 
organizational scholarship had made any noticeable impact on this pattern.  Deutsch’s definition, 
somewhat remarkably given the almost-six-decade lapse of time, continued to be the most 
frequent reference for social science usage of the term, often from his original 1949 article (cf. 
Tauer & Harackiewicz, 2004; Tjosvold, Coleman, & Sun, 2003). His program of research and 
publications in the field of cooperation and peace-related topics (cf. Deutsch, 1973, 1985; 
Deutsch, Coleman, & Marcus, 2006) reinforced his role as an authority on the topic over the 
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years.  Prisoner’s dilemma studies and their variants, often through modeling, also continued (cf. 
Kydd, 2000; Langlois & Langlois, 2001), attesting to the institutionalization of this approach as 
synonymous with “cooperation.”  As one article noted, “The wealth of prior data on behavior in 
repeated prisoners’ dilemmas provides a ready benchmark to assess cooperative behavior” 
(Bottom, Gibson, Daniels, & Murnighan, 2002: 502). 
This result reinforces the impact of early availability of field resources on shaping a 
construct’s meaning and use within a scientific field.  Paralleling the conclusions of Stinchcombe 
(1965) about the enduring impact of the resource environment at the origin of a particular 
organizational form, the availability of resources for research on “cooperation,” later extended by 
international concerns for peace and conflict resolution, stamped the meanings and use of 
“cooperation” according to a specific trajectory.  Some forty to fifty years later, the accumulation 
of data about what researchers have for years defined as “cooperation” is taken for granted as the 
primary appropriate resource for further study of the construct. 
Meanwhile, however, other definitions showed evidence that a goal-structure-based view 
of “cooperation” remained insufficient to eradicate idealized meanings for the construct. Van 
Vugt and colleagues (2000a) defined “cooperation” as “a type of helping that can be 
distinguished from other forms of helping in 1) the number of people who profit; 2) the common 
interdependence; 3) the duration of help and 4) the nature of the helping act” (p. 5).  Here the 
influence of earlier notions about appropriate intentions for “cooperation” remains clear:  “[A] 
key, and defining, feature of cooperation…is that [it] is primarily designed to alleviate a 
structural problem in society.”  Also in line with the concerns of earlier eras, these authors 
express uncertainty over whether regulation or taxation are appropriate to ensure such 
“cooperation” occurs or if dependence on voluntarism is essential (Van Vugt et al., 2000a: 12).  
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Other writers exhibit continued assumptions that “cooperation” entails acting without or against 
pecuniary incentives (Fehr & Schmidt, 1999) or is explicitly altruistic (Turner & Valentine, 
2001).   
Such presumptions of meaning showed continued impact on the construct’s use in 
organizational contexts.  A distinction was emphasized in one study, for example, between 
“compliance” within a relationship of “labor-management cooperation” and the “‘authentic’ 
cooperation” that may possibly evolve out of this (by implication non-authentic) initial 
“cooperation” (Ospina & Yaroni, 2003: 456).  De Cremer & Van Knippenburg (2002) argue that 
“it is not self-evident that individuals in organizations cooperate” (p. 858), reserving 
“cooperation” to designate an exertion of extra effort to contribute in activities.  Consistent with 
this, studies of OCB remained popular, with “cooperation” sometimes highlighted as a label for 
the kinds of extra-role effort recognized as OCB (cf. Thau, Bennett, Stahlberg, & Werner, 2004).  
While none of the earlier ideological objections to the application of “cooperation” in situations 
of private enterprise or power disparity are raised in these articles, the barriers those notions 
helped erect seem to have resulted in a definition for “cooperation” in organizational settings that 
applies only to extra and voluntary rather than ordinary and compulsory activity. 
By the end of the period, in other words, “cooperation” was taken for granted as the 
behavior measured by prisoner’s dilemma studies, where a narrower operationalized meaning 
prevails.  Other definitions and uses of the construct, maintaining its more multi-faceted and 
idealized meanings, persisted without dislodging the primary research approach.  In 
organizational settings, however, the enduring connotations of meaning from prior eras 
continued to restrict “cooperation” to instances of voluntarism or other efforts outside of normal 
work activities.    
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Summary: Evolution of Cooperation from 1938 to 2005.  Barnard’s introduction of 
“cooperation” as a term describing the basic activity of formal organizations, including that of 
for-profit businesses, failed to conform to idealized meanings for the word as it had developed 
through 1937.  His deviations from prior conventions of meaning, coupled with his lack of 
cultural capital (Bourdieu, 1986) and violations, as a business person, with the presumptions of 
disinterestedness essential to scientific authority (Shapin, 1994), may have detracted from his 
ability to influence use of the construct.  By contrast, the widely-accepted definition of Morton 
Deutsch reinforced the psychological perspective on research developed earlier and came with 
the command of significant social and cultural capital resources (Bourdieu, 1986) through his 
academic background and scholarly connections.   
The persistence of this relatively narrow definition—highlighting “cooperation” as 
defined by goal structure and de-emphasizing the shared task activities of cooperators—was 
strengthened through association with a rapidly-instititutionalized experimental approach 
meeting contemporary concerns of international politics and political science.  Notably, the 
meaning of “cooperation” as a more multi-faceted “umbrella construct” (Hirsch & Levin, 1999) 
appears to have collapsed as it became more tightly linked with this operationalization, although 
the language for the construct itself remained the same.  The evolution of the construct was 
nevertheless strongly stamped by resources that helped give the initial impetus for a research 
program, influencing the enduring structure of its meaning much as such initial resource 
availabilities shape the ongoing structure of organizations in a given field (Stinchcombe, 1965).   
Meanwhile, application of “cooperation” within organizations where power inequalities 
or profit motives existed remained controversial and limited, due to the retention of prior notions 
of voluntarism, altruism and egalitarianisms as part of authentic forms of cooperation.  Tensions 
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in the dichotomy between “natural” and “rational” forms of cooperation (paralleling the 
Gemeinschaft/Gesellschaft distinction from Tönnies that Barley & Kunda (1992) cite) now 
seemed to be resolved by restricting the term’s application in scholarly use.  Studies of 
“cooperation” that incorporated shared task activities were largely confined to socially-desirable 
aims such as reducing intergroup prejudice or enhancing education, ends that presented less 
conflict with the construct’s altruistic associations.   
While organizational scholars studied “cooperation” among organizations themselves or 
similar collective units, the few studies of interpersonal “cooperation” in organizational contexts 
were largely confined to peer-level groups, minimizing the violation of connotations that 
excluded the construct from application in hierarchical settings.  Only the introduction of the 
OCB construct, which reintroduced “cooperation” to organizations in a voluntaristic sense under 
the label of “citizenship,” seemed to open the door for application of the construct to workers 
under management in for-profit entities.  Here the consistency with prior meanings requiring 
voluntarism in “cooperation,” combined with the new terminology of “citizenship,” seemingly 
facilitated the sustainability of this new application in research. 
 
Chapter Summary 
In this chapter I have provided an overview of findings regarding the process of construct 
evolution for Cooperation.  Through a preliminary survey, I identified how historical context up 
to 1937 helped develop meanings for “cooperation” that made its application in capitalist settings 
problematic.  Its desirability as an ideal, however, made it central to an emerging research 
agenda within social science, over which the discipline of psychology gained definitional 
control.  Barnard’s attempt to employ “cooperation” as a label for basic organizational activities 
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largely failed to conform to expectations of meaning from the prior period, and his influence 
over the construct was not sustained.  Deutsch’s definition, which aligned with objectives for 
scientific application originating in the prior period and reinforced by contemporary international 
politics, took hold.  Usage of “cooperation” in organizational scholarship developed in limited 
ways and only where it could be harmonized with the idealized meanings of egalitarianism, 
altruism and voluntarism that had developed for the construct prior to 1938. 
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CHAPTER 5:  FINDINGS - PURPOSE 
In this chapter I review findings regarding the construct evolution process for Purpose.  
To develop understanding of historical context and meanings associated with the word “purpose” 
prior to 1938, I begin with findings from the preliminary survey of its usage in the social 
sciences.  I illustrate how, in limited use, the term displayed two facets of meaning.  The first 
was largely instrumental and objective, appearing both in sociological references to “purpose” as 
a common property of organizations and in initial efforts to define the field of administrative 
science.  Another sense of “purpose,” however, was more subjective and inward, even spiritual 
in nature, describing a human attitude or emotional state.  Associations of the word with 
teleological (often explicitly religious) explanations of phenomena seem related to this latter 
understanding for the word, making the word potentially-controversial for use as a scientific 
term.  I next review the evolution process for Purpose in organizational scholarship from 1938 to 
2005, highlighting objections to “purpose” as appropriate scientific language and to the notion of 
a unified organizational purpose.  Terminology for the construct multiplied under the influence 
of multiple disciplinary preferences, while controversies over the term hindered its 
operationalization.  By the end of the period attention to the construct was largely diffuse and 
waning, despite efforts at revival.   
Preliminary Survey:  “Purpose” through 1937 
In the social sciences through 1937, there is limited attention to “purpose” as a word of 
special conceptual meaning, although the term appears as a common feature or even a 
prerequisite of “cooperation” or “organization.”  It was used broadly but largely casually in 
statements like:  “Nations, after all, are only groups of individuals associated together for the 
purpose of the most effective co-operation for common ends” (Cleveland, 1900: 36); or “The 
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object of an industrial organization is to coordinate effort for the continuous and permanent 
accomplishment of a definite purpose” (Feiss, 1915: 103).  In one sociology textbook, Cooley 
(1926) described the term “organization” as “usually understood to imply conscious purpose” (p. 
26).  Ellwood (1921) tied it to the concept of “group will,” suggesting that the “common life” of 
a “social group” entails coordination of their individual activities such that they “are brought to a 
unity of aim, and therefore, of purpose” (p. 114-5).  For Ellwood, groups “created for achieving 
some special end” fall under the category of “artificial forms of association,” which he also 
termed “artificial, purposive groups” (p. 120-1).  As these various usages suggest, “end” or 
“aim” were used more or less equivalently with “purpose” in these contexts, and no distinctive 
reasoning was presented for the choice of one term over another.   
“Purpose” was also linked in discourse with “morale,” an increasingly-popular word in 
the post-World-War-I era (cf. Hall, 1920).  “Morale” was defined by one military author as: “the 
measure of determination to succeed in the purpose for which the individual is trained, or for 
which the group exists. It describes the nature and degree of cooperation, confidence, and unity 
of understanding, sympathy, and purpose existing between the individuals composing the group” 
(Munson, The Management of Men, as quoted by Bradshaw, 1923: 494).  In its relationship to 
“morale,” a notion of “purpose” having more of an inward or subjective, versus objective, 
quality begins to emerge.  This also appears in statements like one author’s reference to “an inner 
team work of feeling and purpose; not the outer acts of co-operation, but the spirit of co-
operation” (Kern, 1919: 445).  As used here, “purpose” relates to an “inner” emotional or even 
spiritual state—with these nuances of meaning, it is impossible to imagine “end” or “aim” being 
an equivalent substitute.   
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These hints at deeper meaning for “purpose” may relate to its connotations of a 
philosophical or even religious nature.  It was one translation of the Greek word telos (τέλος) 
used by Aristotle to label the “final cause” of something—”that for the sake of which” it exists or 
is done (Metaphysics: V,2; Physics: II,3).  The concept was employed by Aristotle in reasoning 
that a being or object tends (or ought to tend) toward a state or action aligned with its telos.  The 
word “telic,” derived from telos, was used repeatedly by Lester Ward in sociological writings to 
describe action in pursuit of a conscious aim (as opposed to instinctive, or what Ward termed 
“genetic,” action).  Dealey & Ward (1920), for example, state that the “organization of 
individuals into a limited body” is “always for some specific purpose, and the word purpose 
sufficiently indicates [its] telic character” (p. 20 – emphasis in original).  Here “purpose” is 
deemed to embody the quality of being “telic.”  
The same Greek root supports the word “teleology,” associated with an appeal to 
“purposes or ‘final causes’” in explanation of scientific phenomena (Turner, 2003: 57).  In the 
early 19th century, Auguste Comte, regarded as one of the founders of sociology, developed his 
philosophy of Positivistic science in explicit rejection of teleology, eschewing all considerations 
of the cause or purpose behind phenomena in favor of a focus on the laws of its operation evident 
from empirical observation.  He associated teleology with superstition and a retreat to religious 
or metaphysical explanations, which had, he regarded, no place in the sciences (Turner, 2003).  
To the extent “purpose” retains these connotations of meaning linked with teleology or religion, 
it could therefore also be discredited for use as scientific language. 
An implicit tie between “purpose” and religion is indeed suggested by this example from 
Ward discussing the human capacity for telic action:  “To the regular course of the social 
phenomena as determined by the laws of evolution, we must conceive added a new force limiting 
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and directing these into special channels and for special ends. Its chief quality as distinguished 
from other forces is purpose. In short, it is the teleological force, the abstract conception of 
which is familiar to all, having formed the basis of theological philosophy” (Ward (1883: 57-58) 
as cited in Ward (1897: 700), with this emphasis).  Here, “purpose” is the distinctive of the 
“teleological force,” known, Ward suggests, in its “abstract conception” as “the basis of 
theological philosophy”—or, to put it more plainly, as God.  While such reasoning was never 
made explicit when “purpose” was employed in connection with organized or cooperative 
activities, its linkage to an inner or almost spiritual human attitude echoes such connotations 
from teleological use. 
The most explicit effort at a social scientific definition for “purpose” (and most consistent 
usage of it in a behavioral sense) appeared in Human Nature and Management (Tead, 1933), a 
book whose author, Ordway Tead, was prominent in the emerging field of “personnel 
administration” in the late 1920s and early 1930s (cf. Tead, 1934; Tead & Metcalf, 1933). Tead 
defined “purpose” as “an aim or objective held definitely in view for reasonably immediate and 
specific accomplishment” (Tead, 1933: 121).  He distinguished a “purpose” from a “desire,” 
which he defined as “a fundamental and usually inborn impulsion in a given direction” (p. 121).  
The distinction between “purpose” as conscious and intentional versus “desire” as inborn 
parallels the contrast between “telic” and “genetic” action as drawn by Ward, again opposing 
purposive action to that seen as more natural or inherent.   
Tead also explicitly defined the notion of “group purpose” as the “desire of its members 
to secure for themselves by acting together those conditions which will enable them to satisfy 
certain individual purposes which they consciously share” (Tead, 1933: 123).  Importantly, 
however, Tead applied “group purpose” only to groups whose members already had common 
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personal aims, such as in a trade association or labor union.  In business organizations, which are 
the focus of Tead’s discussion, he emphasizes that it is the task of the manager constantly to seek 
ways of framing the purposes of organizational leaders so that these harmonize with the personal 
purposes of employees: “[T]he purposes that can get support…are those which can be shown to a 
reasonable being to fit in with and contribute to the attaining of the things in life which he 
himself wants” (Tead, 1933: 176).  Tead’s notion of “purpose” is primarily determined by and 
for individual interests—he defines it as a group-level property only under very specific 
conditions.  Nevertheless, his book offers an example of “purpose” defined in the context of 
management and organizational life. 
Another significant use of “purpose” in relation to organizations appeared in Papers on 
the Science of Administration (Gulick & Urwick, 1937).  Published by Columbia’s Institute of 
Public Administration, the book offered a collection of early writings by those “scientifically 
interested in the phenomenon of administration” (Gulick, 1937a: v).  Importantly, the book also 
reflected rising public and governmental interest in scientific methods of organization.  Its 
publication arose in part due to the lack of ready availability of such writings as resources to 
support the efforts of the President’s Committee on Administrative Management (Gulick, 
1937a), a body formed by Franklin D. Roosevelt specifically to recommend organizational 
improvements in the Executive Branch of U.S. government (Newbold & Terry, 2006).  The 
effort signaled contemporary recognition that, as the committee stated in its report, “bad 
management may spoil good purposes, and…without good management democracy itself cannot 
achieve its highest goals” (as quoted by Newbold & Terry, 2006: 526).  In other words, 
developing scientific authority on effective administrative practices had become a project of 
national importance, and the book’s editors hoped that its publication would “advance the 
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analysis of administration, assist in the development of a standard nomenclature” and generally 
stimulate the formation of an associated scientific field (Gulick, 1937a: v).    
In Gulick’s initial chapter, the word “purpose” is prominently employed as a principle of 
organizational division, putting it very much at the center of this new agenda for administrative 
science:  Workers are characterized as being divided based on “purpose” or “process,” where 
“purpose” is the overall activity being carried out by the group (examples are “furnishing water, 
controlling crime, or conducting education”) and “process” is the specialized skill or technique 
being employed by workers (examples: “engineering, medicine, carpentry, stenography, 
statistics, accounting”) (Gulick, 1937b: 15).  These two “P’s” are joined by “persons [or things] 
dealt with or served” and “place” to compose Gulick’s four-way scheme for systematically 
classifying and arranging work units in an organization.  Elsewhere in the book, “purpose” is 
used more casually but is central to definitions of “organization” (e.g., “the form of every human 
association for the attainment of a common purpose” (Mooney & Reiley (1931) as cited by 
Urwick (1937: 50)) or “something that unites large numbers of people in some common 
purpose” (Mooney, 1937: 91)).  Repeatedly, in other words, the basic and instrumental use of 
“purpose” appeared as a central aspect of these emerging “scientific” principles for 
administration.   
In summary, while the usage of the word “purpose” through 1937 in the social sciences 
was relatively limited, the evidence points to a dichotomous perspective on its meaning.  One 
sense was outward and largely objective, the other inward and more subjective, even spiritual.  In 
the first sense, it was used in sociology to describe a basic quality of organizations or cooperative 
groups—the term was applied relatively casually, with other words (e.g., “end” or “aim”) used 
synonymously.  Superficial or instrumental connotations are likewise suggested by Ellwood’s 
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description of “artificial, purposive organizations” (Ellwood, 1921: 121) and Ward’s distinction 
between “telic” and “genetic” action, associating “purpose” with artificial and rational, as 
opposed to natural and instinctive, action.  Tead’s distinction between “purpose” and “desire,” 
where the latter is “usually inborn” in individuals, similarly suggests that purpose is something 
acquired or adopted versus innate.   
Importantly, though, “purpose” in this instrumental sense was also presented as a key 
term in budding efforts of administrative science.  While Gulick offers perhaps the most explicit 
definition of “purpose,” his use of it as just one of the “four P’s” in a formula to determine 
organizational structure could be seen as somewhat arbitrary, where the word might have been 
chosen simply for its convenient initial consonant, with limited regard for meaning.  As such, the 
designation could possibly reinforce connotations of artificiality in use of the term by others.  
The occasion for the publication of Gulick & Urwick (1937), however, was associated with 
significant hopes of inaugurating a new scientific field.  Even the book’s expressed hope to 
contribute to the creation of “a standard nomenclature” (Gulick, 1937a: v) signals that its 
language was intended to establish a precedent, making the use of “purpose” here important.  
Creation of scientific authority where none has previously existed also present a likely arena for 
disputes among rival claimants for the territory (Gieryn, 1983).  As such, the historical context 
foreshadows contention over the emerging field’s language as well. 
The second sense of meaning for “purpose” evidenced from the social sciences refers to 
an inner emotional or even spiritual state.  This may relate to linkage of the word with notions of 
teleological (purpose-based) explanations, which were construed as quasi-religious by 
comparison with naturalistic or Positivistic perspectives espoused by the likes of Darwin or 
Comte.  The teleological connotations of “purpose” thus place it on the boundary between 
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science and “non-science” (Gieryn, 1983), suggesting possible impacts on use of the term in 
scientific applications.  To the extent teleological explanation is deemed inconsistent with 
“scientific” authority, those hoping to establish or defend such authority would be likely to avoid 
words that invoke teleology, even accidentally.  In the context of attempts to establish a new 
administrative science, such connotations would likely be particularly detrimental for the use of 
“purpose.” 
Evolution of Purpose from 1938 through 2005 
In discussing the evolution of Purpose as a construct from 1938 through 2005, I will treat 
the process roughly in chronological order, but some developments occur in parallel with one 
another.  To provide an overall context, Table 5.1 offers a timeline of several key events and 
publications mentioned in the sequence of construct development. 
TABLE 5.1 – Timeline of Key Publications/Events  
 Key Publications/Events in Evolution Process for Purpose 
1933 Human Nature and Management (Tead) 
1937 Papers on the Science of Administration (Gulick & Urwick, eds.) 
1938 Functions of the Executive (Barnard)  
1946 Simon’s “Proverbs of Administration” article, attacking Gulickian notion of “purpose,” 
appears in Public Administration Review 
1947 Administrative Behavior (Simon) (Chapter 2 repeats arguments against “purpose” from 
“Proverbs of Administration”) 
1949 Wood & Dantzig article in Econometrica describes methods of linear programming to 
maximize an “objective function” 
1950 Public Administration (Simon, Smithburg & Thompson); Herbert Simon joins faculty of 
Carnegie Tech GSIA 
1954 Principles of Management (Drucker) 
1956 ASQ begins publication; initial issues feature articles by Parsons asserting “goal” as 
substitute for Barnard’s “organization purpose” 
1958 Organizations (March & Simon); Amitai Etzioni receives Ph.D. from U. of California 
(Berkeley), joins Columbia faculty; Cressey article, first of many by various authors 
stressing goal conflict in prisons, appears in Pacific Sociological Review 
1959 Reports by Ford and Carnegie Foundations on business education published, highlighting 
Carnegie GSIA as model and stressing importance of social scientific approaches in field 
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 Key Publications/Events in Evolution Process for Purpose 
1960 Etzioni article in ASQ discusses “organizational goals”; Charles Perrow receives Ph.D. 
from U. of California (Berkeley), joins U. of Michigan faculty 
1961 Perrow’s “The Analysis of Goals in Complex Organizations,” distinguishing “official” 
from “operative” goals, published in ASR; Complex Organizations (Etzioni, ed.) 
1962 Conduct of the Corporation (Moore) stresses that “mission” (not “goal” or “purpose”) is 
the appropriate term to apply to organizations; Formal Organizations (Blau & Scott) 
1963 Behavioral Theory of the Firm (Cyert & March) 
1964 Simon’s “On the Concept of Organizational Goal” published in ASQ; Modern 
Organizations (Etzioni); Economics of Discretionary Behavior (Williamson) 
1965 Warriner’s “The Problem of Organizational Purpose” published in Sociological Quarterly 
1966 The Social Psychology of Organizations (Katz & Kahn) 
1968 New edition of International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences includes entry authored 
by Perrow on “Organizational Goals” 
1969 Gross’s “The Definition of Organizational Goals” published in British Journal of 
Sociology 
1973 Mohr’s “The Concept of Organizational Goal” published in American Political Science 
Review 
1974 Management (Drucker) links “purpose and mission” 
1976 Administrative Behavior (Simon) appears in 3rd edition, revised to include Simon’s ASQ 
article on “organizational goal” as Chapter 12 
1978 First of Keeley’s articles with citations of Barnard and reference to “organizational 
purpose” appears in ASQ 
1993 First of Bartlett & Ghoshal articles arguing for revival of unitary “organizational purpose,” 
citing Barnard, appears in SMJ 
2002 Jensen article, “Value maximization, stakeholder theory, and the corporate objective 
function,” appears in issue of Business Ethics Quarterly on stakeholder concepts 
 
Initial tensions in Barnard’s “purpose.”  Chester Barnard’s 1938 book, Functions of the 
Executive, assigned a central role to “purpose” in any cooperative system, the heart of his 
conception of formal organization.  The purpose of a cooperative effort for Barnard was, quite 
simply, that which the group has been organized to accomplish.  For example, he states:  “In an 
industrial organization the purpose is the production of material goods, or services” (1968 
[1938]: 154).  Within the context of cooperative effort, Barnard stressed that fixing a purpose is 
an act that, by placing limits on choice, makes choice possible.  Indeed, he defined arriving at a 
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purpose as being “the attempt to limit the conditions of choice, so that it is practicable to exercise 
the capacity of will” (1968 [1938]: 14).  By way of illustration, he noted that a person awaking in 
a boat, having been set adrift on a foggy night, has no way to choose a direction to paddle.  The 
initial conception of purpose thus generates both the action of individuals and, in the process 
outlined by Barnard, the impulse toward cooperation and organization as a means of overcoming 
identified obstacles to attaining the purpose.  Further, a purpose enables decision-making by 
giving meaning to the circumstances and allowing “limitations”—so perceived because they 
impede the accomplishment of purpose—to be isolated and focused on for action.   
A second key aspect of the operation of purpose is that it provides a vision of future 
possibility.  The necessity of this to its function is apparent from Barnard’s emphasis that the 
purpose must be regarded as possible to be accomplished for effort toward it to continue, and 
that repeated failures to accomplish the stated purpose will doom the organization, as a sense of 
futility drains the willingness of participants to cooperate.  Finally, purpose serves a role in 
coordinating individual efforts within the overall organizational system.  This stems from the 
shared understanding of what is “good for the organization,” conceived by reference to its 
purpose, which Barnard terms “organizational morality.”  This allows individual participants to 
assess actions as right or wrong with respect to how they advance or detract from the 
organization’s purpose.   
Barnard cited no references for his usage of “purpose” in the book when it appeared in 
1938, and it fails to conform fully to any of the precedents identified in earlier writing on 
“purpose” in the social sciences.  Barnard’s use is consistent with the sociological presumption 
that organizations have a “common purpose,” but he goes much further by elaborating the term 
in a full-blown model of organizational operation.  While the example of “making shoes” given 
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by Barnard as a “purpose” (cf. Barnard, 1968 [1938]: 92) has the same concreteness evident in 
Gulick’s example of “furnishing water,” Barnard’s association of “purpose” with “organizational 
morality” hints at an ideal as well as instrumental aspect for the term.  He also uses it not as just 
one of several principles for dividing staff (which Gulick did) but as the central component in a 
dynamic model applying to an organization as a whole.   
Like Tead, Barnard also describes distinctive individual purposes as existing within 
organizations, but he does not propose that managers manipulate the presentation of 
organizational purposes to develop a perceived equivalence between these purposes and the 
purposes of workers—instead, Barnard describes a process whereby the accomplishment of 
organizational purpose generates resources (e.g., income, status, opportunities, other intangible 
rewards) that in turn are distributed to individual participants to satisfy their own purposes for 
participation. Barnard’s separation between “formal organization” (distinguished by shared 
purpose and maintained by consent of participants in the organizational economy) and “informal 
organization” (the social structure developing from individual purposes only) echoes the earlier 
distinctions between rational and natural (e.g., “telic” and “genetic”) action.  He makes no 
suggestion, however, that “purpose” is artificial, employing that same term at both the 
organizational and individual level so as to suggest equivalence in its nature.   
Overall, Barnard’s elaborated definition of  “purpose” seems to link qualities evident 
only in separation from one another when the word was used by prior authors, making it 
particularly well-qualified for consideration as an “umbrella construct” (Hirsch & Levin, 1999).  
At the same time, however, this effort to combine instrumental and ideal meanings presents a 
tension—mixing the mundane (“making shoes”) with the language of “morality” stretches the 
conceptions of each.  The tension confronts the same kind of “natural/rational” dichotomy 
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embodied by Tönnies’ Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft conceptions of organization, a dichotomy 
which Barley & Kunda (1992) suggest could not be reconciled but rather has resulted in 
alternating cycles of emphasis on these respective poles in management rhetoric.  While any 
“umbrella construct” attempts to convey a broad meaning, combining two meanings deemed as 
irreconcilable with one another seems particularly likely to make the construct fragile. 
Immediately subsequent to Barnard’s work, however, mentions of “purpose” in academic 
writing showed consistency with his usage or the apparent common understanding, such as 
Sanderson (1938), who wrote: “At least two things are fundamentally necessary to any 
association—a common purpose or purposes and, to a certain extent, rules of common action” 
(p. 199).  Stene (1940) cited Barnard and, much like him, identified one of the three elements of 
every social organization to be “a common purpose, or a common task to be performed” (p. 
1127).  In an early empirically-oriented article, Treudley (1946) described a classroom 
discussion about the dynamics of a club organization and noted how her students found the 
concept of “purpose” (for which she identifies Barnard as the source of their understanding) 
central to the club’s operation as they analyzed it.  Continuing into the 1950s, authors employed 
“purpose” in the organizational sense as Barnard did and cited him for such usage (cf. Kriesberg 
& Guetzkow, 1950; Latham, 1952).  By then, however, attacks on the term were also underway, 
focusing on its unsuitability for the creation of scientific authority in the field.   
 Attacks on “purpose” emerge.  A journal article disputing the validity of “purpose” as an 
organizational construct appeared in the Public Administration Review in 1946, but the criticisms 
focused on its use by Gulick, not Barnard.  The author was Herbert Simon, a young professor at 
Illinois Tech, and the article, entitled “Proverbs of Administration” (Simon, 1946), presented 
arguments which would also appear in Chapter Two of Simon’s Administrative Behavior, 
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published the following year.  Simon took on the Gulickian idea of “purpose” as contrasted with 
“process,” debunking it in favor of his own conception of administrative science, centered on 
decision-making. Simon objected that “purpose” and “process” as used by Gulick were 
ambiguous and overlapping terms, so that any distinction between them was artificially-created.  
Moreover, he asserted that neither was truly identifiable in the singular form but always involved 
a nesting (i.e., of subpurposes within purposes):   
It must be concluded that there is no such thing as a purpose, or a unifunctional (single-
purpose) organization...If the English language has a comprehensive term which covers 
both of two subpurposes it is natural to think of the two together as a single purpose. If 
such a term is lacking, the two subpurposes become purposes in their own right. On the 
other hand, a single activity may contribute to several objectives, but since they are 
technically (procedurally) inseparable, the activity is considered a single function or 
purpose...There is, then, no essential difference between a “purpose” and a “process,” but 
only a distinction of degree.  A “process” is an activity whose immediate purpose is at a 
low level in the hierarchy of means and ends, while a “purpose” is a collection of 
activities whose orienting value or aim is at a high level in the means-end hierarchy. 
(Simon, 1946: 59) 
 
For Simon, these kinds of incongruities made the terms unworkable for scientists:  Concepts, he 
argued, “to be scientifically useful, must be operational; that is, their meanings must correspond 
to empirically observable facts or situations” (Simon, 1946: 62).  The argument seems a clear-cut 
case of boundary-work (Gieryn, 1983) by Simon in attempting to establish his own authority in 
the development of a new administrative “science.”  The prominent effort toward this end 
embodied in Gulick & Urwick (1937)—an effort backed by the sanction of those experts by the 
federal government—is, not surprisingly, Simon’s target to brand as “non-science” in order to 
elevate his alternative view.  He picks apart Gulick’s core principles of organization design to 
justify an even more “scientific” perspective on organizations.  In the process, he singles out 
“purpose” as being problematic and non-scientific.  Although his attack was not directed toward 
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Barnard, Simon’s arguments against “purpose” could have weakened legitimacy overall for use 
of the word in organizational scholarship.   
Meanwhile, there was evidence that teleological connotations indeed presented obstacles 
to social scientists employing the word “purpose” in theoretical language. Writing in the 
Psychological Review, Moore & Lewis (1953) felt it necessary to make an extended defense of 
their use of “purpose” in connection with learning theory: “We shall be concerned in this paper 
with the notion of ‘purpose,’ a notion that has long troubled social and biological scientists” (p. 
149).  They continued by acknowledging that some psychologists “have insisted vehemently that 
teleological concepts such as ‘purpose’ either have no place in an objective account of behavior 
or at most can be introduced only after they have been derived from primary principles.”  Some, 
they suggested, argue that “if by ‘purpose’ is not meant some metaphysical notion, the word 
should not be used at all.”  As the very mention of “purpose” prompted association with 
teleological causation rather than the now-preeminent naturalistic or evolutionary paradigms of 
explanation, it was a term of suspect validity in the sciences.  The advice is explicit—stay away 
from the term unless you mean to invoke its metaphysical aspects.  To do otherwise poses 
unnecessary threats to your credibility as a scientist, as employing language considered to be 
“non-scientific” offers an easy target for boundary-work (Gieryn, 1983) by scholars opposing 
your claims. 
While the word “purpose” was problematic enough on its own, psychological 
perspectives on behavior also confined notions that implied intention or will to the individual 
only (as used by Tead, for example).  Bergmann (1962), a sociologist, seemed to speak for many 
in terming to the identification of purpose for a group as “nonsense”:  “Human purposes are facts 
among facts. In any other sense, purpose has no place in science. Those who demur are the 
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teleologists....To the extent one thinks teleologically, he does not think scientifically” (p. 237).   
The concerns here are compound—teleological thinking is non-scientific, and thinking that 
groups (rather than individuals) can have anything like a purpose is also non-scientific.  A group-
level “purpose,” therefore, fails the test for “scientific” use on both counts.   
In fact, “purpose” did gain some use as a theoretical construct in psychology, but in a 
way that conformed to both the individual-level expectations and the metaphysical connotations 
of the term.  The “Purpose-in-Life” measure (Crumbaugh & Maholick, 1964), sometimes 
abbreviated PIL, which equated “purpose” with subjective perceptions of “meaning” in life, was 
employed in several published studies.  However, in line with the expectation that “purpose” was 
somehow a quasi-religious notion, this measure most commonly appeared in studies related to 
religious beliefs or vocations (cf. Hicks, 1981; Paloutzian, 1981). 
Whether in Simon’s effort to establish his authority in administrative science against 
Gulick’s, or in concerns about its religious or metaphysical implications, “purpose” was being 
branded as a “non-scientific” word.  As such, those attempting to establish authority for the 
emerging field of organizational scholarship would be likely to avoid its use so as to make 
themselves less vulnerable to boundary-work attacks from other scholars interested in claiming 
the same territory (Gieryn, 1983). 
 Substitutes for “purpose”: “Goal” and “objective” emerge.  In fact, while their reasons 
for not using the term “purpose” were rarely expressed, authors in organizational scholarship had 
been employing alternative terms for the notion of an organizational aim well before Simon’s 
1946 attack.  In sociology journals, Thorner (1942) and Selznick (1943) used the term “goal” 
exclusively or primarily, as Selznick, while citing Barnard and noting theories of “purposive 
organization,” implicitly equated the shared “purpose” from Barnard’s usage with the “professed 
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or ‘original’ goals of the organization” (p. 48 – emphasis added).  Phelps (1942), writing in a 
business journal, referred to “common goal” rather than “purpose” as the prerequisite of 
organization, using “objective” in an equivalent sense as well. 
In Administrative Behavior, Simon applied the term “organization objective” to an 
organization’s “service aim” and called the “output of product” the “organization goal” (Simon, 
1976 [1947]: 113), both uses which resembled the way Barnard had applied “purpose.”  Simon 
did use the word “purpose” occasionally, but “goal” and “objective” dominate, understandably 
given his apparent interest to distinguish his work from Gulick’s and likewise to avoid 
terminology he himself had branded as non-scientific.  Tannenbaum (1949) drew heavily on 
Barnard for his conceptualization of “purpose” but also equated it with “objective,” following 
Simon’s language: “the purpose at any time is always the formal objective of all members of the 
group” (p. 226).   
In Public Administration (Simon, Smithburg, & Thompson, 1950), Simon and his co-
authors initially identified the element of purpose in cooperation with an example very close to 
Barnard’s usage:  “[W]hen two men cooperate to roll a stone that neither could have rolled 
alone…this simple act has the two basic characteristics of what has come to be called 
administration.  There is a purpose—moving the stone—and there is cooperative action” (Simon 
et al., 1950: 3 - emphasis in original).  In this book also, however, “organization objective” and 
“organization goal” emerge as the more dominant terms used.  Limited use of “purpose” offered 
some value for Simon in identifying his work with Barnard’s—Barnard had, after all, written the 
foreword for Administrative Behavior at Simon’s request (Wolf, 1995), and Simon indicated his 
debts to Barnard for many concepts in the book (cf., for example, Simon, 1976 [1947]: 110n, 
113n, 221n).  Undermining Barnard’s use of the term as thoroughly as he had Gulick’s would 
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come at some cost to Simon’s own credibility.  The shift toward “goal” and “objective,” 
however, offered terminology with less baggage, more flexibility and wider scientific acceptance 
than “purpose.” 
The multiplication of terminology, in fact, points at the dynamics of communication in 
the emergent, interdisciplinary field of organizational scholarship.  Even as the establishment of 
authority for a new field required “scientific” language, the need to communicate among 
disciplines such as sociology, psychology and economics in the developing field demanded 
language acceptable to all.  Constructs in an interdisciplinary environment must be suitable for 
use as what Star & Griesemer (1989) have called “boundary objects”—terms that facilitate 
communication through being easily translated by a variety of distinct groups with interest in the 
information. 
The word “objective,” in fact, had a variety of helpful connotations for scientific use—
most prominently, basic principles of empiricism emphasize the value of “objective” evidence 
about a phenomenon.  The term also invoked the optimization techniques of “linear 
programming” and similar mathematical modeling tools emerging in the late 1940s and early 
1950s.  These methods were increasingly regarded as state-of-the-art approaches to solving 
multivariate decision-making problems in businesses and national economies.  One early 
description of linear programming emphasizes how “the selection and types of activities are 
made to depend on the maximization of an objective function” (Wood & Dantzig, 1949: 193).  In 
1950, Herbert Simon, now on the faculty of Carnegie Tech’s new Graduate School of Industrial 
Administration (GSIA), helped teach a course in linear programming to the school’s first class of 
Master’s students (Simon, 1991: 142), evidence both of Simon’s familiarity with the method and 
of its prominence in what was regarded as a cutting-edge management education program.   
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While the term “objective” was understandably a desirable choice among those hoping to 
establish scientific authority for the field of organizational scholarship, its use had implications 
for the meaning of the construct as well.  Importantly, this particular term pointed the construct 
away from defining a task (such as Barnard’s exemplary “purpose” of “making shoes”) and 
toward a quantifiable measure (such as profit or sales) which could meaningfully be 
“maximized.”  The impact of theoretical language on shaping observations—much as has been 
emphasized with the use of measurement instrumentation in scientific paradigms (Kuhn, 1996 
[1969])—is thus apparent in this early choice of alternative terminology for Purpose.  The word 
used shifted the focus so as to implicitly exclude non-quantifiable aims.   
Scholarly writers with significant practitioner audiences could now be seen employing 
“purpose” in limited ways but gravitating toward “objective”:  In a pamphlet published by the 
American Management Association, Urwick (1952) defined “Purpose” as the “first principle of 
organization,” largely following Barnard’s use of it as the core of cooperation (“unless we have a 
purpose there is no reason why individuals should cooperate together at all or why anyone 
should try to organize them” – Urwick (1952: 18)).  He formally termed this rule the “Principle 
of the Objective,” however.  Management consultant and scholar Peter Drucker pronounced in 
The Practice of Management (Drucker, 1954) that “there is only one valid definition of business 
purpose:  to create a customer” (p. 37).  Although he uses the word “purpose,” even here Drucker 
departs from Barnard in disallowing the possibility of distinctions in “purpose” for different 
business organizations.  Drucker’s book instead predominately used “objective” and the phrase 
“management by objectives” to define how businesses should set direction for activities.  He 
wrote, for example: “An objective, a goal, a target serves to determine what action to take today 
to obtain results tomorrow” (p. 88). 
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While “objective” was emerging as a preferred term in writing and education for business 
practitioners, sociologists continued to favor “goal.”  In 1956, a powerful voice validating this 
use in organizational scholarship arose in ASQ, one of the first scholarly journals in the emerging 
field of administrative science.  Sociologist Talcott Parsons authored a two-part article in the 
journal’s first two issues presenting “a sociological approach to the theory of organizations” 
(Parsons, 1956b, 1956a).  Parsons cited Barnard and followed his theorizing very closely and 
accurately, but shifted his terminology from “purpose” to “goal” without comment, as with the 
assertion that for “all organizations there is something analogous to a ‘market’ for the output 
which constitutes the attainment of its goal (what Chester Barnard calls ‘organization purpose’)” 
(Parsons, 1956b: 65).  Later he repeated the identification:  “Devotion of the organization (and 
hence the resources it controls) to production is legitimized as is the maintenance of the primacy 
of this goal over other functional interests which may arise within the organization. This is 
Barnard’s ‘organization purpose’” (Parsons, 1956b: 68).  While Parsons nodded to Barnard’s 
precedent in discussion of the concept, his language choice reinforced “goal” as the preferred 
term in scientific discourse for sociologists writing about organizations.  This precedent by a 
figure with high cultural capital (Bourdieu, 1986) in the sociology field due to his employment at 
Harvard and multiple, influential publications, appearing as it did during an early and defining 
stage for language and scholarship in the organizational field, provided a strong impetus for 
sustaining the construct usage. 
Whether coincidentally or not, Simon’s next major theoretical work, Organizations 
(March & Simon, 1958), displayed terminology aligned with Parsons’, using  “goal” almost 
exclusively to refer to a shared organizational aim.  By now, however, the acceptance of 
pluralism in such language was increasing.  In an article in The Journal of the Academy of 
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Management (later to become AMJ), Dauten (1958) acknowledged in his footnotes a distinction 
in usage of the various terms, based on more specific meanings in psychology, but explicitly 
resolved to treat them interchangeably: 
There seems to be some confusion in terminology in connection with such ideas as 
objectives, purposes, and goals. Most psychologists use the term “goal” to refer to the 
more specific reward that an individual seeks in order to achieve his broader objectives 
and/or the reduction of psycho-physical tension. However, if a man is thirsty, water is not 
necessarily his goal—nor is a glass of beer. Any one of a number of “goals” would 
relieve his thirst. Strictly speaking, therefore, his objective and his goal are of the same 
nature: he seeks one thing, namely, to satisfy his thirst. … Accordingly, we shall use the 
terms objectives, purposes, and goals interchangeably, except when the context indicates 
that one of these terms is a means to another one. (Dauten, 1958: 31-32) 
 
The equivalence of such terms was similarly acknowledged by Arrow (1964), who defined an 
“organization” as “a group of individuals seeking to achieve some common goals, or, in different 
language, to maximize an objective function” (p. 398).  The pluralism in language reinforces 
how the interdisciplinary context of emerging organizational scholarship prompted deployment 
of theoretical constructs suitable for translation across disciplines with a minimum of resistance.  
Concession to a multiplicity of possible terms permitted the inclusiveness essential for achieving 
consensus on theoretical development in the interdisciplinary field. 
The most desirable terminology would be that acceptable to multiple constituencies, 
much as the attribute of “multivocality” offers advantages to a potential leader in coalition-
building (Padgett & Ansell, 1993).   By this measure, the word “goal” was a worthy candidate, 
having, as noted by Dauten (1958), broad usage in behavioral theories in psychology, along with 
being the established preference of sociologists like Selznick and Parsons in organizational 
scholarship.  The term “objectives” allowed linkage with the “objective functions” of economics 
and linear programming, as well as the language of business practitioners.  Only the term 
“purpose” had no significant constituency of support, and its use as a scientific construct had 
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instead been attacked by Simon (for usage by Gulick) and by others objecting to its teleological 
connotations.  Unsurprisingly, the alternative terms, more acceptable both as scientific language 
and as boundary objects (Star & Griesemer, 1989) for interdisciplinary communication, were 
increasingly substituted for “purpose” in organizational scholarship.   
Challenges to unity in organizational purpose.  While the terminology for the construct 
became increasingly varied, another group of scholars challenged the notion of unitary 
organizational purpose entirely.  While largely using “goals” nomenclature, these researchers 
focused not on word choice but on characterizing conflict rather than unity as inherent to any 
organizational aim.  Prominent in the conversation were two young sociologists—Amitai Etzioni 
and Charles Perrow.  In 1958 and 1960, respectively, each had received a doctorate from the 
University of California-Berkeley in sociology, studying in a department headlined by Reinhard 
Bendix, an early critic of the notion of organizational purpose.   
Bendix asserted that it was “meaningless to distinguish between different organizations 
by the ‘purposes’ they are said to serve. The ‘purpose’ of any organization is determined by the 
‘interests’ of its ruling clique” (Bendix, 1947: 494).  His continued use of quotation marks 
around “purpose” in the article suggests his cynicism.  He emphasized that the “purpose” of any 
organization was personally determined by those in power, meaning that external proclamations 
about it are not to be taken at face value:  “Except as individual cases are examined empirically, 
it is difficult, if not impossible, to determine in what manner the various ‘interests’ of individuals 
have contributed towards the ‘purpose’ of a business” (p. 494).   These perspectives—that 
organizational purpose is to be viewed skeptically, being purely a function of elite power 
interests, and that it may only validly be examined by building up empirical evidence that 
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acknowledges the diversity of influences shaping it—appear in work by Etzioni and Perrow as 
well, suggesting the effect of such personal scholarly networks in influencing the field. 
Etzioni, writing in ASQ, described “organizational goals” as “sets of meanings depicting 
target states” (Etzioni, 1960: 258), regarding them as cultural components of an organization’s 
social structure.   His article specifically criticizes the “goal model” of assessing organizational 
effectiveness (i.e., the presumption that an organization achieving its “goals” is an “effective” 
organization).  Such an approach, he argued, merely reinforces the perspective of dominant elites 
who have determined the goals.  A researcher, Etzioni urged, “must be constantly aware of the 
danger of taking over the viewpoint of any single personnel group, including that of a group 
which carries the bulk of the goal activities. He cannot consider the perspective of any group or 
elite as a satisfactory view of the organization as a whole, of its effectiveness, needs, and 
potentialities” (Etzioni, 1960: 278).   
This argument implicitly invokes autonomy as an essential quality of credible scientific 
claims.  For the social researcher’s conclusions to have legitimate authority, Etzioni suggests, he 
or she must form them from a perspective outside that of specific interests within the group being 
studied.  Such reasoning parallels the emphasis by Shapin (1994) on the importance of an 
appearance of disinterestedness in a trustworthy scientific “truth-teller.”  To legitimize unified 
organizational goals, which by default represent the perspective of elites, violates presumptions 
of disinterest, thereby discrediting the authority of any aspiring “scientist.”  In the context of 
desires to establish the new field of organizational scholarship as a whole, arguments for what 
would preserve scientific authority seem understandably prominent.  
Etzioni’s further discussions of the “goal” concept, reinforcing its cultural and socially-
determined character, appeared in subsequent books (Etzioni, 1961, 1964), and his definitions 
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and arguments were quickly cited (cf. Pugh et al., 1963; Young & Hughes, 1965).  Meanwhile 
Perrow (1961), in a string of scholarly efforts focused on goal conflict, introduced a distinction 
between “official” and “operative” goals.  The former appear merely in written statements about 
an organization and are construed ultimately as symbolic, while the latter are evident from the 
actions of organization members and are, Perrow argues, the ones that really matter and should 
be the focus of any organizational study.  Like Etzioni, Perrow was quickly cited for this 
conception, giving rise to papers that focused on the “operative” goals as he defined them (cf. 
Haas, Hall, & Johnson, 1963).    
The rapid influence of such recently-minted doctoral graduates is striking.  While their 
early articles appeared in high-profile journals, both Etzioni and Perrow also benefited from 
early contact with Bendix and from faculty positions at well-resourced institutions where they 
connected with other key figures in the developing field of organizational scholarship.  Etzioni 
taught at Columbia University, home to the influential sociologist Robert Merton, who had 
developed similarly-influential students such as Philip Selznick, Alvin Gouldner and Peter Blau 
(Haveman, 2009), all notably publishing on the topics of bureaucracy and organizations starting 
in the 1940s and 1950s.  Columbia also housed the Bureau of Applied Social Research, giving 
rise to further possibilities for research funding.  Perrow published his early articles from a 
faculty post at the University of Michigan, which was the site of significant early research in the 
organizational field through the Survey Research Center under Rensis Likert, a program 
supporting the work of Katz & Kahn, among others (cf. Katz & Kahn, 1966: vii).  These avenues 
to social, cultural and economic capital (Bourdieu, 1986), while not the only explanations for the 
immediate citations of Perrow’s and Etzioni’s work, certainly presented advantages for them in 
developing influence over the field. 
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Not all use of “purpose” in organizations was lost by this time, but the overall notion of 
the construct was increasingly viewed as problematic.  Clark & Wilson (1961) commented: “The 
notion of organizational purpose is a confusing one in almost all the literature on the subject. 
[These writers] … assume that all organizations have a purpose or goal.  What they mean by 
purpose is never very clear” (p. 135n).   Clark & Wilson lumped together Barnard and the 
Carnegie GSIA writers as examples of those using the ill-defined notion of “purpose,” despite 
the latter group’s preference for “goal” language by this point (and despite Simon’s prior attacks 
on the lack of clarity in Gulickian “purpose”).  For their own part, Clark & Wilson associated the 
idea of “purpose” with a category of incentives, suggesting that there are “purposive 
organizations” which “rely almost exclusively upon their stated purposes as incentives to attract 
and hold contributors” (p. 146). They suggested that volunteer or other cause-based 
organizations fit this definition.   
While the use by Clark & Wilson in some measure affirmed a place for “purpose” within 
organizational scholarship, it also narrowed its application considerably, as this definition made 
only some organizations “purposive.”  This contrasts notably with the presumption by Barnard 
that “purpose” was a property of all organizations and with the comparably-broad application of 
the phrase “purposive organization” by the likes of Ellwood (1921) and Selznick (1943).  In 
essence, Clark & Wilson trimmed the “umbrella construct” (Hirsch & Levin, 1999) somewhat, 
reducing its application.  Importantly, they narrowed the use of “purpose” largely to 
organizations pursuing goals of moral or even spiritual value, where participants are drawn by 
altruistic motives rather than economic reward.  This confined it to settings where quasi-religious 
connotations for “purpose” were less troublesome or even fitting, churches being one possible 
example of “purposive organizations” in this sense.  The idea that such organizations would 
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consist primarily of volunteers drawn together by the “purpose” also favors a collectively-driven 
view of purpose and somewhat neutralizes concerns over the privilege of elites in determining 
it—those who reject it as an incentive for participation are free to walk away.  This narrower 
application of “purpose” thus presented less basis for the objections leveled against 
“organizational purpose” in other instances, offering it better prospects for survival. 
 Zald (1963) offered one of many studies during the period that reinforced the growing 
emphasis on conflict rather than unity in goals by examining prison settings (cf. Berk, 1966; 
Cressey, 1958; Fisher, 1961; Grusky, 1959; Mouledous, 1963; Street, 1965).  These articles 
typically highlighted difficulties inherent to transforming penitentiaries from institutions with the 
primary goal of maintaining secure custody of inmates into ones with rehabilitative or 
“treatment” agendas. Zald’s piece is notable for his summary of the use of “goal” in 
organizational thinking up to that point, articulating five distinct perspectives.  He himself 
exclusively employed “goal” for the construct, although a quote from one of the authors he 
referenced (Drucker) spoke of “purpose.”  Zald’s five categories, and the key authors he tabbed 
for each, were: “goals as functions” (Parsons); “goals as serving external clients” (Drucker); 
“goals as official mandates” (no author named); “goals as executive’s values” (Simon); and 
“staff perspective on goals” (Selznick) (Zald, 1963: 207-210).   In a footnote he mentions a sixth 
perspective in which “organizational goals are the outputs of the organization, or, if not the 
actual outputs, the aims of the major operating programs.”  Notably, nowhere in the article does 
Zald cite or refer to Barnard’s work, although three of the five authors whose perspectives he 
described (Parsons, Selznick and Simon) had done so prominently in their own theoretical 
writing on goals.   
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While it is impossible to say for certain why Barnard’s name was omitted from the 
review, he seemed to face several disadvantages in sustaining influence among scholars.  Unlike 
the writers cited by Zald, Barnard did not hold an advanced academic degree or a faculty 
position, depriving him of resources of cultural capital (Bourdieu, 1986).  His background  as a 
business leader also violated the presumptions of disinterestedness for scientific actors (Shapin, 
1994) that had been reinforced by Etzioni (1960).  While Zald’s work in one sense reflects the 
typological partitioning of meaning expected after increasing use of an “umbrella construct” 
(Hirsch & Levin, 1999), it is noteworthy that neither Barnard’s term (“purpose”) or his efforts at 
definition were included in the conversation.   
 Coalition strengthens against unitary construct.  While sociologists like Perrow and 
Etzioni developed their critiques on the concept of unified organizational goals largely out of 
concerns over power issues, a fragmented view of organizational goals was also congenial to the 
perspective of the Carnegie GSIA writers.  The next major offering from their scholarly 
community was A Behavioral Theory of the Firm (Cyert & March, 1963), which reinforced the 
emphasis prominent in Simon (1976 [1947]) and March & Simon (1958) on decision-making as 
the central operation of organizational functioning.  One of the four major components of the 
book’s titular “theory” was a sub-theory of “organizational goals,” though the authors employed 
the term “organizational objectives” as effectively synonymous.  Reiterating the objection that 
individuals have goals but collectivities do not, the authors suggested that “the problem is to 
specify organizational goals without postulating an ‘organizational mind’” (Cyert & March, 
1963: 26).   
Here the need to establish “scientific” authority for organizational scholarship is 
manifested through concerns for conformity to the assumptions of the already-credible field of 
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behavioral psychology.  To resolve the issues concerning collective goals, Cyert & March 
theorized organizational operation as the function of a coalition in which various participants 
bargain with others to win a group consensus—they concluded that “organizational goals are a 
series of aspiration-level constraints imposed on the organization by members of the 
organizational coalition” (Cyert & March, 1963: 117).  While this description lacks the critical 
stance toward presumed superiority of organizational elites in this coalition, it is otherwise 
compatible with the picture of social reality in organizations described by Perrow, Etzioni and 
others.  All concur that there is no “organizational goal” of any kind except by imposition in an 
overall context of conflict among interest groups.  Now, despite differing emphases in reasoning 
of the two camps, concerns to establish scientific authority seemed to have produced a scholarly 
coalition regarding organizational goals that accommodated both the sociological theorists and 
the Carnegie School.  The agreement of their perspectives on this point solidified the consensus 
against a unitary “organizational goal” notion.   
The next year an ASQ article by Simon crystallized the Carnegie GSIA school’s position 
on goals, defining them as “value premises that can serve as inputs to decisions” (Simon, 1964: 
3).  Like Cyert & March in their book, Simon asserted that any characterization of a singular, 
unitary goal for the organization is inappropriate:  “What is the meaning of the phrase 
‘organizational goal’? … [I]t is doubtful whether decisions are generally directed toward 
achieving a goal. It is easier, and clearer, to view decisions as being concerned with discovering 
courses of action that satisfy a whole set of constraints. It is this set, and not any one of its 
members, that is most accurately viewed as the goal of the action” (Simon, 1964: 20 - emphasis 
in original).   
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Simon’s argument here hearkens back to his criticism of Gulick’s “purpose” with the 
demand that scientific concepts “must correspond to empirically observable facts or situations” 
(Simon, 1946: 62).  Again, he aimed to justify scientific authority for his conceptual perspective 
by attacking the clarity and empirical validity of the competing construct—placing it, by 
implication, outside the boundaries appropriate for scientific study.  His reasoning therefore 
constitutes a boundary-work effort (Gieryn, 1983) in service of establishing the scientific 
credibility of organizational scholarship.  Unlike his earlier article, he here disestablishes not the 
word “purpose” but the concept of unified organizational goal.  Through the combination of 
arguments, however, Barnard’s notion of a singular “purpose” for an organization has been 
effectively demolished.   
The strength of Simon’s influence was backed by others at the Carnegie GSIA, as Simon 
was careful to assert that his conceptual definition was “generally compatible with, but not 
identical to” (Simon, 1964: 2n) that expressed in Cyert & March’s book.  The team effort of 
scholarship at the Carnegie School (cf. March, 2007) offered a united voice against the concept 
of a unitary goal, and its influence was strengthened by recognition of the GSIA as a model to be 
imitated by other emerging business schools, with funds from the Ford Foundation offered as 
incentives for such efforts (cf. Khurana, 2007; Simon, 1991).  Social, cultural and economic 
capital resources (Bourdieu, 1986), in other words, all flowed to help support the scholarly 
perspectives endorsed by the school.  The message of Simon’s 1964 ASQ article would be further 
institutionalized into the field by his choice to include it as Chapter Twelve in the 1976 revision 
of Administrative Behavior, heading the list of six supplemental chapters for the new edition.   
 Given the combination of high interest in and high skepticism about “organizational 
purpose” during the 1960s, it is not surprising that the only journal article with the phrase in its 
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title appeared at this time and characterized it as a “problem.”  In “The Problem of 
Organizational Purpose,” Warriner (1965) reiterated the position of Etzioni in stressing that 
“purpose” is a cultural and social property, therefore appropriately drawn from actual operations 
rather than official statements, which are to be “treated as fictions” (p. 141).  Warriner attempted 
to operationalize “organizational purpose” in a study through creating an “assumed value 
function” based on percentages of employees’ time spent in various activities—his paper 
illustrates and defends this empirical approach.  In so doing, however, it also shows how the term 
“values” was starting to join those closely associated with, if not quite synonymous to, “goals” in 
organizations.  Simon’s 1964 article had equated “goals” with “value premises” in decision-
making, and the language was similarly well-suited to the cultural perspective on social systems 
favored by sociologists.  The customary plurality of “values” was consistent with the fragmented 
understanding of organizational aims and, like “goals” and “objectives,” the term was familiar to 
multiple social science disciplines, making it a useful boundary object (Star & Griesemer, 1989) 
for interdisciplinary communication.  
In The Social Psychology of Organizations (Katz & Kahn, 1966) the authors also employ 
“value” terminology, describing a construction of “roles, norms and values” (p. 36-7) as 
composing the “social-psychological bases of social systems” (p. 36-7).  Reflecting the growing 
consensus, Katz & Kahn rejected unitary purpose concepts.  While they concede these occur in 
what they term a “common sense approach to understanding an organization,” they dismiss such 
ideas as inappropriate for scientific study:  “Though the founders of organizations and its key 
members do think in teleological terms about organizational objectives, we should not accept 
such practical thinking…in place of a theoretical set of constructs for purposes of scientific 
analysis….The theoretical concepts should begin with the input, output, and functioning of the 
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organization as a system and not with the rational purposes of its leaders” (Katz & Kahn, 1966: 
15-16).   
The arguments point to the reality that, in establishing authority over the organizational 
field, scholars also had to confront the authority of its existing practitioners in a rivalry for the 
territory, a common dilemma, especially in the social sciences.  As Gieryn (1999) notes:  “The 
line between scientific understanding and common sense has long been a site for boundary-
work” (p. 100), and those very contrasts show up in Katz & Kahn. Neither the “common sense 
approach” nor the “practical thinking” of organizational leadership suits the needs of those 
pursuing “purposes of scientific analysis.”  Even the scientific taboo of “teleological terms” is 
invoked as a strong signal of concern.  Notably, “purposes” appear on both sides of this 
argument—the “rational” ones belonging to organizational leaders are rejected as a starting point 
for consideration in the development of theoretical constructs.  Seemingly, the “purposes” of 
leaders are incompatible with the “purposes of scientific analysis.”  While the intent of scientific 
analysis is presumably no less rational than the intentions of organizational leaders, the statement 
here emphasizes the inappropriateness of mingling the two aims.   
While Barnard is never mentioned in this context, the argument appears to discredit him 
as a source for scientific knowledge, since he wrote largely from practical experience within 
organizations.  In rejecting “the rational purposes of…leaders” as a starting point, Katz & Kahn 
effectively repudiate Barnard’s usage of “purpose,” which originates in the intentions of an 
individual toward a “purpose” that requires the cooperation of others to be achieved (cf. Barnard, 
1968 [1938]: 22).  The argument also echoes the anxiety apparent in Etzioni and others that 
organizational researchers avoid superficial identification with the purposes of organizational 
leadership—these are valid material to the scientist only as pointers to further data sources, not to 
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be considered authoritative in themselves.  This allows scientific authority claims to be 
constructed as not only distinct from, but superior to, those of practitioners, being formulated on 
a presumably more objective basis. 
The consolidated resistance to notions of a unitary organizational goal, combined with 
mistrust of figures without the prerequisite “disinterestedness” of a scientific perspective 
(Shapin, 1994) or prerequisite academic cultural capital (Bourdieu, 1986) already seemed 
enough to doom the sustainability of Barnard’s use of “purpose.”  His background as a business 
practitioner, though, not only left him vulnerable to accusations of interest but identified him 
with a camp that presented rival claims for the territory of authority being sought for 
organizational scholarship.  As such, the likelihood of him influencing the field regarding the 
construct was even smaller.   
Confusion on goals meets with limited empirical data.   In 1968, the entry on 
“Organizational Goals” in the new edition of the International Encyclopedia of the Social 
Sciences summarized overall scholarly confusion.  Given that Charles Perrow was its author, its 
emphasis on problems with the construct offered no particular surprise:  “The serious student of 
organizational goals finds the matter so complex and categories and concepts so interdependent 
that there is no certainty about what should be labeled a goal, where it comes from, how it 
changes, and what impact it has” (Perrow, 1968: 310).  The same year, a 30th-anniversary edition 
of Functions of the Executive also appeared—its foreword by Kenneth Andrews noted the 
continuing need for “more advanced concepts of purpose” (Andrews, 1968: xix), remarking on 
the construct’s de-emphasis by the Carnegie School.   
A component, or perhaps a symptom, of the perceived problems with the construct was 
lack of consensus regarding its measurement, which limited the possible impact of empirical 
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studies on clarifying its nature or function.  Caution on the part of researchers was evident, for 
example, in Hage & Aiken (1969), who attempted to operationalize the notion of “goal” within 
an organization by asking members to choose among options such as “effectiveness of client 
services,” “efficiency of operation,” “morale of the staff” or “development of new programs” 
and identify which was most emphasized in their organization.  In assessing the data, however, 
the authors suggest that “[v]alues about goals is a safer term to describe what was measured” (p. 
374).  Some studies did employ statements by the organization studied as evidence of its goals 
(Alexander, 1976; Krauss, 1962; Zald, 1965), but this was likely to be considered at best a 
representation of “official goals” as Perrow (1961) had defined it (cf. Scott, 1967).  Substitute or 
supplementary methods of assessing goals included observation of worker activities (Scott, 
1967), surveys where subjects rated a list of “goals” provided by the researcher (Catton, 1962; 
Gross, 1968) or interviews with executives and other staff (Zald, 1963). 
Surveys with such pre-defined lists, of course, made their own assumptions about what 
constituted an “organizational goal,” and these varied widely.  They might list broad goals like 
“organizational efficiency” or “social welfare” (England, 1967) or sector or organization-specific 
ones.  Gross (1968), in a survey of universities, listed 47 possible goals in five overall goal 
categories, including such possibilities as “Prepare students specifically for useful careers,” 
“Carry on pure research,” “Protect the faculty’s right to academic freedom,” and “Keep up-to-
date and responsive” (p. 525).  Recognizable here is the predicted multiplication of meanings 
resulting from increasing attempts to utilize an “umbrella construct” (Hirsch & Levin, 1999).  
While these new meanings weren’t necessarily reflected in new definitions (citations of Simon 
(1964), Etzioni (1961) or Cyert & March (1963) remained common), the choice lists themselves 
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offered a multiplicity of potential interpretations spanning virtually all of the five categories of 
“goal” concepts described by Zald (1963).   
The one thing missing, however, was research into the possibility of a unitary 
organizational purpose—this seemed to have been excluded by the theoretical arguments of 
Etzioni, Perrow and the Carnegie School.  Researchers focused on the presumption of conflicting 
goals, and they designed studies accordingly.  Gross (1968), for example, describes that his focus 
on identifying “how much substance there was to the claims that…fundamental differences 
existed” between faculty and administrative conceptions of appropriate university purposes 
meant that his research “deliberately excluded all colleges which were dominated by some single 
point of view or a commitment to a uniform task which is of such a nature as to severely limit the 
goal variation that can exist. Not included in our original plans, therefore, were church-controlled 
schools, liberal arts colleges, teacher’s colleges, and technical training institutions” (Gross, 1968: 
526).   
In this instance at least, an effort to document goal conflict led to eliminating any 
observation of situations where it might be expected to be in shorter supply.  The choice of data 
was driven by the choice of problem.  Also at work here are the norms of statistical methods 
which demand variance in the focal construct to produce “significant” findings.  The 
combination operates as a Kuhnian paradigm, limiting the problems available for exploration (cf. 
Kuhn, 1996 [1969]: 37) by triggering here an a priori disregard of settings that might offer data 
to contest the presumption of inherent conflict in organizational goals.  The theoretical consensus 
that had problematized the notion was therefore immunized against the possible collection of 
disconfirming evidence. 
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While the existence of a unitary “organization goal” was already contested, its 
relationship to the evaluative claim of what makes an organization “effective” tied it to 
additional controversy.  The measurement of “organizational effectiveness” on the basis of goal 
achievement faced continued challenges (cf. Etzioni, 1960; Ghorpade, 1970; Yuchtman & 
Seashore, 1967) but remained widely-used, which had corresponding implications for the 
construct of “organizational goal.”  As Price (1972) emphasized, “Since effectiveness is defined 
with respect to the degree of goal-achievement, the definition of ‘goal’ is crucial” (p. 3).  This 
added fuel to the earlier arguments for rejecting practitioner statements regarding goals, since 
using them as benchmarks to measure “effectiveness” would align scientific authority regarding 
desirable practices with the presumed interests of the holders of organizational power.  If 
organizational scholarship was to retain autonomy from and authority over organizational 
leaders, a way of defining “organizational goal” from outside the organizational context entirely 
was required.  Consistent with this, Friedlander & Pickle (1968) argued for the relevance of 
organizational interactions with outsiders as a way of establishing “goals,” offering yet another 
possible operationalization of the construct, and foreshadowing the emergent “stakeholder” 
approach to organizational evaluation. 
Again, this result is consistent with the observation and prediction by Hirsch & Levin 
(1999) that the wider use of “umbrella constructs” will result in a multiplication of meanings.  
The new meaning introduced by Friedlander & Pickle (1968), however, helped establish 
authority for organizational scholars to evaluate organizations on a basis separated from the 
private interests of practitioners.  Such politicized perspectives on “organizational goal” (and 
“organizational effectiveness,” which was the focal construct examined in Hirsch & Levin 
(1999)) invited shifts in construct meaning so as to distance it from practitioner-oriented 
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assumptions.  Multiplications of meaning, in other words, may reflect not just diverse choices for 
convenience in operationalization but also strategies to direct the construct’s use with specific 
scholarly interests in mind. 
Despite the lack of consistent empirics, Gross (1969), relying largely on the definitions of 
Parsons and Etzioni, called “organizational goal” the “central concept in the study of 
organizations” and asserted that “it is the dominating presence of a goal which marks off an 
‘organization’… from all other kinds of systems” (p. 277).  For this “central concept,” however, 
the consensus prognosis was bleak.  Noted Mohr (1973): “Much has been written in recent years 
about the concept of organizational goal, some of it rather discouraging; the most frequently 
cited papers offer little hope that the concept will have any real utility for social scientists” (p. 
470).  Writing in a political science journal, he attempted to reconceptualize the idea of 
“organizational goal,” emphasizing its importance for gauging organizational effectiveness and 
for understanding organizations as a whole.   
Notably, Mohr focuses on the construct’s “utility for social scientists”—the assumption 
that scientific terminology must serve the aims of science is consistent with proscriptions on 
defining it in ways that compromise scientific autonomy by alignment with organizational 
interests.  In an effort to get around perceived issues regarding the construct, he suggested a very 
much narrower definition: “An organizational goal is the goal of a program occurring within the 
organization and under its auspices whose direct referent is either the organization itself as an 
institution or some aspect of the organization’s environment” (Mohr, 1973: 475).  His revision 
represents another effort to prune the “umbrella construct” (Hirsch & Levin, 1999), as he 
seemingly attempts to escape the contested nature of generalizable claims about desirable 
organizational practices by making the construct very organization-specific, thus legitimizing an 
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instrumental focus.  While his article gained some citations, it produced no notable change in the 
pessimistic view or inconsistent operationalization of the construct.  The controversy regarding 
“organizational goals” seemed by now too entrenched to be stemmed by a new definition. 
 Emergence of “mission” as alternative term.  Meanwhile, yet another term had emerged 
alongside those of “goal” and “objective” as a potential equivalent to “purpose”—that of 
“mission.”  While there is no clear citation marking its original use, Moore (1962) is the earliest 
cited example offering a definition and claiming the term’s distinctive validity:  Agreeing with 
many others that “organizations do not have goals or ends or purposes,” as such concepts can 
only be valid for individuals, he argued that “[a]dministrative organizations may …properly be 
said to have a mission, meaning a set of specific, limited and ordered objectives” (Moore, 1962: 
23, emphasis in original).  For others, however, the distinction between this and other 
terminology was not so clear:  Katz & Kahn (1966) referred to the “primary mission of an 
organization as perceived by its leaders” as nothing more than an “informative set of clues for 
the researcher” (p. 15), subject to the same deficiencies from a scientific perspective as other 
teleological notions about organizational functioning.   
Use of “mission” did begin to take hold, however, in emergent conceptions of “strategy” 
and especially “strategic planning.”  Definitions of strategy had begun to emerge in the 1960s 
and 1970s, marked by the now-familiar eclecticism in use of “purpose,” “goal” and “objective” 
terminology.  An early and often-cited definition of “strategy” comes from Chandler (1962: 13), 
who termed it “the determination of the basic long-term goals and objectives of an enterprise, 
and the adoption of courses of action and allocation of resources necessary for carrying out these 
goals.”  Similarly, Andrews (1971: 28) states, “Corporate strategy is the pattern of major 
objectives, purposes, or goals and essential policies and plans for achieving those goals.”   
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The language of strategy originated in close affinity with military terminology (cf. 
Andrews, 1971: 26-27), which may also have prompted its frequent use of “mission” (a common 
term for combat assignments).  Strategic planning was described as, for example, “setting the 
organization’s purpose, missions and goals” (Mason, 1969: B-406n).  While explicit definitions 
were rare, some strategic planning writers did attempt highly-specific but little-imitated 
distinctions for the term, such as the suggestion by Osborn et al (1981) that “mission” was one of 
eight possible “alterations in corporate strategy,” explicitly that of “backward or forward 
integration, launching new products in new markets, and/or becoming a captive to a supplier or 
distributor” (p. 186).  Evidence for the growing popularity of “mission” language was also 
apparent in Management (Drucker, 1974).  This book expanded upon and updated The Practice 
of Management (Drucker, 1954) in which the term “objectives” had been predominant.  Twenty 
years later, however, Drucker presented “purpose and mission” jointly as something a company 
must define or know, never distinguishing or separately defining the two constructs.   
 Meanwhile, a “mission” was now sometimes considered identical to a “mission 
statement”—that is, the general aim was not described as something existing in an abstract sense 
but only through a formal document that specified it.  This is the definition reflected by Pearce 
(1982): “The company mission is a broadly defined but enduring statement of purpose that 
distinguishes a business from other firms of its type and identifies the scope of its operations in 
product and market terms” (p. 15).  Also Duffy (1989), while systematically and distinctively 
employing each of the terms “purpose,” “mission,” “objectives” and “goals” in the context of 
strategic planning, followed this pattern of equating “mission” with a statement: “The first 
element of the management planning process is in defining or recognizing the purpose of the 
organization. Although the purpose is frequently formalized, it is often inadvertently confused 
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with the mission of an organization. The purpose is more correctly the real, often unstated, aims 
of an organization. For this reason the purpose may differ from the mission or mission statement, 
which is a formalized document” (Duffy, 1989: 164 - emphases in original).  The “mission,” in 
other words, was consistently identified with the very sort of official declaration about purpose 
by leaders that had already been dismissed as inadequate for the study of organizations from a 
social scientific perspective.   
In other ways, “mission” also resembled “purpose” more closely than did other 
substituted terms such as “goal” or “objective.”  Both, for example, were commonly referred to 
in the singular in applying to a given organization—while occasionally reference was made to 
“purposes,” there were almost no references to “missions” of a single organization.  On the other 
hand, “goals” and “objectives” were commonly used in the plural.  The word “mission” also has 
religious connotations (e.g., in Catholic “mission” outposts in the American West, or a religion’s 
“mission” efforts to other nations), similar to the teleological or spiritual connotations for 
“purpose.”  The presumed symbolism of “mission” may have contributed to its being treated as 
relatively benign and inconsequential in organizational scholarship.   
No articles were uncovered, for example, that expressed cynicism or concern regarding 
the notion of “organizational mission” as being an imposed perspective dictated by those in 
power, or that dismissed the potential for a unitary “organizational mission” for a company.  The 
issue may also be a simple one of timing:  Through the 1960s and 1970s, the period of greatest 
attention to and controversy about “goal” or “purpose,” the term “mission” appeared only 
casually in articles primarily using one of the other words for the construct.  It was never, for 
example, invoked in debates regarding the determination of organizational effectiveness, which 
centered on the nature of “goals” and whether the “goal-based” approach was valid.  The earliest 
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examined article to use “mission” alone, without other substitute terms, is Louis (1980), which is 
by no means focused on the construct.  By entering the discourse slightly later, “mission” seems 
to have failed to attract attention from organizational scholars as a theoretical construct and 
perhaps to have survived as an uncontested, unitary notion as a result.   
If it was too late for Mohr’s new definition to revive the concept of a unified 
“organizational goal,” the use of a new word entirely seemed key to the survival of “mission.”  
Importantly, its connotations were consistent with the construct’s predominately symbolic 
meaning—it was perhaps acceptable precisely because it did not attempt the union of 
instrumental and ideal that accompanied Barnard’s use of “purpose.”  As a partial fragment of 
the original “umbrella construct” (Hirsch & Levin, 1999) in meaning, “mission” remained in 
organizational scholarship, but in failing to spark controversy it also by no means gained the 
attention of theorists and researchers that “organizational goal” once had. 
 Attempts to revive unitary organizational purpose.  Amidst the fallout from the 
deconstruction of the unitary notion of organizational goal in the 1960s and 1970s, some later 
voices tried to resurrect it, citing Barnard in their efforts.  Michael Keeley of Loyola University 
of Chicago produced five solo-authored articles over a period of six years in distinguished 
journals (three in ASQ, two in AMR – (Keeley, 1978b, 1978a, 1980, 1983, 1984)), with an 
apparent overarching agenda of rebuilding a workable approach to organizational effectiveness.  
He approached the matter from a social justice perspective, undertaking the derivation of an 
acceptable concept of collective goals to allow the assessment of effectiveness.  He explicitly 
invoked Barnard’s theorizing as part of a “social contract” model for organizational analysis.  
For appearing in such prominent publication outlets, however, the articles appear lightly cited.   
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About a decade later, a comparable series of articles by Christopher Bartlett and 
Sumantra Ghoshal (Bartlett & Ghoshal, 1993, 1994; Ghoshal & Bartlett, 1994; Ghoshal & 
Moran, 1996) appeared in SMJ, HBR and AMR.  These authors built an even more impassioned 
case for renewal of the idea of shared purpose in organizations as Barnard articulated it, directly 
attacking the perspective of the Carnegie School.  In support of their arguments, they offered 
evidence from a case study of an organization whose leader explicitly built what they asserted 
was an operationalized understanding of shared purpose:   
Rather than waiting for the new organization to develop and institutionalize new 
objectives and behavioral norms through what Cyert and March described as “accidents 
of organizational genealogy” (1963: 34), [the focal firm’s leader] intervened strongly to 
define a new common purpose and ambition to shape those objectives and standards. In 
doing so, [he] seems to reject Cyert and March’s assertion that “people have goals, 
collectives of people do not” (1963: 26). (Bartlett & Ghoshal, 1993: 38) 
 
While they employed a range of terminology (“mission,” “goals,” “purpose,” “objectives”) with 
no emphasis on distinctions, Bartlett & Ghoshal’s key positive citation for the construct was 
Barnard, and they did champion the notion of a unitary organizational purpose.   Ghoshal & 
Moran (1996) later attacked the assumptions of transaction cost theory (developed largely by 
Oliver Williamson, a 1963 Carnegie-Mellon doctoral graduate (cf. March, 2007)) as “bad for 
practice,” again renewing the notion of shared purpose, with citations of Barnard.   
Significantly, these authors also shifted the definition of “purpose” beyond its basic 
character in Functions of the Executive (where the construct refers to a core organizational 
function, such as “making shoes”) to one of more explicitly ethical dimensions.  Their HBR 
article asserted, for example:  “Purpose is the embodiment of an organization’s recognition that 
its relationships with its diverse stakeholders are interdependent. In short, purpose is the 
statement of a company’s moral response to its broadly defined responsibilities, not an amoral 
plan for exploiting commercial opportunity” (Bartlett & Ghoshal, 1994: 88).  The more 
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subjective or even spiritual and religious connotations of “purpose” are blended into this 
definition.  There is movement, in other words, away from the instrumental aspects in Barnard’s 
use and toward the ideal.  Despite a chain of publications in prominent journals and their 
affiliations with prominent schools of Harvard and INSEAD, Bartlett and Ghoshal’s efforts did 
not engender a renewed focus on ideas of unitary organizational purpose, however.  The 
consensus against the notion was perhaps by now too strong. 
In fact, though no articles appeared to directly criticize either Keeley’s or Bartlett and 
Ghoshal’s unitary conceptions of purpose, these relatively isolated attempts represented little 
more than skiffs launched against the tidal wave of theoretical arguments opposing the notion in 
prior decades.  It was not only Cyert & March who had asserted problems with the application of 
goals to collective entities.  Others such as Moore (1962) and Bergmann (1962), for example, 
emphasized that intention was a function of individual psychology and therefore not a valid 
property of a group.  It was not the Carnegie School but rather Bendix, Etzioni and Perrow who 
insisted that a common purpose defined and imposed by elites was an inappropriate focus for the 
true scholar of organizations.  Bartlett & Ghoshal’s attempt to introduce evidence from the 
behavior and thinking of an organizational executive in their case study also flew in the face of 
statements by Katz & Kahn that the “practical thinking” of organizational leaders who employed 
“teleological terms” was irrelevant material for developing theory about organizations.   
Returning to Barnard, a business leader, as a primary source made all these arguments 
subject to the concern that identification with any one organizational faction represented a bias in 
interests that tends to render a figure untrustworthy for conveying scientific knowledge (Shapin, 
1994).  Moreover, to the extent that organizational scholars recognized the practitioner 
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perspective as a possible rival authority in their claims of scientific knowledge about the field, 
such opinions were likely to be reckoned as “non-science” (Gieryn, 1983).   
 Variety of terms persists, even as interest wanes.  As the decades progressed, some 
studies attempting measurement of the construct continued, but with continuing variety in 
terminology:  One study examined the “organizational objectives” of professional football teams 
with a survey asking them to rank the importance of items like “Produce a winning team,” 
“Obtain a share of the entertainment market,” and “Improve the image of professional football” 
(Latham & Stewart, 1981: 406).  A later study headlining the construct of “organizational 
values” freely mixed terminology, measuring these “values” (in non-profit theaters) with a 
survey instrument headed “Please Tell Us About Your Theatre’s Mission” (Voss, Cable, & Voss, 
2000: 339).  Respondents were asked to rate the importance of “value items” such as “Expand 
community access to, and appreciation for, art,” “Increase the theatre’s financial stability,” or 
“Produce work recognized for its contribution to the field” (p. 344).  In both cases, the diverse 
array of items on the list recalled surveys on organizational “goals” in the prior era, though with 
less emphasis on uncovering conflict.   
As the Voss et al study indicates, the term “values” was now increasingly interconnected 
or equated with “goals,” “purposes,” “missions” or “objectives” as part of organizational 
functioning (cf. Freeman, Gilbert, & Hartman, 1988; Wiener, 1988).  Akaah and Lund (1994) 
operationalized a study of “values” with a scale previously considered to relate to “goals”; other 
authors used Perrow’s arguments about competing “goals” and applied this reasoning to 
conclusions about the “values” concept (Buenger, Daft, Conlon, & Austin, 1996).  Empirical 
studies were becoming somewhat more common, but with no consensus on terminology for the 
construct or suggestions that the language even mattered.  This seems to be yet another phase of 
 184 
 
multiplication of meanings under operationalization of an “umbrella construct” (Hirsch & Levin, 
1999), but as the words used were themselves also increasing in variety, no efforts arose by 
“validity police” to consolidate research under a presumed need for unity in construct meaning.  
 As the use of multiple, typically undifferentiated, terms for the construct in studies 
became more common, previously controversial points about its nature also occupied less 
attention.  The concept of “organizational goals” appeared as a component in the definition of 
“organizational commitment” (O’Reilly & Chatman, 1986; Reichers, 1986), which was 
construed to be a measure of individual employees’ integration of organizational goals with their 
own.  In this case, prior objections about the genuine existence of collective goals went 
unacknowledged.  The idea of shared goals was also prominent in the emerging study of social 
movements or collective action (cf. Donnelly, 1987; Edwards & Marullo, 1995; Lowry, 1997).  
In these discussions, earlier protestations against the validity of individuals truly having a shared 
purpose were absent.  Though the populist character of such organizations might be what 
rendered the notion unproblematic, the previous objections were never specifically addressed.   
Hildreth (1994) even invoked the notion of “purposive organizations” (Clark & Wilson, 
1961) and applied it to situations where the “purpose” provides incentive for participation, such 
as social action groups.  Her research identified how the choice of “purpose” for such groups was 
salient to participants, with no suggestion that the use of this word, or of the construct in a 
unitary sense, was problematic in the social sciences.  Notably, this application from Clark & 
Wilson (1961), introduced at the same time as the barrage of arguments against the construct, 
had survived over the decades.  As noted, it had effectively narrowed the “umbrella construct” 
(Hirsch & Levin, 1999) of “purpose” to apply only in organizations whose aims avoided conflict 
with the word’s idealized meaning, leaving it available for use apart from earlier controversies. 
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Some familiar arguments continued, however, to discount the validity of notions of 
shared purpose in organizations, such as:  “Because organizational goals are merely an aggregate 
of disparate individual goals, real purposiveness at the organizational level of analysis is absent”  
(Dow, 1988: 59).   Anspach (1991) acknowledged the previous concerns and controversies 
regarding goals and effectiveness and on this basis disavowed any pretense of objective 
measurement for her study.  Instead, she adopted an interpretive stance, treating organizational 
effectiveness as socially constructed and analyzing participant interviews to understand how they 
developed perceptions about it.   
The year after Ghoshal & Moran (1996) fired their last salvo in support of unitary 
organizational purpose, March & Sutton (1997) reiterated familiar concerns:  “Organizations are 
commonly defined as instruments of purpose. They are seen as coordinated by intentions and 
goals. Such a formulation has often troubled students of organizations. It is not clear that 
organizational purpose can be portrayed as unitary or that the multiple purposes of an 
organization are reliably consistent. It is not clear that a single conception of purposes is shared 
among participants in an organization” (March & Sutton, 1997: 698).   While the authors’ mild 
statements that these points are still “not clear” could otherwise appear to be an invitation for 
further research in the interest of clarity, the energy for such activities seemed to have vanished.  
If the questions weren’t truly settled, the lack of attention suggested that they might now be 
deemed either irresolvable or irrelevant.  
 On the definitional side, spiritual or transcendent connotations of “purpose” were coming 
to the fore even as interest in its instrumental application was waning.  One example is Collier 
(1998), who suggests, “An evaluation of ‘the good’ relies on establishing notions of 
purpose...Purpose is to be conceived of as the goal of the virtuous moral agent—in other words, 
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as the achievement of excellence in terms of the realisation of potential” (p. 635).  She translated 
this to organizations, suggesting that “a sense of corporate purpose can only be fully developed 
by corporate reflection on what the company is ‘for’ in an existential as opposed to a merely 
instrumental sense ...[C]orporate purpose is about doing what the company is there to do in the 
first place as well as it can possibly be done” (Collier, 1998: 638).  
Note that her reasoning explicitly opposes the “fully developed” concept of “purpose” to 
its “merely instrumental sense,” demanding a broad component of quality (“as well as it can 
possibly be done”) as essential for the construct.  This article appeared in Business Ethics 
Quarterly, which began publication in 1991; the Journal of Business Ethics had first published in 
1982.  Both journals invited the employment of philosophical and moral perspectives on 
organization, opening the possibility for “purpose” in organizations to be reconnected with 
earlier transcendental connotations.  In this instance, however, it was only the ideal and not the 
instrumental sense that was emphasized, eliminating the earlier tensions.  Ethical frameworks 
also reflected yet another manifestation of the earlier effectiveness debates—as suggested by 
Collier’s proposal for undertaking “evaluation of ‘the good.’”  Reframing “purpose” for 
organizations in moral terms helped support the authority for scholars to judge organizations 
from an outsider’s stance, while still aligning positive assessments with the successful 
achievement of “purpose.” 
Indeed, while explicit contention over the nature or validity of specific characteristics 
related to Purpose generally seemed more and more a thing of the past, having an authoritative 
position from which to evaluate organizations remained a valuable stake for scholars.  Jensen 
(2002) heatedly defended the unitary objective as “the criterion or objective function to be 
maximized by firms (that is, the criterion by which executives choose among alternative policy 
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options)” (p. 236).  This, argued Jensen, was essential to organizational decision-making and 
something that was only hopelessly muddled or compromised by any stakeholder view that 
introduced multiple perspectives to the question of organizational purpose.  His essay, having 
appeared two years prior in an edited book, was reprinted in the Business Ethics Quarterly along 
with a collection of papers on stakeholder theory, but there seemed to be little interchange 
between proponents of the opposed positions.  By the close of the case period, considerations of 
the construct seemed less an active debate and more the declarations of convinced participants in 
conversations completely divorced from one another. 
By now the “umbrella construct” (Hirsch & Levin, 1999) that began with Barnard’s 
“purpose” continued in limited use under that name—only in ethical discussions where the 
word’s ideal or moral sense could be directly invoked, or in relation to social-cause organizations 
whose ends didn’t violate those same connotations.  A collection of terms (“goals,” “mission,” 
“values,” “objectives”) had accumulated for labeling organizational aims, but the lack of unity in 
terminology failed to inspire efforts to coalesce research about them.  The voices that cared most 
strongly about establishing clear notions associated with Purpose remained focused on 
developing authority to evaluate organizations, and the politically-charged nature of this question 
continued to make prospects for agreement dim. 
Summary: Purpose from 1938 to 2005.    The initial definition of “purpose” as an 
organizational construct by Barnard attempted to bridge instrumental and ideal meanings for the 
word that had been apparent in its use prior to 1938, introducing a tension that made the resulting 
“umbrella construct” (Hirsch & Levin, 1999) difficult to sustain from the start.  Ensuing attacks 
on use of the word as non-scientific, however, originated not just from its teleological 
connotations but from desires by Simon to establish his view of administrative science as 
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authoritative versus Gulick’s.  With the word “purpose” problematic on multiple counts, 
substitutes such as “goal” and “objective” emerged, which had the benefit of familiar use and 
acceptance by multiple social science disciplines.  As such, they became useful “boundary 
objects” (Star & Griesemer, 1989) for communication in the emergent interdisciplinary field of 
organizational scholarship.   
Substitute terminology alone, however, could not overcome a second category of 
objections to the construct, which challenged the unitary conception of organizational purpose as 
only an illusory consensus imposed by the organization’s elites.  Accepting such a construct for 
study was implied to be inconsistent with the disinterested perspective essential to scientific 
authority (Shapin, 1994).  In the context of desires by scholars to gain authoritative control of the 
field of organizational scholarship, boundary-work arguments (Gieryn, 1983) that discredited 
practitioner perspectives as non-scientific also prompted resistance of anything seen as mere 
reinforcement of the viewpoint of organizational leaders.  The fragmented perspective on goals 
was also endorsed by the Carnegie School for its consistency with scientific behavioral theories 
regarding organizational decision-making, solidifying a consensus within the field.   
Operationalization of the construct remained limited and non-standardized during the 
period of greatest theoretical controversy, with studies largely focusing on conflict over goals 
and offering little empirical evidence to contest the presumptions against a unified construct.  
Later decades saw efforts to revive the notion, often citing Barnard in support, but these failed to 
gain support.  Terminology for the construct meanwhile continued to multiply (now regularly 
including “mission” and “values”), and operationalizations remained diverse, even as general 
interest dissipated.  Applications in new areas such as studies of social movements ignored 
previous controversies over the construct, perhaps due to the populist nature of these settings.   
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By the end of the period, surviving uses of “purpose” in an organizational context either 
explicitly invoked or did not conflict with its more idealized connotations, while it use as a basic 
property of organizational function had been dismissed.  The potential power associated with the 
Purpose construct as a means for evaluating organizations and maintaining authority over 
practitioners, however, still motivated dialogue among organizational scholars with contending 
views about what that should be. 
Chapter Summary 
In this chapter I have provided an overview of construct evolution process for Purpose.  I 
highlighted the two-fold instrumental and ideal meanings associated with the word “purpose” 
prior to 1938, noting its connection to early efforts of the establishment of administrative science 
and its potential problems for application as a scientific term due to teleological connotations.  
While initial definition of the construct by Barnard attempted to bridge the word’s two-fold 
meanings, this tension made it difficult to sustain.  In subsequent development, the need by 
organizational scholars to develop “scientific” authority prompted movement away from 
“purpose” and toward substitute words acceptable to multiple social science disciplines in the 
developing field.  Likewise, the unitary notion of organizational purpose was rejected for 
inconsistency both with behavioral science presumptions and with desires to establish scientific 
authority independent of practitioner interests.  By the end of the period, the few uses of 
“purpose” support only its ideal meanings, while various other terms for the construct remained 
in use but largely without focused research attention.   
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CHAPTER 6:  FINDINGS - COMPARISON OF COOPERATION & PURPOSE 
In this chapter, I compare the evolution processes for the analyzed constructs, designated 
as Cooperation and Purpose.  My initial comparisons focus on the journal articles during the time 
period studied—their frequency trends, types of journals in which they appeared, and the nature 
of the articles (empirical versus theoretical).  Next, I consider the individuals with most apparent 
influence on construct meaning, based on citation patterns.  Combining this evidence with details 
from the narratives, I then consider the role played in construct evolution by factors of particular 
interest in my research questions: 1) Actor resources; 2) Actor strategies; 3) Resources of 
language and meaning; and 4) Historical context.  I close with a brief overall summary of 
findings highlighted through this comparison. 
Comparison of Journal Articles 
Frequency over time.  When the numbers of articles identified and analyzed as relevant 
for each construct are charted over time, markedly different patterns emerge, as shown in Figure 
6.1.  Although, as discussed in Chapter Three, my process of selecting articles for examination 
was shaped by theoretical sampling principles and not oriented toward the generalization of 
population characteristics, I compared these trends with other sources of evidence to help 
reinforce confidence that the patterns shown generally correspond with rises and falls in activity 
for each construct.  
 191 
 
FIGURE 6.1 – Number of Analyzed Articles per Year – for Cooperation, Purpose and Both 
 
For Cooperation, there is an initial uptick in related articles during the late 1940s—the 
pieces from this period tend to be almost entirely theoretical in nature, focused on emerging 
theorization about the nature of organizations and social systems from a variety of perspectives 
such as sociology (Homans, 1947; Loomis & Beegle, 1948; Selznick, 1948), particularly the 
subfield of industrial sociology (Moore, 1947, 1948), and political science (Waldo, 1947).  The 
boom generally reflects the increasing interest in organizational theory arising in the U.S. 
following World War II (Augier et al., 2005).  Here, Cooperation remained a general topic in the 
social sciences, discussed in relation to models of organization, but with relatively broad 
definition and limited operationalization. 
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While the end of the 1940s saw the publication of Deutsch (1949b), the volume of 
articles related to the construct did not immediately rise and in fact receded from its early peak. 
Only after the late 1950s, when the construct was tied to a fixed operationalization through the 
prisoner’s dilemma and applied in the topical area of conflict resolution, does the number of 
articles increase.  Following this, it rises relatively steadily over the rest of the period, suggesting 
the accumulating level of research activity and interest associated with a paradigmatic model of 
“normal science” (Kuhn, 1996 [1969]). 
By contrast, articles analyzed related to Purpose peaked in the early 1960s, with a second, 
slightly lower peak in the late 1970s, after which the articles generally fell in numbers.  The first 
peak in Purpose articles follows closely upon the late-1950s emergence of influential journals in 
the field of management and administration.  In other words, while Cooperation was an active 
topic in articles on organization theory in other disciplines, particularly sociology, prior to the 
formation of specialized journals, articles on Purpose peak specifically with the establishment of 
journals in the organizational field proper.  As such, the dynamics of this construct are more 
tightly linked to efforts of creating scientific authority for the field.   
The second peak of articles related to Purpose corresponds roughly to the development of 
strategy as a sub-field in organizational scholarship (SMJ, for example, began publication in 
1980).  The strategy arena produced articles employing a variety of terminology (e.g., “goal,” 
“mission,” “values”), particularly in relation to strategic planning, but the focus on the construct 
as a whole diminishes after this time.   
Interestingly, articles involving both constructs (labeled “Both” in the graph) at first 
matched the peak of Cooperation, rising in the post-World-War-II phase of broad interest in 
organizational theory.  The “Both” articles, however, subsequently share the pattern of Purpose 
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alone—with the double peaks in the early 1960s and late 1970s, then declining to the point of 
completely vanishing after 2000.  In other words, a linkage between Cooperation and Purpose 
appeared in organizational theory during its original formulations.  The combined usage of 
Cooperation and Purpose (effectively as “purposive cooperation”), however, ties it to the 
“rational” side of the Gesellschaft/Gemeinschaft dichotomy from Tönnies.  It gradually vanishes 
from the field after 1980, in alignment with the final “normative” phase of discourse identified 
by Barley & Kunda (1992). 
Journal publication by disciplines.  When viewed in terms of publication outlets, the two 
constructs again contrast with one another, as shown in Figure 6.2.   
FIGURE 6.2 – Article Distributions by Journal Disciplines* 
 
* To consolidate journal disciplinary categories for simplification of this graph, categories with fewer than 25 
articles were combined with a larger, closely-related category.  Articles from journals coded as Anthropology (5 
total) were combined with Blended Social Science journal articles into the Other Social Science category, articles 
from Public Administration journals (8 total) were combined with the Management-OB category, and those from 
journals coded as Economics (22 total) were combined with Business into the Business-Economics category.   
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More than 30% of the Cooperation articles appeared in Psychology journals, with Political 
Science the next largest category but less than half the size of Psychology.  Of the Political 
Science journal articles, more than 60% appeared in the Journal of Conflict Resolution, meaning 
that interest within this discipline was also focused on a relatively specific application of the 
construct. The evolutionary process for Cooperation thus occurred within a more limited 
disciplinary audience, linked to an operationalization and use that fit this context.  Not 
surprisingly, the trend of its growth in articles coincides with this convergence and expansion of 
research tied to this settled paradigm (Kuhn, 1996 [1969]). 
More than half the articles related to Purpose, on the other hand, appeared in journals 
from a grouping of Management-OB and Administration, with Sociology the next largest 
category.  Again, the indications tie Purpose more strongly with the organizational scholarship 
field and its development.  As such, its evolution also more fully reflects the impact of an 
interdisciplinary setting on construct development.  This pattern is suggested by the 
multiplication of construct terminology in language palatable to different disciplines and suitable 
for use as “boundary objects” (Star & Griesemer, 1989) to facilitate communication within the 
field.   
Articles treating both constructs in a significant way were distributed similarly to those 
related to Purpose, with just a slightly lower share (about 40% versus over 50% for Purpose) 
appearing in management-related journals.  The difference is offset by a higher share of 
publications in Other Social Science journals, most of which occurred in the period prior to the 
1950s when no specialized organizational journals yet existed.  This reinforces that the linked 
perspective between Purpose and Cooperation emerged prior to the more tightly-defined 
scholarly field, dating back at least to Barnard (1968 [1938]). 
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Empirical versus theoretical emphasis.  As shown in Figure 6.3, the constructs also 
differ in the extent to which articles operationalized the construct—meaning that they presented 
some way of measuring or assessing it in relation to an empirical study.   
FIGURE 6.3 – Levels of Construct Operationalization in Articles 
 
 
Nearly two-thirds of the articles related to Cooperation operationalized the construct—from the 
mid-1950s through 1980, roughly the period of the emergence and high popularity of prisoner’s 
dilemma studies, this proportion ran upwards of 80-90%, reinforcing the ready consensus on 
research of the construct within its relatively narrow disciplinary audience and application for 
conflict resolution studies.  The proportion for Purpose is almost exactly the reverse, with less 
than one-third of the articles operationalizing the construct overall.  While the trend of increase 
in articles related to Cooperation directly corresponds with the increased operationalization, 
fitting a “normal science” type of development focused on empirical research (Kuhn, 1996 
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[1969]), the levels of operationalization for Purpose show limited or sometimes negative 
correlation with the volume of articles, highlighting ongoing controversy regarding the construct. 
Articles in the Purpose stream more commonly presented theoretical arguments, often in 
the context of building and refining general organizational theory.  The higher volume of articles 
in the early 1960s, for example, largely reflected disputes over the legitimacy of a unified goal 
construct.  These were not accompanied or resolved by empirical work, as attempts to 
operationalize the construct were also tentative and fragmented due to the controversy.  Over 
time, however, there was some increase in operationalization, particularly in a spike during the 
period of 1991-1995 that saw multiple survey-based and case-based assessments of Purpose-
related terms including “goals,” “values” and “mission.”  The increasing operationalization 
might seem to suggest growing consensus about measurement, but it was accompanied by 
divergence rather than convergence in construct language.  Due perhaps both to the variety in 
nomenclature and to the prior controversies, no “validity police” (Hirsch & Levin, 1999) efforts 
emerged to attempt to coalesce the research program.  In fact, the spike in operationalization for 
Purpose occurred in conjunction with a diminishing number of related articles, looking more like 
a “last hurrah” of interest than a signal of renewed vitality for the construct. 
 Summary comparison of journal articles.  The Cooperation construct evolution process 
displays a narrower disciplinary audience in terms of journals in which the research is published, 
accompanied by a high level of empirical study of the construct and a steady increase in the 
volume of related articles subsequent to a settled operational approach being identified.  The 
general pattern is very characteristic of that expected from a paradigmatic science model (Kuhn, 
1996 [1969]), where ongoing study of the construct develops under strong conventions of 
operationalization and measurement, leading to a steady series of journal articles that test varying 
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assumptions and build on one another’s results.  Also consistent with expectations of a Kuhnian 
paradigm, the operationalization had an effect of narrowing the focus of research to a specific 
facet of the construct (i.e., shared goal structure) and affecting the kinds of problems studied.   
By contrast, in the interdisciplinary context for Purpose, operationalization of the 
construct was rendered problematic by concerns of both theoretical (over the validity of a 
collective of persons being considered as having a “purpose”) and ideological (over power 
inequities in the organizational context) origins.  Unlike Cooperation, Purpose was not able to be 
extricated from its organizational context for research to defuse these controversies.  The 
quantity of articles on Purpose thus more closely reflects specific trends in organizational 
scholarship as a whole (its initial formation and then the emergence of strategy as a subfield 
within it).   
The articles employing both constructs show patterns similar to those for Purpose alone 
but also resemble the pattern for those associated with Cooperation in the earliest stages, 
showing a spike in the period immediately following World War II.  The linked perspective 
seems to have been more prevalent while interest in organizational theory was rising but before 
more formalized components of the scholarly field, such as dedicated journals, had appeared.  
After that, articles using the constructs in a combined way follow the quantity spikes of Purpose 
but decline even more severely, vanishing by 2000.  In short, the linkage of the constructs seems 
to have had more traction before concerns of scientific professionalism and distinctiveness took 
hold in organizational scholarship and to have been more harshly penalized than the separate 
constructs over time by the establishment of that perspective.  
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Influential Figures for each Construct 
One focus of my research questions was to identify factors that sustain the influence of 
specific authors on construct use and meaning.  Comparing citation patterns for articles on 
Cooperation, Purpose and Both constructs helps highlight similarities and differences among the 
significant figures.  Table 6.1 (shown on next page) presents a listing of authors most commonly 
cited in reference to construct use or definitions. 
As shown, the lists overlap very little between constructs, but each is dominated by a 
single scholar (Deutsch for Cooperation and Simon for Purpose) who is referenced more than 
twice as often as the next one commonly cited.  In Simon’s case, this includes citations of his co-
authored books; another by one of those co-authors is also relatively well-cited (Cyert & March, 
1963).  Only Barnard (1968 [1938]) is cited with any marked frequency in both article streams 
(holding the second position on both), and he is by far the most common author cited in articles 
that meaningfully employ both constructs.  This reinforces the implication from trends in article 
quantities that the perspective linking the two constructs originated with Barnard or at least was 
particularly prominent at an early stage of the field where his book was among the most notable 
resources. 
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TABLE 6.1 – Comparison of Central Figures based on Citations 
Cited in Articles relevant to 
Cooperation 
Figures 
Cooperation Purpose Both Work(s) commonly referenced 
Deutsch 25 4 1 Deutsch (1949) 
Barnard 10 19 18 Barnard (1938) 
Axelrod 9 0 0 Axelrod (1984) 
Katz (including 
Katz & Kahn) 
5 1 1 
Katz & Kahn (1964) 
Johnson, R. & 
Johnson, D. 
4 0 0 
Johnson & Johnson (1989) 
Luce & Raiffa 4 0 0 Luce & Raiffa (1957) 
Organ 4 0 0 Organ (1988) 
Argyle 4 0 0 Argyle (1991) 
Mayo 3 0 0 Mayo (1933) 
Roethlisberger 3 0 0 Roethlisberger & Dickson (1939) 
Purpose Figures Cooperation Purpose Both  Work(s) commonly referenced 
Simon 
3 41 6 
Simon (1947); Simon, Smithburg & 
Thompson (1950); March & Simon 
(1958); Simon (1964) 
Barnard 10 19 18 Barnard (1938) 
Cyert & March 0 17 2 Cyert & March (1963) 
Etzioni 1 15 2 Etzioni (1964) 
Parsons 1 15 2 Parsons (1956); Parsons (1960) 
Perrow 0 13 3 Perrow (1961); Perrow (1968) 
Gulick & Urwick 
0 9 1 
Gulick & Urwick (1937); also 
Urwick (1952) 
Thompson, J.A. 
1 6 0 
Thompson & McEwen (1958); 
Thompson (1967) 
Gross 0 6 2 Gross (1968; 1969) 
Blau 1 5 1 Blau & Scott (1962) 
Drucker 0 5 0 Drucker (1954) 
Williamson 1 4 0 Williamson (1964) 
Argyris 
0 3 2 
Several books by Argyris, no one 
dominant 
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A distinction between the constructs is evident from the type of reference cited—among 
prominent authors related to Cooperation, only Deutsch is primarily cited for an article (though 
he is also cited for books).  For Purpose, however, several of the prominent citations focus on 
articles in management or sociology journals (Gross, 1968, 1969; Parsons, 1956b; Perrow, 1961; 
Simon, 1964; Thompson & McEwen, 1958).  Like the initial peak in journal articles examined 
related to Purpose, the timeframe for these articles as well as the key books cited (Blau & Scott, 
1962; Cyert & March, 1963; Etzioni, 1964; Parsons, 1960) falls within a relatively narrow band 
of time during the late 1950s and 1960s.  Indeed, no works significantly cited for construct 
definitions related to Purpose date from after the 1960s.  All these factors suggest the tight 
linkage of the Purpose construct with scholarly concerns prevalent during this period, when the 
first academic journals in the field were founded and organizational scholars were working to 
establish credibility for their work as a scientific pursuit.  This coincides with the relatively high 
occurrence of boundary-work (Gieryn, 1983) arguments in relation to Purpose, disputing the 
legitimacy of a unified goal definition based on concerns either for coherence with behavioral 
science (cf. Cyert & March, 1963) or for autonomy from the interests of power elites among 
practitioners (Etzioni, 1960).  
The timeframe of the books cited in relation to Cooperation differs noticeably from 
Purpose—with the exception of Deutsch’s writings, books repeatedly cited in relation to 
Cooperation originated either much earlier (Barnard, 1968 [1938]; Mayo, 1933; Roethlisberger 
& Dickson, 1939) or from the 1980s onward (Argyle, 1991; Axelrod, 1984; Johnson & Johnson, 
1989; Organ, 1988), pointing to lengthier continuity and vitality in development of Cooperation.  
The later books cited for Cooperation also tend to compile or build on empirical work from prior 
journal articles, reinforcing the general bent of this construct’s development in cumulative 
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research within an established, “normal science” paradigm that primarily relies on journal 
articles and empirical studies (Kuhn, 1996 [1969]). 
Evidence from Factors of Theoretical Interest 
 My research questions focused on the interaction of four general factors in construct 
evolution: the actor-focused components of actor characteristics and strategies, and the 
situational components of language resources and meanings and historical contexts.  Comparing 
the role of each of these factors in the evolution of both Cooperation and Purpose offers more 
insight to how they contributed to determining which meanings endured and which figures were 
most influential.  Also, based on the journal audiences involved (as shown in Figure 6.2), the 
discourse regarding Purpose took place more completely in the interdisciplinary environment of 
organizational studies, so comparing it with Cooperation helps flesh out understanding of my 
question relating to the specific impacts of interdisciplinary fields on construct evolution. 
Actor-specific resources.  Despite the listings of central figures of influence related to 
Cooperation and Purpose being distinct, those who appear on them have some common 
characteristics.  With both constructs, the most-cited figures have associations with high-status 
and well-resourced academic institutions, suggesting the power of both economic capital and the 
cultural capital (Bourdieu, 1986) in developing influence over field language.  Affiliation with a 
prominent and well-endowed school can facilitate research support and funding, along with the 
chances to mentor top doctoral students, all of which helps to advance the preferred theoretical 
perspectives and construct definitions of affiliated scholars.  Carnegie-Mellon, for example, the 
site of concerted theoretical development by Simon, March and Cyert during the establishment 
of its GSIA, is prominent in the evolution of Purpose.  Its institutional prestige in the 
organizational field was reinforced by early endorsement of the school by the Ford Foundation as 
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a model for graduate business study (cf. Khurana, 2007), presenting its scholars’ views as likely 
inspiration for mimetic isomorphism (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983) among others seeking 
legitimacy in the emergent field of organizational scholarship.   
Other high-prestige schools with strong resources for establishing research programs and 
drawing top scholars also show up consistently in the vitae of influential figures.  Columbia 
University, noted for its academic leadership in sociology (Camic, 1995), and home to the 
Bureau of Applied Social Research that sponsored, for example, the work of Luce & Raiffa 
(1957), appears in connection with both constructs, being the primary scholarly home for both 
Etzioni and Deutsch.  Axelrod’s career links him to Yale, U.C.-Berkeley and Michigan, sites also 
associated with Perrow (doctorate at Berkeley, initially taught at Michigan and later at Yale), 
Etzioni (doctorate at Berkeley) and Katz (taught and researched at Michigan).  Harvard was the 
academic home of faculty members Parsons, Mayo and Roethlisberger, and Barnard, a former 
Harvard undergraduate and a participant in an advisory role on some administrative and 
academic committees, was also associated with the institution.  Prestigious academic ties and 
networks offer benefits such as increased potential access to editorial posts in scholarly journals 
(cf. Crane, 1967), facilitating the development of normative isomorphism (DiMaggio & Powell, 
1983) through establishing the gatekeepers for subsequent research publications.  
The role of social capital, those important “relationships of mutual acquaintance and 
recognition” (Bourdieu, 1986: 248) among scholars, is also suggested by interpersonal 
connections facilitating the influence of key figures.  Ties with already-prestigious scholars 
increase the legitimacy of newer ones, as well as providing informal opportunities for access to 
the latest ideas.  In turn, this can present chances for influence on students and later scholars.  
For example, Deutsch’s early association with Kurt Lewin at MIT and his mentoring of David 
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Johnson (whose co-authored book is dedicated to Deutsch) both seem important factors to his 
early and sustained influence on the study of Cooperation.  Deutsch also notes that personal 
contact with Raiffa during his work in New York played a role in his early use of the prisoner’s 
dilemma approach in research.  In relation to Purpose, Simon’s outreach to Barnard for 
comments and a foreword to Administrative Behavior (Wolf, 1995) may have contributed to his 
early credibility, and his interconnections with Cyert, March and students like Williamson at 
Carnegie-Mellon facilitated the shared influence of the perspectives from that School.  Common 
ties between Perrow and Etzioni at Berkeley to Bendix and for Etzioni to Merton, Selznick, Blau 
and other prominent researchers on bureaucracy at Columbia seem to have been important to 
their immediate influence as newly-minted scholars.  Etzioni, for example, acknowledges the 
“extensive comments offered by…colleagues at Columbia University and at the University of 
California at Berkeley,” naming Merton and Selznick in particular, in his preface to Complex 
Organizations (Etzioni, 1961: viii-ix).   
Given that influence on language in a scientific field is driven primarily through citations, 
accumulation of cultural capital (Bourdieu, 1986) credentials through continued scholarly 
publication is not surprisingly a common factor for influential figures.  Simon and Deutsch, the 
most consistently cited figures for each construct, reinforced their views through continued 
participation in academic dialogue through publications.  While Deutsch’s 1949 article remained 
a touchstone citation into the 21st century, his later articles and books, along with work by his 
students (Johnson & Johnson, 1989) solidified his status.  Simon published academic journal 
articles as well as books across virtually every decade from the 1940s through the 1990s.  Like 
Simon, other influential figures in relation to Purpose including Parsons, Etzioni and Perrow 
consolidated work from their journal articles into books, and Perrow authored an entry on 
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“Organizational Goals” for the 1968 International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences.  A later 
figure in relation to Cooperation, Dennis Organ, whose work helped successfully establish the 
Organizational Citizenship Behavior (OCB) construct, published not just repeated journal 
articles but a summary book further articulating and documenting the construct and his related 
research.  As with prestigious academic ties, the cultural capital of publications commonly 
translates to opportunities for reviewing and editing in academic journals, facilitating influence 
over later construct use and meaning. 
Causality within these factors has to be approached cautiously, given the interrelationship 
between publishing and influence over theoretical constructs (without publishing no such 
influence is possible, as influencing discourse requires participating in it) and also between 
publishing and institutional prestige (association with a higher-status institution may well arise 
and is certainly sustained by frequent, high-status publications, which in turn help elevate not 
just the scholar’s but the institution’s reputation).  Herbert Simon’s initial publications while at 
the Illinois Institute of Technology helped attract the attention that gained him the post at 
Carnegie-Mellon, for example, and that institution’s influence developed in part through his later 
work, through collaborations with others at the institution, and through the funding and 
endorsement of the Ford Foundation.  The inference that institutional prestige helps give rise to 
publications and thus influence seems more strongly supported in instances where such influence 
arose at very early stages of scholarly careers, as with Deutsch, Perrow or Etzioni.  Here their 
associations with scholars of high repute during doctoral education at top institutions appear to 
have played at least some part in helping attract attention to their work so quickly.  
These tentative conclusions can also be strengthened through comparative analysis.  
Considering the more influential figures for each construct against those with similar published 
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work that had less impact, contrasts do emerge along dimensions of social or cultural capital 
(Bourdieu, 1986).  Some solo-authored pieces that incorporated significant definitional efforts 
(examples include the typology of co-operation presented by Eaton (1948), a Wayne State 
University sociologist, or the series of prestigiously-published articles by Michael Keeley of 
Loyola University) without obvious collaborative support or connections to help forward the 
ideas, gained little traction in terms of citations or subsequent use of their definitional proposals.  
On the other hand, significant resources of social or cultural capital, such as those available to 
the Harvard- and INSEAD-affiliated and well-published team of Bartlett & Ghoshal, or in the 
book and multiple articles on cooperation by Wisconsin-based scholar Gerald Marwell, were 
sometimes also inadequate to shift construct use and definitions in a new direction.  Here the 
obstacles of a well-entrenched definitional and operational perspective (for Cooperation) or the 
similarly-well-entrenched objections to the construct (for Purpose) by the time of these scholars’ 
writing were perhaps too much to be surmounted by calls to reopen the debate. 
Though it seems inappropriate to label Barnard as non-influential, given his level of 
citations in relation to both constructs, the long-term failure of his integrated perspective on 
“cooperation” and “purpose” to survive suggests that at least in this regard his influence did not 
last.  For one thing, Barnard lacked cultural capital (Bourdieu, 1986) from a scholarly 
perspective—he never even completed his bachelor’s degree at Harvard, and his participation in 
written field discourse was quite limited.  After Functions of the Executive, his publications were 
largely confined to book chapters, which were often edited versions of speeches, plus a few book 
reviews in academic journals.  He never really revisited his full organizational model in 
subsequent writings, with the result that many viewed Simon’s work, even with his departures 
from Barnard in language and conceptual definitions, as its de facto continuation. 
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The limitations on Barnard’s influence also seem linked to boundary-work concerns 
(Gieryn, 1983) by organizational scholars to maintain autonomy from practitioner influence in 
the interest of establishing scientific authority in the field.  Barnard’s background as a business 
and organizational leader violated the presumptions of “disinterestedness” considered integral to 
trust in a scientific community (Shapin, 1994).  His managerial background position was even 
explicitly invoked to discredit his ideas as mere reinforcements of his self-interest  (cf. Pondy, 
1992; Scott, 1992).  Since a fundamental basis for opposition to the notion of shared 
organizational purpose or the possibility of true cooperation within capitalist organizations was 
the unequal power among organizational participants, referring to Barnard as a source for theory 
on these constructs was doubly-problematic.   
The more remarkable thing about Barnard, given these disadvantages, is the level of 
influence he in fact had in terms of citations.  Timing appears been crucial to this, however.  
While he is prominently cited by, for example, Selznick (1943, 1948), Simon (1976 [1947]), 
Deutsch (1949b) and Parsons (1956b), he is not even mentioned by Zald (1963) in a review of 
perspectives on “organizational goal.”  The increasing pressure to scientize organizational 
scholarship, particularly subsequent to the 1959 reports on business education from the Ford and 
Carnegie Foundations (Khurana, 2007), may have stimulated the concerns for professional 
knowledge jurisdiction (Abbott, 1988) that helped increase barriers against non-academic voices.  
The window for Barnard’s influence was thus in the very earliest stages of field development, 
and the later article citations tie mainly to the linked perspective between “cooperation” and 
“purpose” that he contributed in that period. 
While factors of high economic, cultural and/or social capital (Bourdieu, 1986) thus tend 
to be particularly associated with influential figures in both constructs, these are not fully 
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determinative of those able to sustain meanings within the field.  Timing appears critical, as 
figures attempting to challenge well-entrenched construct meanings may not be successful 
despite strong capital resources, whereas an early stage of field development may allow even 
relative outsiders (such as Barnard) to have impact. 
Actor strategies.  Distinctions emerge between the two constructs in terms of the 
evidence of specific strategies by actors to gain authority over construct language for the field.  
In Cooperation, the most obvious boundary-work in establishing a position of scientific authority 
(Gieryn, 1983) actually appears in May & Doob (1937), where the authors argue for the 
“scientific” superiority of a psychological perspective and experimental methodology for gaining 
knowledge about the phenomenon of cooperation.  Here the boundary-work denigrates previous 
sociological theorization on cooperation as inadequate for the task—the stakes of funding for 
scientific research on the construct help justify the effort to establish the authority claims of 
psychological research.   
Going forward, however, the construct displays limited evidence of boundary-work 
(Gieryn, 1983) arguments.  Interestingly, the closest example was effectively a reversal of the 
usual contrasts between science and non-science.  Knowles (1952) asserted a voluntaristic 
definition of “cooperation” against the presumption of those he termed “scientists” that it can be 
applied within a hierarchical organizational context.  That is, he staked a claim to authority over 
and against the “scientists” on the basis of the presumed legitimacy for a definition of 
“cooperation” that excluded its application in coercive situations.  The word’s proper application 
was of greater concern to him, apparently, than defense of his opinion as “scientific,” suggesting 
the strength of conviction regarding the term’s socialistic and egalitarian roots.  Notably, this 
instance occurs outside of the psychological literature and prior to the initiation of the prisoner’s 
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dilemma approach to research in the late 1950s.  Once the combination of Deutsch’s goal-
structure-based definition (quite similar to the one presented by May & Doob) and the prisoner’s 
dilemma experimental operationalization emerged, the approach became institutionalized so 
quickly as the “scientific” way to study the construct that little threat emerged to require defense 
of that authority against rivals.   
By contrast, the process of evolution for Purpose is marked by multiple instances of 
boundary-work (Gieryn, 1983), where the need for a “scientific” approach is invoked in defense 
or criticism of construct definitions or uses.  For example, Simon (1946) undertakes boundary-
work by attacking Gulick’s use of “purpose” as non-scientific, leveraging this argument to 
establish his own, new “scientific” perspective on organizations in Administrative Behavior.  
Critiques of “purpose” as a scientific term (cf. Moore & Lewis, 1953), while not focused on its 
organizational use, likewise reject it for reasons of boundary concerns—it unnecessarily invokes 
the teleological forms of explanation that true “science” now disavows.  Rejection of the validity 
of a collective of persons (such as an organization) being able to possess any shared intention or 
will (Bergmann, 1962; Cyert & March, 1963) is also argued based on “scientific” principles 
derived from psychological and behavioral theory.  The heightened extent of boundary-work in 
relation to Purpose points to its interconnectedness with initial efforts to establish organizational 
scholarship as a scientific field.  Establishing acceptably-scientific constructs for the study of 
organizations was facilitated by conformity to existing conventions from the now-established 
social sciences.   
Similar boundary-work in the interest of autonomy for scientific development (Gieryn, 
1983) is evident again and again in arguments related to purpose that emphasize a demarcation 
between organizational scholarship and practitioners.  Development of theory based on or 
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inadvertently-supportive of managerial views is seen as a threat to the objectivity essential in a 
truly scientific perspective on organizations (Etzioni, 1960).  Another form of the argument 
invokes the rivalry between organizational scholarship and the “common sense” approach of 
organizational leaders (Katz & Kahn, 1966), implicitly discrediting practitioners as sources of 
knowledge.  In multiple instances, anxiety to establish and defend a new and distinct “science” in 
organizational scholarship is apparent. 
The disciplinary boundaries within the interdisciplinary context of organizational 
scholarship also seemed to contribute to strategic multiplication and selection of alternative 
terminology for Purpose.  When Simon and others in the Carnegie School elected a dominant use 
of “goal” language for the construct, they settled on a term offering a suitable “boundary object” 
(Star & Griesemer, 1989) for interdisciplinary communication.  Though their perspective 
differed in other respects from sociologists like Perrow and Etzioni, conforming to the 
sociologists’ preferred terminology of “goal” helped enable development of interdisciplinary 
organizational theory, as the word was also congenial for use in psychology, economics or 
political science.  The tendency as time went on for similar terms (“objectives,” “values,” 
“purpose,” “mission”) to co-exist with limited distinctions seemed to reflect on-going 
concessions for inclusion of the language preferences of multiple disciplines.  There was a little 
something for everyone, and the acceptance (as evidenced, for example, in Dauten (1958))  of 
the interchangeability of various terms (apart from initial resistance to the use of “purpose” itself 
as non-scientific) allowed theoretical conversation to continue in the shared interest of 
establishing scientific authority for organizational scholarship as a whole. 
Actor strategies thus appear to function in developing construct meaning in varying ways 
depending upon the field context and timing.  Early boundary-work (Gieryn, 1983) between 
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disciplines regarding Cooperation is matched by similar boundary-work on behalf of developing 
interdisciplinary organizational scholarship as a whole against practitioner’s voices and interests 
regarding Purpose.  The interdisciplinary context likewise tends to produce a polyglot approach 
to Purpose that promotes constructs suitable as “boundary objects” (Star & Griesemer, 1989).  
Resources of language and meaning.  In both constructs, the resources available in 
meanings of language for the construct seem particularly prominent in influencing later 
development.  For a start, as of 1938 the initial words of “cooperation” and “purpose” had very 
different status in terms of desirability as scientific constructs.  The word “cooperation” had 
strong positive connotations developed through use in popular discourse.  Research to help foster 
understanding about and increase the occurrence of human “cooperation” was thus a very 
desirable and fundable scientific endeavor, as evidenced by the May & Doob (1937) publication 
initiative from the SSRC.  On the other hand, “purpose,” while seeing some use in social science 
and administrative applications prior to 1938, had teleological connotations that made the word 
problematic in scientific use.   
Not surprisingly, the word “cooperation” stuck firmly to the construct in most uses, while 
the word “purpose” was quickly interchanged with and supplanted by other terminology more 
congenial to scientific use.  Only about 15% of Purpose-related articles exclusively used the 
word “purpose” for the concept; by contrast only about 15% of Cooperation-related articles 
introduced any kind of substitute terminology, most of these in very recent articles connected 
with the OCB construct, where “altruism” and “pro-social behavior” appeared as terms equated 
with “cooperation.”  As the definition of OCB, particularly in Organ’s writings, involved a 
reintroduction of the “cooperation” label to activities in the context of capitalist, hierarchical 
organizations, the appearance of alternative terminology in this instance may reflect residual 
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resistance to that application.  It could suggest, in other words, a continuing preference for 
employing terms other than “cooperation” to describe activity in these kinds of settings. 
Indeed, later use of “cooperation” and “purpose” in organizational scholarship reflected 
ongoing influence from divergent perspectives on the words’ respective meanings and 
applications that dated from prior to 1938.  Concerns that “cooperation” was an inappropriate 
label to apply in capitalist or hierarchical settings (e.g., Bendix & Fisher, 1949), and that true 
“cooperation” must be voluntary and altruistic (e.g., Knowles, 1952), continued to inspire 
resistance to its application within formal organizations.  Ultimately, only a renaming (as a 
component of “organizational citizenship” (Smith et al., 1983)) and, with it, a fully-voluntaristic 
definition (associated behaviors were specified as outside of job expectations and unrewarded) 
permitted a lasting application of the construct to individuals under management.  Meanwhile, 
“cooperation” was freely used to describe interactions between organizations as collective units 
(e.g., Thompson & McEwen, 1958), where interpersonal hierarchy was not a focal point.   
In the instance of “purpose,” the tension between the word’s prior instrumental and 
idealistic uses showed signs of being resolved in favor of the purely idealistic by the end of the 
period studied—to the extent the word itself was being used in organizational writing, moral and 
philosophical connotations appeared prominent in the definition (cf. Bartlett & Ghoshal, 1994; 
Collier, 1998).  By then, “goal” and “objective” were well-established as terms of instrumental 
meaning, freeing a definition of “purpose” (as well as “mission”) that migrated toward purely 
ideal or symbolic understandings.  
In both constructs, too, the limited influence of Barnard’s definitions that linked them 
explicitly within formal organizations may relate to his violation of prior norms for their 
meaning.  In applying “cooperation” and particularly “cooperative system” to formal 
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organizations (including, though not exclusively, hierarchical and capitalistic ones) he ignored 
the ways his use challenged prior socialistic meanings for these terms.  He similarly failed to 
attend to presumptions of spontaneity and altruism in “cooperation” from early sociologists, 
instead including both social and economic motivations into his model of organizational 
participation.  Also, his use of “purpose” tied the instrumental use apparent from Gulick with 
transcendent, subjective connotations of the word through linking it with the creation of 
“organizational morality.”  He thus produced tensions in both definitions that were difficult to 
sustain, given the conventions of prior use.   
In each instance, in fact, Barnard’s definition directly confronted the 
Gemeinschaft/Gesellschaft distinction from Tönnies between natural and rational organizations, 
cited by Barley & Kunda (1992) as being irreconcilable poles of contrast within the field.  He 
incorporated the natural ideal of “cooperation” into a rational organizational environment, while 
still attempting to preserve the naturalistic factors of personal motives and informal organization, 
and he included both the instrumental and inspirational or idealized operations of “purpose.”  
Those emphasizing Barnard’s self-interest as a managerial figure (cf. Scott, 1992) may deduce 
here an attempt to co-opt the positive meanings of “purpose” and “cooperation” to legitimate 
formal organizations—whether deliberately or naïvely, however, he created definitions that 
generally did not last in their application within organizational scholarship.  
Viewed as typical “umbrella constructs” (Hirsch & Levin, 1999), these initial definitions 
both collapsed, but with differing results in use of the words themselves.  On the one hand, the 
word “cooperation” survived in field usage, though restricted in its application to the dominant 
prisoner’s dilemma operationalization and to group or organizational settings that didn’t violate 
norms against its association with capitalistic aims or hierarchical, non-voluntaristic situations.  
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On the other hand, “purpose” was largely replaced by words separately assuming either the 
instrumental (“goal,” “objective”) or ideal (“mission”) component of its meaning.  Only later, as 
organizational journals that offered an outlet for ethical and philosophical language appeared, did 
the teleologically-associated “purpose” begin to re-emerge, but with that narrowed and idealized 
meaning only. 
Historical context.  Both constructs also bear a strong stamp from the historical context 
in which they emerged.  Events that helped structure resource availability and scholarly concerns 
at crucial points of each construct’s evolution made lasting impacts on their meanings, much as 
predicted by Stinchcombe (1965) concerning the relation of organizational structures to 
conditions at the field’s origins. 
Though the evolution of each construct covers the same timeframe, in fact, the events 
shaping them differ based on the differing timing and disciplinary context of their use.  For 
Cooperation, the historical context of the Cold War, encompassing the Korean War and then the 
Vietnam War and associated Peace Movement, offered a key spur to interest and funding for 
research in the area of conflict resolution starting in the 1950s.  Publications like the Journal of 
Conflict Resolution quickly appeared as a result.  The coupling of Deutsch’s definition of 
“cooperation” with the prisoner’s dilemma game approach to experiments was rapidly enshrined 
and institutionalized in this environment.  The opportunities for publication and research 
funding, coupled with the appeal of supporting a peace-oriented political agenda popular on 
many campuses, helped sustain continued research under this paradigm for decades.  Even the 
simulations and models employed by Axelrod (1981; 1984) and successors continued to build on 
this well-established approach.  The dominance of this research paradigm tended likewise to 
subsume the understood definition of “cooperation.”  Its use within the prisoner’s dilemma game 
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format became increasingly taken-for-granted and almost symbolic, while other facets of 
meaning for the construct (including shared task activities and interpersonal interaction) drew 
only limited research attention.  Into the 21st century, articles related to Cooperation still strongly 
bore the stamp of the experimental approach institutionalized nearly fifty years before. 
For Purpose, the concentration of key references in books and articles dating from the 
1960s suggests that this was a formative period fixing definitions and attitudes toward use of the 
construct.  While the post-World-War-II momentum for scientific research regarding large 
organizations had begun to shape organizational scholarship through the founding of key 
journals such as ASQ and the Journal of the Academy of Management (later AMJ) in the mid-
1950s, the end of that decade saw reports on the state of university-based business education 
from both the Carnegie and Ford Foundations that stressed the need for a more stringent social-
scientific basis for the field (Khurana, 2007).  This made the early 1960s a period when concerns 
to develop and legitimize a practice of organizational scholarship on the foundations of scientific 
authority ran high.  Simultaneously, there was a posture of awe and suspicion toward the large, 
“complex” organizations that provided the inspiration for such research.  Blau & Scott captured 
both aspects of the period’s consciousness well in their preface to Formal Organizations:  “Our 
ability to organize thousands and even millions of men in order to accomplish large-scale 
tasks…is one of our greatest strengths.  The possibility that free men become mere cogs in the 
bureaucratic machineries we set up for this purpose is one of the greatest threats to our liberty” 
(Blau & Scott, 1962: ix).   
The arguments employed in relation to Purpose that emphasize, by turns, concerns for 
“scientific” construct use (e.g., Simon, 1946, 1964) and for the autonomy of organizational 
scholarship from the power exercised by organizational managers (e.g., Etzioni, 1960) flow from 
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the heart of this period.  Organizational scholars were engaged in the enterprise of legitimating 
themselves as scientists, but with concurrent concerns that this enterprise maintain a freedom 
from and authority over the potential abuse of managerial power.  As detachment from outside 
interests is a key marker of legitimacy for “scientific” practice (Shapin, 1994), these agendas 
merged in rejection of a unitary organizational purpose that could be shared by participants.  A 
unified notion for Purpose violated both the behavioral presumption against the validity of 
group-based concepts of intention and the desire for scholarly autonomy from the interests of 
organizational elites.  The energy to establish a scientific project on organizational research thus 
combined with suspicion toward the power concentrated in those dauntingly-complex 
organizations to make further research on or development of the construct as initially described 
by Barnard hopelessly controversial. 
With each construct, then, historical context helped to significantly shape its meaning and 
use, primarily through the research agenda that the moment presented.  For Cooperation, an 
opportune linkage of construct definition and operationalization meshed with issues of 
contemporary concern that drew interest from scholars and funding through public interest.  For 
Purpose, the agenda to establish organizational scholarship was no less of a public concern, but 
its combination with mistrust of such organizations launched a theoretical controversy that 
largely precluded development through empirical research.  Consistent with Stinchcombe (1965), 
the momentum from several critical years in shaping meaning for each construct could not easily 
be redirected later, despite attempts to do so.  
Summary Comparison 
The evolution processes for Cooperation and Purpose diverge in ways that seem to begin 
with the differences in the status of the initial words in terms of desirability for use in scientific 
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applications as of 1938:  “Cooperation” was a word with positive connotations and ready 
desirability for social science research; “purpose,” due to its teleological connotations, was a 
word to be avoided.    The definition of “cooperation” within a framework endorsed by a single 
discipline (psychology), congenial to an experimental context, and with applications of 
contemporary interest in international relations, combined to produce a quickly-legitimated 
“normal science” paradigm of research.  The desirable word quickly meshed with a non-
controversial operationalization, facilitated by the involvement of few distinct disciplines and the 
strong incentives for a popular research agenda on conflict resolution.  The result was a steady 
and increasing stream of research on the construct, albeit with a focus on the dimensions 
emphasized by this specific operationalization.   
On the other hand, “purpose” was a word with initially-problematic connotations for 
research, and its further development was almost exclusively confined to the formative, 
interdisciplinary environment of organizational research.  The problematic word was replaced by 
multiple substitutes through the interaction of multiple disciplinary language preferences, and 
operationalization of the construct within the organizational context was controversial, leading to 
a largely fragmented and ultimately abandoned research program.  
Despite the divergence in outcomes, however, the evolution processes for the constructs 
also exhibit notable similarities.  First is the continued influence of connotative meanings for the 
words “cooperation” and “purpose” from prior to 1938.  The understanding of “cooperation” as 
essentially voluntaristic and inappropriate for describing situations of formal, hierarchical 
authority persists long after names like Robert Owen and Herbert Spencer have been forgotten.  
The teleological connotations for “purpose” cling to the word so that its few remaining uses in 
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organizational or social science discourse invoke moral or transcendental rather than 
instrumental meanings.   
Another similarity between the evolution narratives of the constructs is the contention 
between organizational scholars and the perspective of managerial interests.  For Purpose, this 
tends to deconstruct research on unitary organizational purpose altogether, while for Cooperation 
it largely excludes the term from application in an organizational context by its original name.  
The seemingly-paradoxical result of the process is that multiple organizations (each composed of 
many people) may “cooperate” with each other (requiring the organizational entities to share a 
common purpose) but individual organizations (composed of many people) may not be 
considered to share a unitary “purpose.” 
Further similarities come in the strong stamp of the historical moment on determining a 
central path for each construct that helped it either to thrive or to founder.  The combination of 
contemporary incentives or concerns had a focused impact within about a five- to ten-year 
window, and subsequent efforts to negate or overturn the direction determined in that period 
were largely unsuccessful.  Indeed, while both constructs’ processes of evolution suggest the 
value of social and cultural capital (Bourdieu, 1986) for helping actors to gain influence over 
construct meanings, when their efforts ran counter to well-established meanings or 
operationalizations for the constructs, or violated the anxieties for autonomy from practitioner 
interests, such actor resources were not enough.   
In both constructs, also, the specific use of the terms as employed by Barnard was not 
sustained.  Given the problems identified for applying each construct within an organizational 
context, Barnard’s definitions of them operating in conjunction within a formal organization 
appear to have been doomed by that aspect alone, although his identity as an organizational 
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manager further weakened the likelihood of his influence.  In each instance, his definition’s 
attempt to bridge the divide between rational and normative organizational discourse (Barley & 
Kunda, 1992) seems to have been key to bringing a collapse to the “umbrella construct” (Hirsch 
& Levin, 1999).  The initial acceptability of each term for scientific use, however, seemed to 
contribute to determining whether the word itself continued to be popular in research with a 
narrowed meaning and application (as for “cooperation”)  or was marginalized and largely 
substituted for by related language (as for “purpose”). 
Chapter Summary 
In this chapter, I have compared the findings regarding construct development for 
Cooperation and Purpose.  I highlighted their divergence in trends of article frequency, 
disciplinary focus of the discourse and level of operationalization for each construct.  I noted 
similarities between the constructs in the involvement of key central actors with high social and 
cultural capital but also the tendency for such actor resources to be inadequate for sustained 
influence where their efforts ran counter to established construct meanings.  I also highlighted 
the role of historical context in influencing the direction of construct development.  In each 
instance, the construct’s operationalization and application within organizational settings were 
particularly contested due to violations of prior meanings for the terms and concerns for 
autonomy of organizational scholarship from practitioner interests. 
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CHAPTER 7 - DISCUSSION 
In this chapter, I review and discuss my findings, first returning to my elaborated research 
questions and addressing them based on data from this study.  I identify contributions from this 
study to greater understanding of the process of construct evolution and of the dynamics of 
organizational scholarship as a field.  I acknowledge several limitations of the study and then 
briefly suggest its implications for future research in organizational scholarship, as well as 
potential implications for management practice.  I finish the chapter with overall conclusions 
regarding the study.  
Summary of Findings 
My general research question focused on the evolution of “cooperation” and “purpose” as 
theoretical constructs in organizational scholarship during the period from 1938 to 2005. Given 
prior findings on construct and discourse evolution in academic fields, combined with theory 
from the sociology of knowledge, I elaborated this question to explore the interaction of several 
factors in construct evolution.  While these factors—actor characteristics, actor strategies, 
language resources and historical context—were implied independently by different studies, I 
aimed to offer a contribution by studying their combined impact on determining the sustained 
meanings and influential actors in construct evolution within an interdisciplinary field. 
Sustained construct meanings.  My first question focused on how actor strategies, 
language resources and historical context combined to explain which construct uses or meanings 
were sustained within the field.  I found that historical context contributed to specific language 
resources and meanings associated with “cooperation” and “purpose” prior to 1938.  These 
developed for “cooperation” primarily through rhetoric from the Progressive Era and practices of 
Christian Socialism and for “purpose” in relation to emergent naturalistic and positivistic 
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(thereby anti-teleological) norms for scientific studies.  In each instance, this context of 
historically-situated meaning had lasting impact on later evolution of the associated construct.     
For “cooperation,” prior associations of the word with socialistic organizational practices 
and with altruistic, voluntaristic activity brought challenges to its application in hierarchical and 
specifically capitalistic settings.  This restricted its use in organizational scholarship but 
presented no obstacles to its operationalization in research on conflict resolution.  By contrast, 
prior teleological associations for “purpose” rendered it problematic for scientific use 
altogether—also, the attempt by Barnard (1968 [1938]) to define “purpose” in a way that bridged 
prior instrumental and ideal meanings created a tension that was not easily resolved.  Generally, 
substitute terms such as “goal” and “objective” arose within organizational scholarship to assume 
the construct’s instrumental meanings, while “purpose” (later joined by “mission”) assumed the 
ideal component of meaning, but with diminished usage in research. 
In both instances, my findings support the conclusions of Barley & Kunda (1992) 
regarding the dichotomous tension in management discourse between the Gemeinschaft and 
Gesellschaft conceptions of “natural” versus “rational” organization, dating to the late 19th-
century work of Tönnies but paralleled by other sociological categorizations of natural versus 
rational “cooperation” during the era.  An inability to resolve the conflicts presented by these 
poles of meaning made application of “cooperation” problematic in hierarchical (rational rather 
than natural) settings and made use of “purpose” in a simultaneously instrumental/rational and 
idealized/normative sense problematic.  It also particularly disadvantaged the sustainability of 
their combined use as specified by Barnard (i.e., as “purposive cooperation” with rational 
connotations in a hierarchical organizational setting).   
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I also found interaction between actor strategies and historical context in shaping 
construct meanings.  Strategies of boundary-work (Gieryn, 1983) played a prominent role in 
each process of evolution, though at different times.  For Cooperation, funding incentives to 
create a “scientific” research program on the subject prompted psychologists to develop a 
definition within boundaries of their disciplinary perspective—this early work by May & Doob 
(1937) was then adapted and disseminated via Deutsch (1949b).  This combined with the context 
of international tensions during the 1950s and 1960s to solidify a definition for the construct 
embodied in the prisoner’s dilemma research program regarding conflict resolution and peace.  
Studies multiplied within this perspective shaped largely by psychology and, to a lesser extent, 
political science.  The dominance of a single discipline in framing research helped facilitate 
quick consensus on a paradigm (Kuhn, 1996 [1969]) and rapidly propagated the associated 
construct meaning focusing on goal structure rather than shared task activities in cooperation.   
For Purpose, on the other hand, the project of establishing a scientifically-credible field 
of organization scholarship, beginning after World War II but sharpened after the 1959 reports 
from the Carnegie and Ford Foundations on the state of business education, heightened anxiety 
to establish “scientized” meanings of the construct.  This prompted the boundary-work (Gieryn, 
1983) by early organizational theorists like Simon, Etzioni, Katz & Kahn and others to argue for 
construct language and definitions that resonated with assumptions from the behavioral sciences 
and that preserved the autonomy of organizational scholars from ties with practitioner interests. 
In each instance, the occasion for boundary-work seemed to have a lasting effect on 
construct meanings for both Cooperation and Purpose affected by research-related resources and 
field interests within a relatively brief window of time.  This coincides with observations from 
Stinchcombe (1965) of the enduring stamp that resource availabilities at the time of an 
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organizational form’s emergence will place on norms for organizational structure in that field.  
My study highlights those same dynamics at work in helping fix lasting conventions of meaning 
and usage for scientific field language.   
Influential actors.  A second focal area for my research was identifying how actor 
characteristics, historical context and available language resources constrained or facilitated the 
success of specific actors’ efforts to influence construct usage or meaning.  For both Cooperation 
and Purpose, I was able to identify actors highly cited for definitions and use of the construct and 
do some tentative comparisons of them with actors whose attempts at influence were less-
sustained or less well-cited.  Common characteristics of actors like Simon and Deutsch who were 
able to sustain influence over the field were high resources of cultural capital (Bourdieu, 1986) 
such as affiliations with prestigious academic institutions and long track records of scholarly 
publication, plus strong social capital resources developed through careers interconnected with 
other well-published scholars.  The cultural capital for members of the Carnegie School in 
particular was positioned to influence Purpose through a historical context in which the GSIA 
was promoted by the Ford Foundation as a model for business education, with educational 
programs funded to help disseminate its approaches to other schools.   
The identification of these correlations does not constitute firm evidence of causality, 
particularly when the accumulation of cultural capital and the occurrence of influence could be 
seen as unfolding simultaneously through scholarly publications.  The conclusions are thus 
tentative but also in line with other work highlighting that actors with greater resources of social 
or cultural capital may have advantages in influencing institutional fields (cf. Battilana, 2006; 
Greenwood & Suddaby, 2006). 
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In my study, however, prestigious academic affiliations were not enough to allow actors 
such as Bartlett & Ghoshal (1993, 1994) to reframe construct usage once alternative meanings 
had become well-established.  By contrast, the historical context of the late 1930s and 1940s—
while interest in organizational scholarship was rising but before the boundaries of 
professionalized science around the field had been drawn—enabled even Barnard, whose 
business background and lack of academic credentials presented disadvantages to his influence 
as a scholarly actor, to penetrate the conversation with his linked conception of “cooperation” 
and “purpose” in organizations.  
The dynamics of the process overall appear very consistent with those of “embedded 
agency” (Seo & Creed, 2002), where actors can leverage personal resources in pursuit of 
institutional change but are also either constrained or facilitated by existing meanings and field 
conditions.  This confirms the appropriateness of relating the process of construct development 
with studies and theory on institutional entrepreneurship (Hardy & Maguire, 2008). 
Interdisciplinary context.  My third research question focused on the impact of 
disciplinary boundaries within the interdisciplinary field of organizational scholarship on actor 
strategies and construct meanings.  Here, the constructs presented an opportunity for contrast, as 
discourse and development of Cooperation largely took place outside of the organizational 
scholarship journals, while the development of Purpose largely took place within that 
interdisciplinary context.  Differences in their process of evolution may thus be related in some 
part to that differing extent of interdisciplinary involvement.  
A notable contrast between the two processes is the multiplication of terminology 
(“goal,” “objective,” “mission,” “values”) alongside “purpose” during the evolution of the 
construct.  The words that dominate the field (particularly “goal”) tend to have the advantage of 
 224 
 
prior use and acceptability in multiple social science disciplines, making them ideal for use as 
“boundary objects” (Star & Griesemer, 1989) to facilitate theoretical conversations across 
disciplinary boundaries in an interdisciplinary field.  No similar multiplication of language is 
apparent with Cooperation, which is largely researched within just two disciplines (psychology 
and political science), and, in these, primarily within a relatively-narrow application of conflict 
resolution. 
The findings reinforce the importance of disciplinary “ownership” in facilitating research 
and theoretical development within a field.  The pre-eminence of psychology as a discipline in 
both the definition and then the operationalization of Cooperation led to a standardized approach 
for research studies.  Studies subsequently increased in volume, building upon the comparable 
prior work to test new factors for possible relationships to the construct as operationalized.  The 
overall pattern is thus consistent with observations of Kuhn (1996 [1969]) regarding the role of 
paradigmatic convergence in facilitating scientific field development.  By contrast, the 
interdisciplinary context of Purpose helped prompt the multiplication of terminology for the 
construct, and under those conditions no “validity police” (Hirsch & Levin, 1999) emerged to 
argue for standardization of practices.  With construct language unstandardized, partly in efforts 
to include the perspectives of multiple disciplines, the urgency to standardize measurement was 
lacking and, over time, research related to the topic declined.  This process aligns with familiar 
concerns about the prospects for advancement within organizational scholarship in the absence 
of paradigm formation (cf. Pfeffer, 1993).  Though the distinctions between paradigmatic versus 
non-paradigmatic fields may be familiar, my findings point to the impact of interdisciplinarity on 
field language as a specific factor that may hinder paradigm formation. 
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Contributions and Implications for Theory 
My findings offer several contributions to greater understanding of the development of 
theoretical constructs and discourse, particularly within the field of organizational scholarship.  
These contributions in turn have potential implications for ongoing efforts of theoretical 
development within the field.   
First, my research makes a contribution through offering elaborations to the theory of 
construct development presented by Hirsch & Levin (1999).  My findings suggest, for example, 
that the prior meanings of words employed for the construct need to be considered as an 
antecedent condition affecting the construct’s further development.  The choice of words with 
connotations that influenced the willingness of social scientists to apply them within specific 
types of organizations (as with “cooperation”) or to consider them as valid scientific terms at all 
(as with “purpose”) appeared to have an impact in each instance by circumscribing or dampening 
the construct’s popularity in research usage.  This highlights that the initial stage of popular 
usage in Hirsch & Levin’s model will not necessarily be experienced by all constructs, pointing 
to prior connotative meanings as an antecedent factor helping to determine this.  Similarly, my 
findings suggest that historical context is an important antecedent as well as a potential ongoing 
factor in driving research popularity, as the interest in research related to Cooperation arose in 
part due to its idealization during the Progressive Era and its perceived importance in connection 
with international political affairs. 
Due to the differences in the extent of interdisciplinary involvement in development of 
Cooperation versus Purpose, comparative observations from my study also extend Hirsch & 
Levin (1999) by highlighting interdisciplinarity in the field as a likely boundary condition on 
their model.  Contrary to their prediction that popular use of a construct will tend to multiply its 
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meanings, the standardization of meaning (primarily within one discipline’s perspective) and 
operationalization for Cooperation are factors that precede trends of increased use in research.  
Further, this increased use under the dominance of a single disciplinary perspective resulted over 
time in a narrowing rather than multiplication of the construct’s meaning, aligning it with the 
facet emphasized by this operationalization.  Thus, the effect Hirsch & Levin (1999) observe of 
popularity in research leading to multiplication of meanings may be conditioned upon the 
interdisciplinary environment of organization studies.  This is reinforced by the findings of 
Bartunek & Spreitzer (2006) that usage across other disciplines multiplied meanings for 
“empowerment” even further, contrary to their hypothesis based on Hirsch & Levin’s model 
anticipating a consolidation of meanings over time. 
Likewise, my work extends Hirsch & Levin (1999) by highlighting how the partitioning 
of language within an interdisciplinary context, reflecting differing disciplinary preferences, 
helped prompt the creation of “fragment” terms that would outlast the umbrella.  Consistent with 
Hirsch & Levin’s expectations, substitute terms introduced for Purpose tended to carry narrower, 
more specific meanings (particularly “objective,” which invites connotations of quantity and 
maximization).   However, my work provides additional insight by showing how the interaction 
of various disciplines in the field helped spawn these terms.  Further, I help address the question 
of which terms may survive in the field and why, as my findings suggest that interdisciplinary 
acceptance offers an advantage.  Constructs employing terminology familiar to multiple 
disciplines within the field (e.g., “goal”) may have particular advantages in sustainability, being 
more viable as “boundary objects” (Star & Griesemer, 1989) to facilitate the transfer of 
knowledge across disciplines.  
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Moreover, the multiplication of terminology related to Purpose produced an anomaly in 
this instance compared with the prediction of Hirsch & Levin’s model for a stage of contraction 
in construct meanings under the influence of “validity police.”  The urgency to resolve 
discrepant definitions was not stimulated while the language being used for the construct 
continued to vary.  This illustrates how an interdisciplinary environment may produce impacts on 
language that slow or prevent the standardization of construct meanings and operationalization.  
Consistent with the observation that an institutionalized “commensurability” is required for the 
common understanding that enables market activities (Stinchcombe, 2002), standardization of 
language is prerequisite to the standardization of measurement that helps facilitate scientific 
research.  This offers an insight into the challenges for paradigm convergence in organizational 
scholarship (Pfeffer, 1993), pointing to the pluralism in theoretical language that may arise 
through interdisciplinarity as a particular source of such difficulties. 
My study also points to the possibility for fragmentation of an “umbrella construct” 
(Hirsch & Levin, 1999) to occur via the narrowing of its meaning through operationalization, 
even without a change in terminology.  By the view of Hirsch & Levin (1999), in fact, the 
“umbrella construct” of “cooperation” would not be considered to have collapsed, because the 
word is still prominently used in research.  Its meaning under the research paradigm driven by 
prisoner’s dilemma experiments, however, has tended to narrow to that of a specific decision 
choice rather than a broad description of ongoing, purposive interpersonal activities.  Here, the 
narrowed meaning emerged as predicted to survive the “umbrella,” but invisibly, because the 
construct’s name remained unchanged.  Thus, while there is much in my study to indicate the 
importance of specific words and their meanings in affecting the deployment of a theoretical 
construct, my findings also suggest that focusing only on language may direct attention away 
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from the less-visible role of operationalization in determining theoretical definitions and 
development.   
This ability of operationalization to impose meaning apart from, or even in spite of, the 
terminology used for the construct, is illustrated by the fact that the boundary-work (Gieryn, 
1983) evident in my study by scholars concerned to specify theoretical constructs that separated 
the scientific perspective of organizational scholars from the interests of practitioners has not 
prevented the dominance of practitioner-oriented measures of organizational performance within 
the field (Walsh et al., 2003).  Denying legitimacy to shared notions of organizational purpose 
developed by organizational leaders (and to notions of “organizational effectiveness” based on 
these) did not keep financial measures of “organizational performance” from becoming the most 
common operationalization of “organizational goodness” (Shenhav et al., 1994).  As documented 
by Margolis & Walsh (2003), even research on corporate social responsibility has focused to a 
significant degree on attempting to establish its relationship to economic performance.   
These observations highlight the continuing tensions between normative and rational 
concerns in the field of organizational scholarship noted by Barley & Kunda (1992).  My work 
builds upon theirs by uncovering such dynamics in operation during the evolution of theoretical 
constructs, suggesting that the interaction between these conceptions of organization has 
influenced theoretical development in the field in an ongoing way, not only in the periodic 
dominance of one versus the other.   This insight leads to the identification of another factor 
related to the sustainability of “umbrella constructs” (Hirsch & Levin, 1999), as my findings 
suggest that constructs with meanings bridging the Gemeinschaft/Gesellschaft divide may be 
particularly vulnerable to collapse or partitioning in meaning.  My study also offers reasons why 
specific substitute or fragment constructs may survive the collapse of an “umbrella construct”—
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the resulting fragments seem likely to be narrowed in meaning so as to fall on either one side or 
the other of the rhetorical divide, reducing the tension inherent to combining these opposite poles 
of organizational conception.  Within my findings, for example, the term “goal” seems to fall 
comfortably on the rational side, while “mission” aligns more closely with a normative 
perspective, and neither term attracted significant challenges as to the legitimacy of its use in an 
organizational context. 
The preoccupation with bounding the applications of normative language and 
distinguishing it from rational applications, however, has, as noted, failed to curtail the 
dominance of rationalized expressions of meaning through the operationalization of 
organizational performance.  The situation reinforces the suggestion that the “dark side” of 
legitimation is misdirection—opposing concerns are invisible when attention is drawn elsewhere 
(Freudenburg & Alario, 2007).  In this case, the resistance of the scholarly field toward language 
implying a blend of rational and normative rhetorics has resulted not in a dominance of outsider-
driven and stakeholder-centric perspectives on organizational performance but rather the 
opposite.  This reinforces the point made by Pfeffer (1995) that eschewing concerns for 
paradigmatic convergence in favor of pluralism in theoretical language actually cannot prevent 
the inevitable incursion of rationalist or positivist perspectives.  Whatever the resistance to 
specific theoretical language or applications, more rationalized frameworks are likely to prevail 
in operationalization of the constructs or in schools of research that gradually dominate the field 
through their own enhanced productivity.   
In fact, the gradual impact of this tendency toward partitioning theoretical language to 
separate rational and normative implications may have produced field conditions that now 
supersede the cyclical pattern of rational/normative discourse as identified by Barley & Kunda 
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(1992).  Much as these tensions were resolved in the theoretical constructs I observed through a 
partitioning of terminology and meanings, they may have been resolved through a partitioning of 
the field of organizational scholarship itself.  Barley & Kunda (1992) connect the beginning of 
the last cycle observed in their study (one of “normative” rhetoric) with the rise of culture-related 
discourse in organizational studies beginning in 1980.  More or less coincident with that 
development, organizational scholarship also saw the creation of strategic management as a 
separate sub-field (Hambrick & Chen, 2008), with a progressively greater integration of 
neoclassical economic perspectives and closer alignment with practitioner concerns than in other 
segments of organizational scholarship.  Could the suggested domination of normative discourse 
beginning in 1980 also reflect the creation of the sub-field of strategic management as a separate 
arena for more rationally-oriented discourse?   
Such a division would parallel the cleavage between sociology and economics in U.S. 
academia during the late 19th and early 20th centuries (Oberschall, 1972), when sociologists with 
largely normative and reformist perspectives split off from economists emphasizing rationalistic 
perspectives.  While schools of thought such as institutional economics or economic sociology 
still bridge the gap in part, separate disciplines did emerge as a result.  As the 1970s has also 
been noted as the last decade giving rise to significant new organizational theories (Davis, 2010), 
the perception of reduced fruitfulness in theoretical development starts roughly at 1980 as well.  
The coincidence in timing suggests that a partitioning of the field into distinctive camps of 
normative versus rational emphasis may also have diminished the opportunities for theory-
generation that had been produced by continued efforts at integrating those tensions.  Instead, 
separate and independent conversations continue, with only the occasional battles over whose 
voice is the authoritative one to govern organizational practices (cf. Jensen, 2002). 
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Another insight into the dynamics of organizational scholarship offered by my study is 
deeper understanding of factors behind the continued challenges identified for linking 
management research and theory with practice (cf. Bartunek, 2007; Ghoshal, 2005; Sandberg & 
Tsoukas, 2011).  The boundary-work (Gieryn, 1983) arguments over construct meanings during 
the formation of organizational scholarship, evident especially in my findings regarding Purpose, 
prompted cleavage between the perspectives of practitioners and academics.  Initial desires to 
maintain scientific authority and autonomy made identification with practitioner interests 
problematic and shaped theoretical definitions in the field accordingly.  Working through these 
difficulties in the present day requires recognition of how these dynamics have been deeply 
embedded into assumptions and research over time, and my study points to some of these 
origins.   
The consistency of my observations with those of Stinchcombe (1965) concerning the 
lasting impacts of conditions at a field’s emergence on organizational structure within it 
reinforce the need to recognize the enduring imprint that directions taken in theory and language 
by the organizational scholarship field at the point of its emergence have on its prospects for 
continued theoretical development.  Today’s organizations, in fact, are often less hierarchical 
(Kanter, 1989) and increasingly different in structure from the complex monoliths of the 1950s 
and 1960s that prompted both the curiosity and suspicion of early organizational scholars.  
Strategies for advancing the development of organizational theory in light of these newer 
organizational models (Suddaby et al., 2011) may be enhanced via a retracing of steps to 
understand what topics and approaches to research the assumptions of the past helped to exclude.   
My study suggests that barriers erected against “common sense” practitioner perspectives 
in theoretical development (cf. Katz & Kahn, 1966) or against studying “cooperation” in 
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hierarchical environments did restrict the development of certain areas of research within 
organizational scholarship.  When Heath & Sitkin (2001), for example, observe the dearth of 
“Big-O” research on “organizing behavior,” the lack seems linked at least in part to the same 
concerns that constrained development of Barnard’s linked perspective on “purpose” and 
“cooperation” within organizations.  This kind of organizationally-situated research demands 
some bridging of the Gemeinschaft/Gesellschaft divide (Barley & Kunda, 1992), and it requires 
confronting the embeddedness of early boundaries established against practitioner perspectives.  
Without this, continued attempts to tap practitioner perspectives for research or theoretical 
development (cf. Sandberg & Tsoukas, 2011) seem destined to encounter the same obstacles.   
Limitations of the Study 
There are several limitations with my study.  Prominent among them is that, in an effort 
to build greater understanding of the complex interaction of the factors of actor-focused and 
situational characteristics over a lengthy time span, my research design makes it difficult to 
control for or tease out their relative impacts.  Historical work is particularly suited to viewing 
causes in conjunction through a narrative (Abbott, 1994), but less well-suited to identifying 
causality for individual variables.  My suggestion of, for example, the importance of cultural and 
social capital (Bourdieu, 1986) in the production of influential actors in construct evolution is 
subject to the criticism of possible reverse or at least concurrent causation (e.g., does cultural 
capital lead to influence, or are cultural capital and influence concurrently produced by some 
different process associated with the perceived merit of one’s scholarship?).  Similarly, my 
assessment of the importance of prior meanings for the words, to the extent of overruling such 
impacts of actor capital, is only tentative.  I attempted to strengthen my basis for making such 
conclusions through consideration of alternative explanations (e.g., checking for citations of May 
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& Doob (1937) to identify if independent influence from the similar definition of “cooperation” 
in their work offers a better explanation for the acceptance of Deutsch’s definition) and through 
informal comparative analysis, such as brief assessments of qualities in the influential versus 
less-influential actors.  Systematic methods of qualitative comparative analysis (Ragin, 1987), 
however, are better suited to this application of teasing out the relative impacts of causal 
variables in case narratives, and my findings could be further specified through a future project 
undertaking that approach. 
Similarly, theoretical sampling, while appropriate to enrich understanding for an 
inductive, descriptive process (Strauss & Corbin, 1998) and to generalizations toward descriptive 
and theoretical insight (Yin, 2003) such as those required for developing my chronological 
narratives, is not suited toward generalizing about population characteristics.  My use of the 
selected journal articles to identify trends in quantity of articles related to the constructs over 
time and proportions published in various journals or operationalizing the construct thus must be 
viewed with caution.  In particular, my filtering out of a proportion of “prisoner’s dilemma” 
studies from examination would likely have affected the number of articles on Cooperation more 
substantially than for Purpose.  In this instance, however, this would mean that the trend of 
increase in quantity of journal articles for Cooperation is probably understated, and likewise the 
proportion of them operationalized and appearing in Psychology or Political Science journals, as 
all these factors tended to be common to the “prisoner’s dilemma” studies.  As such, the data I 
have is likely to understate rather than overstate the distinctions suggested between the two 
constructs.  Nevertheless, I attempted to bolster conclusions related to these trends through a 
strategy of triangulation (Yin, 2003), comparing these patterns with outside events identifiable in 
the narrative such as the timing of emergence for specific journals or topics within organizational 
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scholarship.  The correspondence with other data sources helps strengthen my basis for viewing 
these trends comparatively, but with this acknowledgement of their limitations.  
My study was also limited by the fact that I followed conventions for standardization of 
data collection from historical documents (Danto, 2008) more consistently for journal articles 
than for the books I examined for evidence of construct meanings or use.  In each phase of 
research, the primary data collection document or instrument served for the computer-based 
compilation of data from journal articles only, while data was collected from books almost 
exclusively through handwritten notes.  While I intended that my study’s inclusion of the 
evidence from books would itself be a step forward from prior studies of construct evolution or 
discourse that focused solely on analyzing journal articles (cf. Barley et al., 1988; Bartunek & 
Spreitzer, 2006), my own approach also fell short of seamlessly integrating the data from the two 
sources.  My early inductive conclusions about both the meanings of words (during the 
Preliminary Survey Phase) and the significant events in the narrative (during the Construct 
Evolution Phase) were likely biased toward data from the articles because that was what I had 
available for review in standardized form.  One corrective could have been, for example, to add 
parallel spreadsheet entries for books examined in the Construct Evolution Phase so that I could 
have viewed them directly in context while examining the sheets to build an initial narrative 
timeline.  Instead, I incorporated the data from books later, but this was more dependent on my 
independent recall of information about them to add into the timeline.  As I recognized this, I 
attempted to compensate by intentionally reading through all of my book notes and memos at 
later stages of the process periodically to check for omissions, but there remains a likely bias 
toward the primacy of journal article information in shaping my findings. 
 235 
 
Similarly, my compromise in not attempting to sample directly on usages of “purpose” 
independently of “cooperation” in the Preliminary Survey Phase may have resulted in the 
overlooking of some relevant facets of meaning for the word.  This was compensated for in part 
through my examination of books (e.g., sociological textbooks, Tead (1933), Gulick & Urwick 
(1937)), in which I could review the table of context and index for both terms and examine 
chapters freely for both topics.  Generally, however, this limitation meant that my inductive 
analysis of meanings of “purpose” during data collection for the Preliminary Survey Phase was 
less active than it was for “cooperation.”  None of the headings created in my initial data 
collection document, for example, focused on “purpose,” although my reflective remarks within 
the quotations captured occasionally did.  I addressed this gap initially through making the effort 
to create a separate heading of information related to Purpose in the interim summary document, 
drawing mostly on the data from books.  However, at the later stage of analysis where I began 
composing and enhancing the detailed narratives regarding Purpose, I recognized that this 
summary did not effectively incorporate insights from the journal articles in the Preliminary 
Survey.  I then returned to my original data collection sheet from the Preliminary Survey to help 
correct this, doing computerized searching for occurrences of “purpose” within this document to 
check and enrich my understanding as I composed the completed findings.   
By focusing on journal articles available through computer databases (particularly 
JSTOR) and secondarily scholarly books, my study was limited primarily to the consideration of 
published discourse as evidence for the dynamics of influence by specific actors in the evolution 
of theoretical constructs.  This excluded not only other elements of scholarly activity (such as 
conference presentations) but also interpersonal interactions and informal exchanges which may 
have shed more light on this process.  While I drew upon autobiographical and biographical 
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resources for some such evidence, more primary sources would have been preferable to 
strengthen, for example, my largely circumstantial conclusions about the likelihood of 
interchange and influence between Bendix, Etzioni and Perrow during the period of their 
concurrent studies and work in sociology at U.C.-Berkeley.  A future opportunity to enrich my 
study’s suggestive findings on these points would be to incorporate scholarly correspondence or 
other archival documents to enhance this evidence (cf. Khurana, 2007).   
By focusing on theoretical constructs as specific words (e.g., “cooperation” and 
“purpose”), even with the inclusion of formally-introduced substitutes (such as “goal” for 
“purpose”), I may have understated the extent to which derivative branches of research within 
organizational scholarship and related disciplines carried out agendas associated with topics tied 
to the definitions of these constructs.  For example, research in social identity and social 
categorization (cf. Tajfel, 1974; Turner, 1982), inspired in part by the intergroup work of Sherif 
and colleagues (cf. Sherif, 1958; Sherif et al., 1988), has addressed similar questions of 
interpersonal dynamics in the context of shared activities but without prominent use of the word 
“cooperation.”  As such, my focus on searching only for specific words and formally-introduced 
substitutes cannot be assured to account for all development within the field of concepts related 
to the initial constructs, and any suggestions of possible gaps in research focus require more 
study for confirmation.  
Finally, the generalizability of conclusions from my study regarding patterns of construct 
evolution is limited by the features of the constructs I chose for my focus.  Although I felt their 
common origin point early in the field and differing relative outcomes in research popularity 
presented some advantages of comparability, the initial words do lack comparability in other 
ways.  For example, “cooperation” is a noun describing activity, while “purpose” is an object of 
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activity.  This could affect tendencies toward operationalization of the constructs in different 
ways.  As differences in their process of evolution may thus relate to such basic differences 
between the words, and I do not have a third construct over the same period to compare with 
them, conclusions about causation for the distinctions omit these possible impacts.  
Implications for Research 
To build on this study’s findings regarding evolution of “umbrella constructs” (Hirsch & 
Levin, 1999) within organizational scholarship, a next step could be to attempt a comparative 
study of two “umbrellas” that stress either the rational or normative elements of organizational 
discourse but not both.  In light of my prior suggestions about potential partitioning of the field 
around 1980, the two constructs of “strategy” and “culture” (both included in Hirsch & Levin’s 
original list and both considered as emerging in prominence around this timeframe) might be 
particularly interesting to compare.  A study of their development and evolution across time 
could help test my suggestion that attempting to bridge rational and normative understandings is 
what dictated the “collapse” of “organizational effectiveness” observed by Hirsch & Levin 
(1999) and similarly prompted the fracturing of meaning and usage for both “purpose” and 
“cooperation” as observed by this study.  It also may reveal how or if the emergence of the sub-
field of strategic management affected the perceived tensions in organizational discourse.  If in 
fact the two constructs show evidence of popularity in almost completely separate streams of 
discourse, this would tend to support a conclusion of partitioning for the overall field. 
My findings also suggest future research possibilities related to the notion of 
organizations as knowledge-based systems (cf. Grant, 1996), a framework for study which has 
become prominent in recent decades and continues to be extended through theory drawing on the 
sociological aspects of academic knowledge production (Håkanson, 2010).  Notions of spanning 
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knowledge boundaries within organizations (cf. Levina & Vaast, 2005) and of deployment of 
“boundary objects” for communication (Bechky, 2003; Carlile, 2002) were echoed by insights on 
theoretical language apparent from my study.  In particular, the requirements for paradigm 
convergence within an interdisciplinary scientific field seems to require the crossing of what has 
been termed a “pragmatic” boundary in knowledge creation (Carlile, 2004), where boundary 
objects must facilitate not just transfer or translation of concepts but actual transformation for the 
creation of new, shared knowledge by members of groups with differing stakes in their own, 
specialized sources of initial knowledge.  There thus may be opportunities for mutually-
informing research in these areas, as a focus on language and the role of specific words as 
“boundary objects” might be an important direction for future research in organizations, while 
lessons learned about the requirements for crossing “pragmatic” knowledge boundaries within 
organizations may help shed light on similar issues in construct evolution for the 
interdisciplinary field of organizational scholarship. 
Another future research direction emerging from this study is the opportunity for further 
research on scientific field language to offer insights into institutional entrepreneurship.  As 
highlighted by Hardy & Maguire (2008) and similarly by Zilber (2008), studies of institutional 
entrepreneurship or other crafting of institutionalized meanings have tended to be dominated by 
research focusing retrospectively on successful actors or instances of institutionalization.  
Research on construct development within a scientific field offers, as this study illustrates, the 
opportunity to observe many of the same mechanisms of institutionalization and diffusion of 
practices, but in an environment where multiple actors attempt to influence meanings, some 
succeeding and some failing (as measurable by citations and evidence of changes in definition).   
As such, the arena seems an apt and rich setting for future studies to build on insights from this 
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one about actor characteristics and their interplay with structural factors consistent with 
“embedded agency” (Seo & Creed, 2002). 
With respect to organizational theory itself, findings from my study suggest that the 
tensions between rational/normative perspectives (Barley & Kunda, 1992) and the partitioning of 
the field’s interest from those of practitioners, prompted particularly by boundary-work (Gieryn, 
1983) during concerns for the development of organizational studies as an independent science, 
tended to channel research in the field away from applications integrating these perspectives.  
Accordingly, opportunities for innovation in organizational theory may come from examining 
theoretical development in areas where such research was able to continue due to its harmony 
with socially-oriented organizational aims.  This would include research on interpersonal 
cooperation in cooperative learning studies (Johnson & Johnson, 1989) or on notions of shared 
purpose in socially-oriented organizations (Hildreth, 1994).  Examination of factors facilitating 
shared task activities in these arenas, or perhaps in small group research, where concerns about 
hierarchy are less prominent, could be one way of identifying insights that may contribute to 
developing or enhancing theory on cooperative execution of activities across larger or more 
formal organizations as well. 
Similarly, bearing in mind conclusions consistent with Stinchcombe (1965) that 
organizational theory would have been strongly stamped by assumptions about research existing 
during its formative years, some frameworks that have developed more recently in the behavioral 
sciences might now be employed to reconsider previously-rejected concepts.  For example, 
perspectives on shared organizational cognition (cf. Elsbach, Barr, & Hargadon, 2005; Walsh, 
1995) that arose within the field in recent decades might now fruitfully be used to consider 
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notions of shared organizational purpose that were deemed illegitimate at an earlier stage of field 
development. 
Finally, my findings illustrate that specific words used for theoretical constructs matter 
greatly and have impact, even through subtle connotative meanings, on the sustainability of 
construct definitions and research applications.  This reinforces the importance of current 
research in the organizational field on the significance of metaphors (cf. Boxenbaum & Rouleau, 
2011).  Whether in the discourse of organizational scholarship or organizational life, my study 
suggests that attention to the words employed and which ones survive or are favored in usage can 
be a fruitful way of revealing underlying field dynamics. 
Implications for Practice 
 As noted above, the function of organizations as centers of knowledge production and 
dissemination (cf. Grant, 1996) makes this study’s findings regarding dynamics in the generation 
of academic knowledge also of potential value to management practitioners.  There may be 
direct analogies between the use of theoretical constructs in scientific fields and the deployment 
of language within organizations to specify desired procedures or construct future plans.  This 
study suggests that an important factor determining such language may be contests for authority 
between different professional or jurisdictional groups within the organization, analogous to 
differing disciplines in an interdisciplinary scientific field.  Here boundary-work (Gieryn, 1983) 
may be manifested in the arguments of one group versus another for the right to determine 
appropriate terminology. 
Findings from this study also suggest that the temptation to settle such arguments by 
compromising in the direction of plurality and inclusivity (such as with multiple “boundary 
object” (Star & Griesemer, 1989) terms acceptable to both sides in an argument) may be 
 241 
 
expedient but can have longer-term consequences.  The plurality of construct language regarding 
Purpose within the organizational field had costs in knowledge generation over time, as the 
acceptance of a lack of precision in language was ultimately part of a trend of lost interest in 
research focused on the construct.  Standardizing shared meanings (such as is required both for 
consensus on operationalization to support a scientific research agenda and for effective 
organizational collaboration) is harder once the language has become non-standardized. 
Organizations may also draw upon findings from this study to reflect on ways that 
embedded connotations for common procedural language may obstruct knowledge development 
or innovation.  Does the use of “objective,” for example, in the company’s strategic planning 
process, subtly preclude those involved from considering shared aims that may not be 
quantifiable or maximizable?  Have efforts to encourage collaboration between departments 
gotten stuck over different understandings or views of a specific term?  While such examination 
may point toward the possible positive results from a change in nomenclature, this study also 
highlights that new word choices should be undertaken with care and consideration of the 
possible impacts of their connotative meanings for the groups both inside and outside the 
organization who must employ them.  Overcoming those long-embedded understandings is, as 
this study suggests, particularly difficult.  
Conclusion 
This dissertation aimed at deepening understanding of theoretical construct evolution in a 
scientific field through considering four important factors in the process in an integrated way for 
the first time.  By choosing theoretical constructs in the area of organizational scholarship, I also 
helped to address contemporary questions in the field regarding obstacles to theory development.  
My study delivered contributions by elaborating prior theory on construct development from 
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Hirsch & Levin (1999), suggesting, for example, the importance of prior word meanings and 
historical context as antecedents affecting the development of a construct’s popularity in 
research.  My work also illustrated how narrower, fragmentary constructs may develop out of 
“umbrella constructs” via either the partitioning of language in interdisciplinary communication 
or the narrowing of meaning implied through operationalization.  Within organizational research, 
I helped deepen understanding of how the tension between rational and natural understandings of 
organizations has affected the field, highlighting its ongoing impact on specific theoretical 
constructs.  In light of current knowledge-based conceptions of organizations, this study also 
suggested ways that language use within them may be an important area for future research 
regarding its role in knowledge development.  Finally, integration of sociology of knowledge 
theory and concepts helped me to identify the arena of construct development as a viable one for 
future research in institutional entrepreneurship.   
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Categories Sample Usages 
Earliest Uses: Pre-1886 (only 
anthropology journals/publications 
available) 
“… bi-sexual differentiation became the basis of co-operation 
at the foundation of life” (Powell, 1882: 185) 
Cooperation as organization 
form/Cooperative Systems of 
Organizing Labor/Management and/or 
Consumers/Producers 
“experiments in what is known under the general name of co-
operation; that is, management of industry by the producers or 
the consumers as distinct from the investors” (Hadley, 1888: 
576) 
Softening/Shift in Usage of 
Organizational Form of Cooperation 
“Co-operation as a panacea failed, but when it became a petty 
and uninspired sort of shop-keeping, it began to achieve great 
results” (Cummings, 1907: 164)  
Cooperation as a philosophical position, 
pitted against competition  
“Cooperation is the method of civilization.  It is this fact that 
saves mankind from becoming a horde of hungry beasts all 
competing for the same morsel of food” (DeGarmo, 1892: 20)  
Cooperation as Conceptual Focus of 
Study for Sociology as a Discipline  
“[T]he ultimate function of sociology as I conceive it, is to 
discover the principles of cooperation by application of which 
human society may adopt the most effective means of 
securing happiness” (Small, 1895: 183) 
Economics Usage  “economic fruits are always the result of the co-operation of 
two or more productive agents” (Hoxie, 1905: 218) 
Cooperation by Capital/Capitalists in 
the Form of Trusts 
“The law of economic efficiency is the cohesive force that 
induces, compels and maintains co-operation between men by 
combining them into organized business units … then forcing 
co-operation between such organized units by creating 
multiple business units, such as combines and trusts”(Foote, 
1912: 111) 
Education for Cooperation “The real aim of education is not to make men into wooden 
pegs fitting nicely into the structure of society but to make 
them critical, intelligent beings capable of rational social co-
operation” (Young, 1927: 539) 
Business Administration “The vital problem in business to-day is to develop growth in 
the capacity for, and to establish the machinery for practice in 
the habits of co-operation” (Metcalf, 1917: 176) 
Anthropology “[T]he social fusion of kin results in producing a community 
whole within which there is a tendency toward harmony and 
the most thorough-going cooperation. Strife is scarcely 
present; violence strenuously avoided; competition even 
courteously disdained” (Speck, 1933: 559) 
Psychology   “psychology finds itself compelled in an ever-increasing 
degree to recognise the co-operation in all mental process of 
factors that are unconscious and so cannot be introspectively 
observed” (Titchener, 1912: 430), quoting McDougall 
(Physiological Psychology, 1905, p. 2) 
Government/Political Structures as 
Cooperation 
“It has been argued that, in a democracy, governmental 
activity may be called a form of co-operation” (Kleene, 1904: 
11) 
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Categories Sample Usages 
Political Science/International 
Cooperation 
“International negotiations may be carried on in a spirit of 
cooperation or in a spirit of competition. The latter puts 
common objects second to national desires and interests” 
(Wright, 1925: 348) 
World War Implications (including 
League of Nations development) 
“It was recognized, in a conflict in which there was call for the 
entire energy and resources of nations, that economic 
cooperation was as necessary as military organization; and 
continuous cooperation was only to be assured by more or less 
formal organization”(Tosdal, 1921: 100) 
Fascism & Cooperation “Fascism, the passion for national cooperation which arose in 
Italy in a period of chaos, spiritual, political, social and 
economic, after the War—a great wave of emotion with 
certain vague general principles behind it” (Goad, 1933: 775) 
Depression Impact “Cooperation has been advocated at meetings of associations 
as the only vehicle which can get the industry out of the mire” 
(Kendall, 1931: 141) 
New Deal Ideas/Contestation “It is all too clear that we must develop new agencies of 
human cooperation to meet the new economic conditions 
produced by the industrial revolution” (Richberg, 1935: 31) 
Labor Issues “Antagonism between the capitalist on one side and labor on 
the other is extremely wasteful of both capital and effort. 
Cooperation in industry in its widest sense must in the general 
social interest replace conflict” (Day, 1931: 439) 
Applications of Cooperation in 
Society/Social Science 
“The problems of vice, crime, poverty are ours. Only by 
intelligent study of the situation, only by effective cooperation 
in remedial and constructive measures can ultimate downfall 
be averted” (Kelsey, 1909: 8) 
Scientific Management “The worker must receive his or her reward for a job 
efficiently performed within twenty-four hours of its 
completion. To bring this about requires a type of co-operation 
and a degree of co-operation that will come only as the result 
of the most far-sighted and kindly interrelation between the 
different individuals who make up an industrial or other 
establishment” (Cooke, 1913: 489) 
Miscellaneous Notes/Applications  “Professor Mason, in his book on ‘Woman’s Share in 
Primitive Culture,’ devotes a chapter to woman as a Jack-at-
all-Trades, and remarks that in the entire course of human 
history the combination of abilities in one woman stands in 
sharp contrast with the co-operation of many individuals at 
one duty or activity among men. ‘In co-operation,” he says, 
“women have always been weak. There are few duties that 
they have in common. Even as beasts of burden they seldom 
worked in pairs.’” (Yudelson, 1904: 67) 
 
Appendix B - Full list of preliminary text searches and results for JSTOR articles in Construct 
Evolution Phase 
1 
 
All searches for articles across eight JSTOR disciplinary categories (Anthropology, Business, Economics, 
Management & OB, Political Science, Psychology, Public Administration, Sociology)  
Search Criteria 
From 
1938 to 
1950 
1951 
to 
1960 
1961 
to 
1970 
1971 
to 
1980 
1981 
to 
1990 
1991 
to 
2005 Notes 
“organizational purpose” 
full-text 1 6 18 43 35 62 
“purposive cooperation” 
(w/ vars) 0 1 0 1 0 2 
“cooperative system” (w/ 
vars) 55 38 67 78 93 134 
From 1961 fwd, mostly re 
cooperative form of 
organization structure 
“formal organization” full-
text 275 303 545 644 492 588 
Would include any 
referencing Blau & Scott 
“informal organization” 62 150 138 139 127 179 
“cooperation purpose” ~15 
words 258 157 187 201 214 390 
“organization purpose” ~15 
and NOT “organizational 
purpose” 650 561 689 795 843 1245 
“May Doob Cooperation” 
~15 words 0 0 0 0 0 0 
For Doob, May, cooperation 
all in same text, 196 for 
whole pd 
“Ordway Tead purpose”~15 
words 0 2 0 0 0 0 
2 refs to 1959 book by 
Tead: Administration, Its 
Purpose & Performance 
“cooperate#” (incl vars) in 
TITLE 127 109 94 131 212 456 
Early re cooperative orgs, 
latter re behavioral, 
international cooperation 
“organizational goal” full-
text 1 11 84 155 110 162 
“goal organization”~15 and 
NOT “organizational goal” 104 171 366 541 569 1103 
“goal cooperation”~15 
NOT “goal 
organization”~15 or 
“organizational goal” or 
“organizational purpose” 45 49 104 145 193 392 
“Gulick Science 
Administration”~15 21 28 30 51 77 61 
Increasingly only in public 
administration jrnls 
“personnel administration” 
full-text 218 220 184 278 284 424 
Fm 1971 on, predominantly 
public administration jrnls 
“personnel administration” 
full-text, w “Tead” or 
“Metcalf” 10 4 2 2 3 3 
“morale” in title, 
“cooperation” (w/vars) in 
full text 22 6 2 0 1 6 
In 1991-2005, 2 in French 
(“morale” = “moral”)  
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JSTOR Search for “cooperative system” in full-text, 1938 to 1950 
Saved for examination First 8 matches not saved 
Gardner, B. B. & Whyte, W. F. 1946. Methods for the 
study of human relations in industry. American 
Sociological Review, 11: 506-512. 
C, C. M. 1944. The Baltic States during the war: 
I—as members of the Soviet union. Bulletin of 
International News, 21: 991-1000. 
Homans, G. C. 1947. A conceptual scheme for the 
study of social organization. American Sociological 
Review, 12: 13-26. 
Chossudowsky, E. M. 1941. De-rationing in the 
U.S.S.R. The Review of Economic Studies, 9: 1-
27. 
Loomis, C. P. & Beegle, J. A. 1948. A typological 
analysis of social systems. Sociometry, 11: 147-191. 
E, J. M. 1946. Canadian economy and the war. 
The World Today, 2: 28-34. 
Moore, W. E. 1947. Current issues in industrial 
sociology. American Sociological Review, 12: 651-657. 
Hubbard, G. E. 1944. The place of the Far East in 
world reconstruction. International Affairs 
(Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-), 
20: 179-191. 
Moore, W. E. 1948. Industrial sociology: Status and 
prospects. American Sociological Review, 13: 382-391. 
K, D. 1943. The situation in Yugoslavia: I. 
Administration under Axis occupation. Bulletin 
of International News, 20: 1071-1078. 
Oberg, K. 1943. A comparison of three systems of 
primitive economic organization. American 
Anthropologist, 45: 572-587. 
Pines, D. 1948. Collective settlements in 
Palestine. Journal of Educational Sociology, 22: 
171-182. 
Selznick, P. 1948. Foundations of the theory of 
organization. American Sociological Review, 13: 25-35. 
Selwyn-Clarke, H. 1947. Hong Kong dilemma. 
Far Eastern Survey, 16: 5-8. 
Ward, L. R. 1942. The social significance of 
cooperation. The Review of Politics, 4: 445-458. 
Woolsey, L. H. 1942. A pattern of world order. 
The American Journal of International Law, 36: 
621-628. 
  
JSTOR Search for “organization (or organizational) purpose” in full-text, 1951 to 1965 
Saved for examination First 14 matches not saved 
Baldwin, W. L. 1964. The motives of managers, 
environmental restraints, and the theory of managerial 
enterprise. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 78: 
238-256. 
1964. American government and politics. The 
American Political Science Review, 58: 127-142. 
Blau, P. M. 1963. Critical remarks on weber’s theory of 
authority. The American Political Science Review, 57: 
305-316. 
Fesler, J. W. 1960. Editorial comment: In 
analyzing university administration. Public 
Administration Review, 20: 59. 
Case, H. L. 1964. Gordon r. Clapp: The role of faith, 
purposes and people in administration. Public 
Administration Review, 24: 86-91. 
Form, W. H. & Dansereau, H. K. 1957. Union 
member orientations and patterns of social 
integration. Industrial and Labor Relations 
Review, 11: 3-12. 
Clark, P. B. & Wilson, J. Q. 1961. Incentive systems: A 
theory of organizations. Administrative Science 
Quarterly, 6: 129-166. 
Hance, W. A. 1955. The Zande scheme in the 
Anglo-Egyptian Sudan. Economic Geography, 
31: 149-156. 
Dorsey, J. T., Jr. 1957. A communication model for 
administration. Administrative Science Quarterly, 2: 
307-324. 
Howard, H. N. 1952. Middle Eastern regional 
organization: Problems and prospects. 
Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science, 
24: 101-111. 
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Krauss, I. 1962. An approach to evaluating the 
effectiveness of a public health program. Journal of 
Health and Human Behavior, 3: 141-146. 
Kerr, C. 1954. The trade union movement and 
the redistribution of power in postwar Germany. 
The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 68: 535-
564. 
North, R. C., Koch, H. E., Jr., & Zinnes, D. A. 1960. 
The integrative functions of conflict. The Journal of 
Conflict Resolution, 4: 355-374. 
Levin, H. 1964. The future of voluntary family 
and children’s social work: A historical view. 
The Social Service Review, 38: 163-173. 
Parsons, T. 1956. Suggestions for a sociological 
approach to the theory of organizations-I. 
Administrative Science Quarterly, 1: 63-85. 
Malcolm, D. G. 1965. On the need for 
improvement in implementation of O.R. 
Management Science, 11: B48-B58. 
Parsons, T. 1956. Suggestions for a sociological 
approach to the theory of organizations.II. 
Administrative Science Quarterly, 1: 225-239. 
Patterson, F. K., Lukoff, I., & Winick, C. 1956. 
Is society the patient? Research and action 
implications. Journal of Educational Sociology, 
30: 106-112. 
Pugh, D. S., Hickson, D. J., Hinings, C. R., Macdonald, 
K. M., Turner, C., & Lupton, T. 1963. A conceptual 
scheme for organizational analysis. Administrative 
Science Quarterly, 8: 289-315. 
Pauling, N. G. 1953. Labor and government in 
New Zealand. Southern Economic Journal, 19: 
365-376. 
Shull, F., Jr. 1962. The nature and contribution of 
administrative models and organizational research. The 
Journal of the Academy of Management, 5: 124-138. 
Shipman, G. A. & Lyden, F. J. 1964. 
Developments in public administration. Public 
Administration Review, 24: 266-270. 
Thompson, V. A. 1961. Hierarchy, specialization, and 
organizational conflict. Administrative Science 
Quarterly, 5: 485-521. 
Smith, D. G. 1964. Pragmatism and the group 
theory of politics. The American Political 
Science Review, 58: 600-610. 
Warner, W. K. & Miller, S. J. 1964. Organizational 
problems in two types of voluntary associations. The 
American Journal of Sociology, 69: 654-657. 
Whisler, T. L. 1960. The “assistant-to” in four 
administrative settings. Administrative Science 
Quarterly, 5: 181-216. 
Warriner, C. K. 1961. Public opinion and collective 
action: Formation of a watershed district. 
Administrative Science Quarterly, 6: 333-359. 
Wilensky, H. L. 1964. The professionalization of 
everyone? The American Journal of Sociology, 
70: 137-158. 
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Period Database Search Criteria Articles 
Found 
Saved for 
Examination 
Full-text 
Examined 
Retained 
for 
Case(s) 
Comments 
1938 to 
1950 
JSTOR “morale” in title 
and 
“cooperation” 
(with variant 
spellings) in full 
text 
22 2 2 2  
1938 to 
1950 
JSTOR “Doob” and 
“May” and 
“cooperation” in 
full text; not 
“morale” in title 
23 1 1 0  
1938 to 
1950 
JSTOR “cooperate#” in 
title 
127 5 5 5 Almost all found 
initially regarded 
agricultural 
cooperatives or 
international/intergov
ernmental 
cooperation 
1938 to 
1950 
JSTOR “Gulick science 
administration”~1
5 and “purpose” 
in full text 
19 9 9 9  
1938 to 
1950 
JSTOR “cooperative 
system” (w/ vars 
of cooperative) in 
full text 
55 7 7 7  
1938 to 
1950 
JSTOR “organizational 
purpose” in full 
text 
1 1 1 1  
1938 to 
1950 
JSTOR “organizational 
goal” in full text 
1 1 1 1  
1938 to 
1950 
JSTOR “organization 
purpose” or 
“organization 
goal” in full text 
5 1 1 1  
1938 to 
1950 
JSTOR “organization 
goal”~15 and 
NOT 
“organizational 
goal” in full text 
104 10 10 8  
1938 to 
1950 
JSTOR “goal 
cooperation”~15 
and NOT ((“goal 
organization”~15 
or “organizational 
purpose” or 
“organizational 
goal”) in full text 
or “cooperate#” 
in title) 
45 2 2 2  
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Period Database Search Criteria Articles 
Found 
Saved for 
Examination 
Full-text 
Examined 
Retained 
for 
Case(s) 
Comments 
1938 to 
1950 
JSTOR “common 
purpose” and 
(cooperation or 
goal or 
organization) in 
full text and NOT 
(“goal 
organization”~15 
or “organizational 
purpose” or 
“organizational 
goal”) in full text 
162 9 9 7  
1938 to 
1950 
JSTOR “common goal” 
and (cooperation 
or goal or 
organization) in 
full text and NOT 
(“goal 
organization”~15 
or “organizational 
purpose” or 
“organizational 
goal”) in full text 
83 3 3 1  
1938 to 
1950 
JSTOR “purpose” in title 10 0 0 0  
1938 to 
1950 
JSTOR “purpose 
cooperation”~15 
and NOT 
((“common 
purpose” or 
“organizational 
purpose” or 
“organizational 
goal”) in full text 
or “cooperate#” 
in title) 
241 5 5 5  
1938 to 
1950 
PsycARTI
CLES 
“cooperation” or 
“co-operation” in 
title 
6 1 1 1  
1938 to 
1950 
PsycARTI
CLES 
“cooperative” or 
“co-operative” in 
title 
8 4 4 4  
1938 to 
1950 
PsycARTI
CLES 
“cooperative” or 
“cooperation” 
(both w/ vars) in 
keywords 
30 2 2 2  
1938 to 
1950 
PsycARTI
CLES 
“purpose” in 
keywords 
2 0 0 0  
1938 to 
1950 
PsycARTI
CLES 
“goal” in 
keywords 
32 0 0 0  
1938 to 
1950 
PsycARTI
CLES 
“organization” in 
keywords 
76 2 2 2  
1938 to 
1950 
PsycARTI
CLES 
Doob any field 
with cooperation 
any field 
1 0 0 0  
1938 to 
1950 
PsycARTI
CLES 
Tead any field 0 0 0 0  
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Period Database Search Criteria Articles 
Found 
Saved for 
Examination 
Full-text 
Examined 
Retained 
for 
Case(s) 
Comments 
1938 to 
1950 
PsycARTI
CLES 
Barnard any field 12 0 0 0 None re Chester 
Barnard  
1938 to 
1950 
PsycARTI
CLES 
Gulick any field 0 0 0 0  
1938 to 
1950 
EBSCO For HBR 
publication: 
“cooperation” or 
“cooperative” or 
“purpose” or 
“organization” in 
title 
8 2 2 2  
1938 to 
1950 
EBSCO For HBR 
publication: 
“administrative” 
or 
“administration” 
in title 
6 0 0 0  
1951 to 
1965 
JSTOR Cooperate# 
(w/vars) in title 
157 12 12 12  
1951 to 
1965 
JSTOR morale in title, 
“cooperation” (w/ 
vars) in text 
7 2 2 2  
1951 to 
1965 
JSTOR “Doob May 
cooperation”~15 
in full text 
0 0 0 0  
1951 to 
1965 
JSTOR “Gulick science 
administration”~1
5 and “purpose” 
in full text 
30 16 16 10  
1951 to 
1965 
JSTOR “cooperative 
system” (w/ vars 
of cooperative) in 
full text 
64 12 12 10  
1951 to 
1965 
JSTOR “purpose” in title 28 4 4 4  
1951 to 
1965 
JSTOR “organization 
purpose” or 
“organizational 
purpose” in full 
text 
32 14 14 14  
1951 to 
1965 
JSTOR “organization 
goal” or 
“organizational 
goal” in full text 
52 38 38 31  
1951 to 
1965 
JSTOR “organizational 
goals” or 
“organization 
goals” in title 
4 3 3 3  
1951 to 
1965 
JSTOR “organizational 
purposes” in title 
0 0 0 0  
1951 to 
1965 
JSTOR “purposive 
organization” or 
“purposive 
cooperation” in 
full text 
4 0 0 0 All 4 matches relate 
to Gouldner’s 
Patterns of Industrial 
Bureaucracy, which 
uses “purposive 
organization” 
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Period Database Search Criteria Articles 
Found 
Saved for 
Examination 
Full-text 
Examined 
Retained 
for 
Case(s) 
Comments 
1951 to 
1965 
JSTOR “common 
purpose” or 
“shared purpose” 
or “common 
goal” or “shared 
goal” AND 
[cooperation w/ 
variants or 
organization in 
full text] AND 
NOT [cooperate# 
in title or 
“organizational 
purpose” or 
“organizational 
goal” or 
“cooperative 
system” in full 
text] 
358 62 2 1 Two articles by 
Sherif et al examined 
due to citations of 
work 
1951 to 
1965 
JSTOR “goal 
cooperation”~15 
and or “purpose 
cooperation”~15 
and not matching 
prior queries 
293 24 0 0  
1951 to 
1965 
JSTOR “organization 
values” or 
“organizational 
values” in title 
1 0 0 0  
1951 to 
1965 
JSTOR “organizational 
values” or 
“organizational 
values” in full 
text 
44 11 11 5  
1951 to 
1965 
JSTOR “organization 
objective” or 
“organizational 
objective” in full 
text 
17 7 7 5 Search added after 
Granger HBR article 
“Hierarchy of 
Objectives” identified 
by citation 
1951 to 
1965 
PsycARTI
CLES 
Cooperation or 
cooperative (w/ 
vars of each) in 
title 
24 15 15 14  
1951 to 
1965 
PsycARTI
CLES 
cooperation or 
cooperative (w/ 
vars of each) in 
keywords but 
NOT title 
27 5 5 3  
1951 to 
1965 
PsycARTI
CLES 
organization in 
title 
62 5 5 1  
1951 to 
1965 
PsycARTI
CLES 
organization in 
keywords but not 
title 
60 1 1 0  
1951 to 
1965 
PsycARTI
CLES 
Purpose in title or 
keywords 
4 1 1 1  
1951 to 
1965 
PsycARTI
CLES 
Goal in title 52 2 2 2  
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Period Database Search Criteria Articles 
Found 
Saved for 
Examination 
Full-text 
Examined 
Retained 
for 
Case(s) 
Comments 
1951 to 
1965 
PsycARTI
CLES 
Goal in keywords 
and “group” or 
“social” in 
keywords 
6 1 1 1  
1951 to 
1965 
PsycARTI
CLES 
Doob or Tead or 
Barnard or Gulick 
in full text 
0 0 0 0  
1951 to 
1965 
EBSCO For HBR 
publication: 
cooperation or 
cooperative or 
purpose or 
organization in 
title 
13 3 3 0  
1951 to 
1965 
EBSCO For HBR 
publication: 
administrative or 
administration in 
title 
9 1 1 0  
1951 to 
1965 
EBSCO For HBR 
publication: goal 
in title 
5 0 0 0  
1966 to 
1985 
JSTOR Cooperate# 
(w/vars) in title 
286 66 33 21 Sampled first on 
occurrence of “game” 
or “prisoner’s 
dilemma” in titles 
(kept 1/3rd of these 
by date); kept half of 
rest 
1966 to 
1985 
JSTOR morale in title, 
“cooperation” (w/ 
vars) in text 
2 1 1 1  
1966 to 
1985 
JSTOR “Doob May 
cooperation”~15 
in full text 
0 0 0 0  
1966 to 
1985 
JSTOR “Gulick science 
administration”~1
5 and “purpose” 
in full text 
71 34 12 2 Sampled 1/3rd by 
date to examine 
1966 to 
1985 
JSTOR “cooperative 
system” (w/ vars 
of cooperative) in 
full text 
164 21 21 10  
1966 to 
1985 
JSTOR “purpose” and 
“organization” in 
title 
0 0 0 0  
1966 to 
1985 
JSTOR “goal” and 
“organization” in 
title 
4 4 4 3  
1966 to 
1985 
JSTOR “objective” and 
“organization” in 
title 
0 0 0 0  
1966 to 
1985 
JSTOR “value” and 
“organization” in 
title 
2 1 1 1  
Appendix D – Full list of Construct Evolution Phase searches and results by records saved 
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Period Database Search Criteria Articles 
Found 
Saved for 
Examination 
Full-text 
Examined 
Retained 
for 
Case(s) 
Comments 
1966 to 
1985 
JSTOR “objective” or 
“purpose” in title 
without 
“organization” 
231 8 8 6  
1966 to 
1985 
JSTOR “organization(al) 
purpose” in full-
text w “purpose” 
in title 
0 0 0 0  
1966 to 
1985 
JSTOR “organization(al) 
purpose” in full-
text not in title 
95 29 29 27  
1966 to 
1985 
JSTOR “organization(al) 
goal” in full-text 
with Goal(s) in 
title 
24 13 13 11  
1966 to 
1985 
JSTOR “organization(al) 
goal” in full-text 
without Goal(s) 
in title 
292 77 28 24 Sampled 1/3rd by 
date to examine 
1966 to 
1985 
JSTOR “organization(al) 
objective” in full-
text 
63 10 10 6  
1966 to 
1985 
JSTOR “organization(al) 
values” in full-
text 
165 24 12 7 Sampled 1/2 by date 
to examine 
1966 to 
1985 
JSTOR “purposive 
organization” or 
“purposive 
cooperation” in 
full text 
17 1 1 1  
1966 to 
1985 
PsycARTI
CLES 
“cooperation” or 
“cooperative” 
w/vars in title 
97 44 20 20 Sampled first on 
occurrence of “game” 
or “prisoner’s 
dilemma” in titles 
(kept 1/3rd of these 
by date); kept half of 
rest 
1966 to 
1985 
PsycARTI
CLES 
Purpose in title 14 1 1 1  
1966 to 
1985 
PsycARTI
CLES 
Purpose in 
keywords not title 
16 0 0 0  
1966 to 
1985 
PsycARTI
CLES 
objective in title 42 0 0 0 Most matches about 
“objective” in 
empirical/evidentiary 
sense 
1966 to 
1985 
PsycARTI
CLES 
objectives in title 23 2 2 2  
1966 to 
1985 
PsycARTI
CLES 
organization or 
organizational in 
title  
383 Many initial matches about organization of mental processes or 
information; used subtopics to filter 
1966 to 
1985 
PsycARTI
CLES 
organization or 
organizational in 
title: Topic - 
Organization 
Structure 
40 5 5 1  
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Period Database Search Criteria Articles 
Found 
Saved for 
Examination 
Full-text 
Examined 
Retained 
for 
Case(s) 
Comments 
1966 to 
1985 
PsycARTI
CLES 
organization or 
organizational in 
title: Topic - 
Industrial/organiz
ational 
psychology 
37 0 0 0  
1966 to 
1985 
PsycARTI
CLES 
organization or 
organizational in 
title: Topic - 
Organizational 
behavior 
25 7 7 2  
1966 to 
1985 
PsycARTI
CLES 
“organization(al) 
values” in any 
field 
0 0 0 0  
1966 to 
1985 
PsycARTI
CLES 
“organization(al) 
goal(s)” in title or 
keywords 
1 0 0 0  
1966 to 
1985 
PsycARTI
CLES 
“goal” and 
“organization” in 
title 
4 2 2 1  
1966 to 
1985 
PsycARTI
CLES 
“values” and 
“organization” in 
title 
1 0 0 0  
1966 to 
1985 
PsycARTI
CLES 
“values” and 
“organizational” 
in title 
1 0 0 0  
1966 to 
1985 
EBSCO For HBR 
Publication: 
“cooperation” or 
“cooperative” or 
“purpose” or 
“goal” or 
“values” or 
“objectives” or 
“organization” in 
title 
40 7 7 6  
1966 to 
1985 
EBSCO For HBR 
publication: 
administrative or 
administration in 
title 
1 0 0 0  
1986 to 
2005 
JSTOR Cooperate# 
(w/vars) in title 
545 110 53 48 24 saved were PD 
cases (kept 1/3rd); 
kept half of rest 
1986 to 
2005 
JSTOR morale in title, 
“cooperation” (w/ 
vars) in text 
6 2 2 0  
1986 to 
2005 
JSTOR “cooperative 
system” (w/ vars 
of cooperative) in 
full text 
181 19 18 12 1 saved was PD case 
(dropped when these 
filtered to 1/3rd) 
1986 to 
2005 
JSTOR “purpose” and 
“organization(al)” 
in title 
2 0 0 0  
1986 to 
2005 
JSTOR “goal” or “goals” 
and 
“organization(al)” 
in title 
8 3 3 3  
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Period Database Search Criteria Articles 
Found 
Saved for 
Examination 
Full-text 
Examined 
Retained 
for 
Case(s) 
Comments 
1986 to 
2005 
JSTOR “objective(s)” 
and 
“organization(al)” 
in title 
2 0 0 0  
1986 to 
2005 
JSTOR “value(s)” and 
“organization(al)” 
in title 
41 9 9 4  
1986 to 
2005 
JSTOR “mission” and 
“organization(al)” 
in title 
2 2 2 2  
1986 to 
2005 
JSTOR “mission” in title 
and 
“organization(al) 
mission” in text 
8 3 3 2  
1986 to 
2005 
JSTOR “goal(s)” in title 
and 
“organization(al) 
goal(s)” in text 
18 10 10 8  
1986 to 
2005 
JSTOR “objective(s)” 
and 
“organization(al) 
objective(s)” in 
text 
9 4 4 4  
1986 to 
2005 
JSTOR “value(s)” and 
“organization(al) 
value(s)” in text 
74 8 8 7  
1986 to 
2005 
JSTOR “organizational 
citizenship” or 
“citizenship 
behavior” or 
OCB in title 
47 18 18 5 Searched for this 
prior to 1986 matched 
1 (not relevant to 
OCB) 
1986 to 
2005 
JSTOR “organization(al) 
purpose” in full 
text 
159 41 41 27 Lots of 
executive/practitioner 
pieces; focused on 
academic journals 
1986 to 
2005 
JSTOR “purposive 
organization” or 
“purposive 
cooperation” in 
full text 
16 8 8 2  
1986 to 
2005 
PsycARTI
CLES 
“cooperation” or 
“cooperative” 
w/vars in title 
69 23 15 15 11 saved were PD 
cases (kept 1/3rd); 
kept all of rest 
1986 to 
2005 
PsycARTI
CLES 
“purpose” in title 
or keywords 
24 3 3 3  
1986 to 
2005 
PsycARTI
CLES 
“objectives” in 
title 
10 1 1 0  
1986 to 
2005 
PsycARTI
CLES 
“organizational 
citizenship” or 
“citizenship 
behavior” or 
OCB in title 
23 13 13 2 Focusing only on 
articles that invoke 
cooperation as part of 
OCB 
1986 to 
2005 
PsycARTI
CLES 
“organization(al) 
value(s)” in title 
1 1 1 1  
1986 to 
2005 
PsycARTI
CLES 
“organization(al) 
goal(s)” in title 
2 2 2 2  
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Period Database Search Criteria Articles 
Found 
Saved for 
Examination 
Full-text 
Examined 
Retained 
for 
Case(s) 
Comments 
1986 to 
2005 
PsycARTI
CLES 
“mission” in title 5 0 0 0 All about “mission” 
of journal or field 
1986 to 
2005 
PsycARTI
CLES 
“organizational” 
in title: Subtopic 
of Organizational 
Behavior 
97 14 14 4  
1986 to 
2005 
EBSCO For HBR 
Publication: 
“cooperation” or 
“cooperative” or 
“purpose” or 
“goal” or 
“values” or 
“objectives” or 
“mission” or 
“organization” in 
title 
32 9 9 3  
  TOTALS  966 676 486  
 
Appendix E – Sample Records Set with Data Collected 
Five records each with codings of “Cooperation,” “Purpose,” and “Both” 
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Coop-Purpose Cooperation 
Dodd, 1939 
Cooperation 
Knowles, 1952 
Cooperation 
Rapoport & Chammah, 1965 
Cooperation 
Lindskold, 1978 
Cooperation 
Desforges et al, 1991 
Author(s) Dodd, Stuart C. Knowles, William H. Rapoport, Anatol;Albert M. 
Chammah 
Lindskold, Svenn Desforges, Donna M.;Charles 
G. Lord;Shawna L. 
Ramsey;Julie A. 
Mason;Marilyn D. Van 
Leeuwen;Sylvia C. West;Mark 
R. Lepper 
Year 1939 1952 1965 1978 1991 
Article A Tension Theory of 
Societal Action 
The Nature of Industrial 
Cooperation 
Sex differences in factors 
contributing to the level of 
cooperation in the Prisoner’s 
Dilemma game 
Trust development, the 
GRIT proposal, and the 
effects of conciliatory acts 
on conflict and cooperation 
Effects of structured 
cooperative contact on 
changing negative attitudes 
toward stigmatized social 
groups 
Journal American 
Sociological Review 
Southern Economic Journal Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology 
Psychological Bulletin Journal of Personality and 
Social Psychology 
Volume 4 18 2 85 60 
Issue 1 3 6 4 4 
Pages 56-77 350-361 831-838 772-793 531-544 
Author’s 
Professional 
Title 
N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Author’s 
Institution 
American University 
of Beirut, Syria 
Michigan State College University of Michigan (both) Ohio University Texas Christian U (all but 
Lepper); Stanford U (Lepper) 
Author’s 
Discipline 
N/A N/A N/A Psychology N/A 
JrnlDisc-
Stdized 
Sociology Economics Psych Psych Psych 
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Coop-Purpose Cooperation 
Dodd, 1939 
Cooperation 
Knowles, 1952 
Cooperation 
Rapoport & Chammah, 1965 
Cooperation 
Lindskold, 1978 
Cooperation 
Desforges et al, 1991 
Definition 
Presented 
“what commonly is 
meant by 
cooperating, the 
working together 
towards a common 
goal.” 
The term cooperation carries at 
least three different 
connotations. Economists 
simply mean a division of labor 
accomplished by an exchange 
mechanism. Industrial relations 
experts with a management 
bias, designated as the 
“scientists” in this paper, seek 
techniques to make people do 
what they want them to do and 
call this cooperation. The 
“institutionalists,” so-called in 
this paper because of their 
emphasis upon history and 
institutional development, use 
the term in the special sense of 
free men and free groups 
voluntarily giving their consent 
to work together. As organized 
economic groups grow ever 
larger, the automatic price 
mechanism so dear to laissez 
faire economists breaks down 
as a means of maintaining 
sustained cooperation. To 
remove the threat of industrial 
conflict the “scientists” have 
sought natural laws of 
cooperation to replace the law 
of supply and demand. In 
contrast, the “institutionalists” 
would replace the law of 
markets with industrial and 
political common law aided by 
special institutional 
developments. This paper will 
examine these three approaches 
to industrial cooperation. 
Another way of putting it is that 
“individual rationality” 
prescribes the choice of D, while 
“collective rationality” 
prescribes the choice of C. 
Hence there is no 
unambiguously optimal way of 
playing the Prisoner’s Dilemma  
game, and, in fact, human 
subjects playing this game 
exhibit a large degree of 
variability in the frequency of 
their choices of the 
“cooperative” (C) strategy and 
of the “defecting” (D) strategy.” 
None explicit - Implicitly 
that “cooperative” is used 
throughout as equated with 
choice behavior in PD 
(which is the empirical 
setting of the research 
reviewed) 
None explicit - implicit 
associations in group activity 
with equal status and 
interdependence (cf. 
descriptions of jigsaw & 
scripted cooperative activity) 
Appendix E – Sample Records Set with Data Collected 
Five records each with codings of “Cooperation,” “Purpose,” and “Both” 
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Coop-Purpose Cooperation 
Dodd, 1939 
Cooperation 
Knowles, 1952 
Cooperation 
Rapoport & Chammah, 1965 
Cooperation 
Lindskold, 1978 
Cooperation 
Desforges et al, 1991 
Cites No citation Many for various approaches; 
most heavily Commons for the 
institutionalist perspective (to 
which the author seems most 
sympathetic) 
None for definition None for definitions; lots of 
empirical work 
For jigsaw cooperative 
learning (Aronson, Bridgeman, 
& Geffner, 1978 - Jrnl of Res 
& Devel in Education; Blaney 
et al., 1977 - Jrnl of Educ 
Psych) and scripted 
cooperative learning 
(Dansereau et al., 1979 - in 
Cognitive and Affective 
Learning Strategies (book)).  
Used to define 
other 
Constructs? 
By contrast w/ 
conflict and 
accommodation 
N/A Implicitly “defecting” contrasted 
with “cooperating”; also 
“collective rationality” construed 
as “cooperation” and 
“individualistic rationality” 
construed as “Defecting” 
No Two types of cooperative 
interaction appeared to be 
likely candidates [for 
exploring research question]: 
jigsaw cooperative learning 
(Aronson, Bridgeman, & 
Geffner, 1978; Blaney et al., 
1977) and scripted cooperative 
learning (Dansereau et al., 
1979). In the jigsaw 
cooperative learning 
technique, students are 
typically divided into racially 
mixed groups. Each member 
of a group receives a portion 
of the material to be learned, 
which he or she must then 
teach to group members. 
Within each group, therefore, 
each student is the expert on 
some aspect of the material, 
and all students are dependent 
on one another. As evidenced 
by a rank ordering of 
classmates, students in jigsaw 
classes were shown to like 
their classmates of other races 
more after the jigsaw 
technique was introduced than 
before. Subsequent attitudes 
toward the larger racial group 
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Coop-Purpose Cooperation 
Dodd, 1939 
Cooperation 
Knowles, 1952 
Cooperation 
Rapoport & Chammah, 1965 
Cooperation 
Lindskold, 1978 
Cooperation 
Desforges et al, 1991 
have not been assessed.  
Similarly, scripted cooperative 
learning involves placing 
students in dyads and 
providing them with material 
to read and learn in a very 
specific way (Dansereau, 
1988). It differs from the 
jigsaw technique in that both 
participants in the dyad have 
access to all of the material to 
be learned, whereas jigsaw 
participants each possess only 
a portion of the whole. In 
scripted cooperative learning, 
however, both partners read 
the material provided and then 
follow an experimenter-
generated script, taking turns 
teaching parts of the material 
to the other person, asking 
questions, and providing 
feedback. These procedures 
have been shown to increase 
learning; their effects on 
evaluation of either the 
specific person interacted with 
or that person’s larger social 
group have not previously 
been tested. 
Objection 
Raised 
None Much to the “scientists” view 
(with which the author seems 
to identify not only Taylor but 
also Mayo) 
None None None 
Substitutes 
Introduced 
N/A N/A None None None 
Used in 
Hypotheses 
N/A N/A None - measuring differences in 
game between play by men and 
women 
N/A N/A 
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Coop-Purpose Cooperation 
Dodd, 1939 
Cooperation 
Knowles, 1952 
Cooperation 
Rapoport & Chammah, 1965 
Cooperation 
Lindskold, 1978 
Cooperation 
Desforges et al, 1991 
Operationalized N/A N/A Prisoner’s dilemma game with 
different pairings of men and 
women or mixed 
N/A Students were assigned with a 
partner into the jigsaw or 
scripted cooperative learning 
program - testing the impact 
(versus control) of these on 
attitudes toward a stigmatized 
group [of which they believe 
their partner to be a member] 
Incorporated in 
Typology 
Cooperation linked 
w/ Conflict and 
Accommodation as 
“subtypes of three 
processes which are 
all on the one 
continuum...the 
societal tension” 
N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Cited By: 6 in JSTOR None in JSTOR 25 in PsycARTICLES 58 in PsycARTICLES (!) 106 in PsycARTICLES 
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Coop-Purpose Cooperation 
Dodd, 1939 
Cooperation 
Knowles, 1952 
Cooperation 
Rapoport & Chammah, 1965 
Cooperation 
Lindskold, 1978 
Cooperation 
Desforges et al, 1991 
Other 
Comments 
Author creates 
econometric-like 
model for social 
processes:  “The 
purpose of this 
system of definitions 
and symbols for 
societal processes is 
partly 
classificational, i.e., 
to make an orderly 
system of concepts 
built on a logical 
basis that can be 
indefinitely 
extended. Perhaps 
more useful than this 
is the more precise 
observation and even 
measurement of 
these processes that 
is promoted by these 
definitions which 
reduce the concepts 
to measurable 
entities.”  
Illustrates a three-pronged 
understanding/contestation 
over the term, and its 
politicization 
Note series of continued 
variations on Prisoner’s 
Dilemma approach - what makes 
a difference in the level of trust 
created (assessed by willingness 
to cooperate) between parties? 
Review article for the 
GRIT approach - 
systematic way of 
communicating 
choices/strategies in 
mutually-interdependent, 
potential conflict situation 
(based on Cold War idea) 
 
How Found Found by search for 
“common goal” 
Found by search for 
“cooperate#” in title 
Found in PsycARTICLES 
search for 
“cooperation”/”cooperative” in 
title 
Found in PsycARTICLES 
by searching for 
“cooperative/cooperation” 
in title 
Found in PsycARTICLES 
through search for 
“cooperation/cooperative” in 
title 
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Coop-Purpose Purpose 
Sanderson, 1938 
Purpose 
Simon, 1964 
Purpose 
Beedles, 1977 
Purpose 
Anspach, 1991 
Purpose 
Van Yperen, 2003 
Author(s) Sanderson, Dwight Simon, Herbert A. Beedles, William L. Anspach, Renee R. Van Yperen, Nico W. 
Year 1938 1964 1977 1991 2003 
Article A Preliminary Group 
Classification Based 
on Structure 
On the Concept of 
Organizational Goal 
A Micro-Econometric 
Investigation of Multi-
Objective Firms 
Everyday Methods for 
Assessing Organizational 
Effectiveness 
Task Interest and Actual 
Performance: The Moderating 
Effects of Assigned and Adopted 
Purpose Goals 
Journal Social Forces Administrative Science 
Quarterly 
The Journal of Finance Social Problems Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology 
Volume 17 9 32 38 85 
Issue 2 1 4 1 6 
Pages 196-201 1-22 1217-1233 1-19 1006-1015 
Author’s 
Professional 
Title 
N/A Professor Assistant Professor N/A N/A 
Author’s 
Institution 
Cornell University Graduate School of 
Industrial Administration, 
Carnegie Institute of 
Technology 
Indiana University University of Michigan University of 
Gronigen/University of Nijmegen 
(both in Netherlands) 
Author’s 
Discipline 
N/A Administration & 
Psychology 
Finance Sociology Social & Org Psych/Work & Org 
Psych 
JrnlDisc-Stdized Sociology Mgmt-OB Business Sociology Psych 
Appendix E – Sample Records Set with Data Collected 
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Coop-Purpose Purpose 
Sanderson, 1938 
Purpose 
Simon, 1964 
Purpose 
Beedles, 1977 
Purpose 
Anspach, 1991 
Purpose 
Van Yperen, 2003 
Definition 
Presented 
Indirect:  “At least 
two things are 
fundamentally 
necessary to any 
association-a common 
purpose or purposes 
and, to a certain 
extent, rules of 
common action” 
“By goals we shall mean 
value premises that can 
serve as inputs to 
decisions.” “What is the 
meaning of the phrase 
“organizational goal”? 
First, we discovered that it 
is doubtful whether 
decisions are generally 
directed toward achieving a 
goal. It is easier, and 
clearer, to view decisions as 
being concerned with 
discovering courses of 
action that satisfy a whole 
set of constraints. It is this 
set, and not any one of its 
members, that is most 
accurately viewed as the 
goal of the action.”  
Implicitly what “firms” 
have/do - “goal” and 
“objective” treated as 
synonymous, cf. :  “The 
premise of this essay is that the 
poor positive results may be 
due, at least in part, to the 
inadequacy of the normative 
assumption that stock price 
maximization is the single goal 
of the firm. Therefore, a 
general methodological 
framework for the study of 
firms with more than one 
objective is proposed and 
applied in this work.” - in 
selecting “goals”/”objectives” 
appropriate, apply criteria from 
Simon, Admin Behav During 
the late 1950’s and early 
1960’s a flurry of literature 
centered on the objectives of 
the firm [Baumol et al; Cohen 
& Cyert; Cyert & March; 
Davidson & Suppes, (Chapter 
3); Machlup; March & Simon, 
pp. 140-151; Simon Admin 
Behav (1961 ed cited); also 
Models of Man, pp. 261-273 
and Chapter 14; Simon (1959, 
AER)]. A distillation of the 
exchanges of that vintage 
reveals three goals which seem 
to meet three important 
requirements: being fairly uni- 
versal, being ends rather than 
means, and being measureable 
[Simon, Admin Behav, p. 50 
and p. 189].” 
None explicit - that goals are 
what organizations do (by 
implication of the “goal 
attainment” model) 
Suggest multiple definitions of 
“goal” (one inclusive of purpose):  
“In goal-setting theory (for a 
review, see Locke & Latham, 
1990), a goal has typically been 
operationalized as a target goal, 
that is, a representation of an end 
or result that an individual aims 
to achieve, such as producing five 
pieces an hour, or running 100 
yards in 10 s. Achievement goal 
theorists have proposed a novel 
conceptualization of goals, 
defining a goal as the purpose for 
which one engages in a task 
(Harackiewicz & Sansone, 1991). 
Initially, achievement-related 
purpose goals were discussed and 
examined in terms of two major 
classes (Ames, 1992; Duda, 
2001; Nicholls, 1984). Mastery 
goals reflect the desire to develop 
and gain competence, whereas 
performance goals reflect the 
desire to demonstrate competence 
relative to others.  [From 
footnote:  Others have referred to 
mastery goals as task goals 
(Duda, 2001; Nicholls, 1984), 
learning goals (Dweck, 1999), or 
intrinsic goals (Pintrich & Garcia, 
1991). A performance goal has 
also been called an ego goal 
(Duda, 2001; Nicholls, 1984), an 
ability-focused goal (Ames, 
1992), a relative ability goal 
(Midgley et al., 1998), an 
extrinsic goal (Pintrich & Garcia, 
1991), or a competitive goal 
(Roberts, 1992). Others expanded 
the mastery versus performance 
distinction beyond achievement 
Appendix E – Sample Records Set with Data Collected 
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Coop-Purpose Purpose 
Sanderson, 1938 
Purpose 
Simon, 1964 
Purpose 
Beedles, 1977 
Purpose 
Anspach, 1991 
Purpose 
Van Yperen, 2003 
situations and referred to the 
goals as belief in growth and 
belief in destiny (Knee, 1998) or 
growth-seeking and validation-
seeking (Dykman, 1998).] 
Recently, Elliot and his 
colleagues (Elliot, 1999; Elliot & 
Covington, 2001; Elliot & 
McGregor, 2001) argued and 
demonstrated that approach-
avoidance is a fundamental and 
basic distinction that also 
deserves a central place in the 
conceptualization of purpose 
goals. Approach goals are 
directed toward positive or 
desirable events, whereas 
avoidance goals are aimed at 
avoiding negative or undesirable 
events. 
Cites G. D. H. Cole, Social 
Theory, p. 37 
None for concept, but does 
say his discussion 
“congenial to” that of Cyert 
& March in BTOF 
Implicitly following 
conceptions from those cited, 
cf. Baumol et al (1970, A New 
Rationale for Corporate Social 
Policy); Cohen & Cyert (1965 
- Theory of the Firm); Cyert & 
March (1963 - Behavioral 
Theory of the Firm); Davidson 
& Suppes (Decision Making, 
1957 (Chapter 3)); Machlup 
(AER, 1967); March & Simon, 
pp. 140-151; Simon Admin 
Behav (1961 ed cited); also 
Models of Man, pp. 261-273 
and Chapter 14; Simon (1959, 
AER)] 
Alludes to controversy over 
goal attainment vs. systems 
models of effectiveness 
(citing several usual 
suspects) 
Harackiewicz & Sansone, 1991 
[definition of “goal” as “purpose 
for which one engages in a task” 
- chapter in Advances in 
Motivation and Achievement 
(eds. Maehr & Pintrich)]; also re 
“purpose goals” [apparently in 
terms of educational 
achievement] - Elliot, 1999 Educ 
Psychologist; Elliot & Covington, 
2001 Ed Psych Rev; Elliot & 
McGregor, 2001 JPSP; Also 
Sansone & Smith, 2000 [chapter 
in Intrinsic and Extrinsic 
Motivation (eds. Sansone & 
Harackiewicz)] 
Appendix E – Sample Records Set with Data Collected 
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Coop-Purpose Purpose 
Sanderson, 1938 
Purpose 
Simon, 1964 
Purpose 
Beedles, 1977 
Purpose 
Anspach, 1991 
Purpose 
Van Yperen, 2003 
Used to define 
other 
Constructs? 
Yes: “association” “By motives we mean the 
causes, whatever they are, 
that lead individuals to 
select some goals rather 
than others as premises for 
their decisions” 
No Indirectly defines 
“effectiveness” in part by 
comparison with goals, albeit 
developed in subjective 
approach to assessment (i.e., 
how people themselves 
assess things): “I identify 
five methods of evaluation: 
(1) measuring “success” 
against personal trajecto- 
ries, (2) interpreting acts in 
the context of relationships, 
(3) using the dramatic 
incident, (4) relying on 
appearances of involvement, 
and (5) scaling goals to meet 
shifting constraints” 
“Purpose goals” - “can 
encompass other reasons for 
engaging in an activity that do 
not involve achievement, for 
example, being able to help 
people (Sansone & Smith, 
2000).” 
Objection 
Raised 
None Problem that 
“organizations” as 
collectivities may not have 
“goals” difficulty that any 
motive connection to action 
is indirect and chained (am 
I scratching to relieve an 
itch?  Am I reaching into a 
medicine cabinet to get 
calamine lotion or to relieve 
my itch?), hence a 
multiplicity of “goals” is 
the more accurate view (the 
“set,” not any one of them, 
taken along with limiting 
conditions) 
None None None 
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Coop-Purpose Purpose 
Sanderson, 1938 
Purpose 
Simon, 1964 
Purpose 
Beedles, 1977 
Purpose 
Anspach, 1991 
Purpose 
Van Yperen, 2003 
Substitutes 
Introduced 
N/A “goal” for purpose (does 
not use “purpose”) 
“goals,” “objectives” for 
“Purpose” 
“goal,” “objective” for 
purpose (purpose also used 
once; goal most prominently) 
“goals” for “purpose” - but this is 
all in individual context - and 
there are “purpose goals” as 
well…”purpose” also suggested 
as equivalent to “framing” [of the 
goal] 
Used in 
Hypotheses 
N/A N/A N/A N/A Hypothesis 1 is that only among 
individuals who have a mastery-
approach goal does a positive 
relationship exist between initial 
task interest and actual 
performance. Hypothesis 2 is that 
only a mastery-approach goal 
will enhance subsequent task 
interest.  Hypothesis 3 states that 
goal attainment enhances 
subsequent task interest. 
Appendix E – Sample Records Set with Data Collected 
Five records each with codings of “Cooperation,” “Purpose,” and “Both” 
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Coop-Purpose Purpose 
Sanderson, 1938 
Purpose 
Simon, 1964 
Purpose 
Beedles, 1977 
Purpose 
Anspach, 1991 
Purpose 
Van Yperen, 2003 
Operationalized N/A N/A N/A Case study of organization - 
interviews from which 
assessments of effectiveness 
(some in relation to goals) 
are emergent 
To test the three hypotheses, a 
full 2 × 2 design of the mastery-
performance and approach-
avoidance distinctions was used 
in which clear and unambiguous 
goal concepts were included. For 
each participant, the target goal 
was to attain a score of 22 or 
more correct answers, but the 
purpose (or framing) of the goal 
depended on the condition. For 
performance goals, the numerical 
criterion was framed in terms of 
other-referenced comparisons, 
whereas for mastery goals, the 
purpose was presented in a self-
referenced framework. For 
approach goals, the purpose was 
to achieve a positive outcome, 
and the purpose of an avoidance 
goal was to avoid a negative 
outcome. ...They were told that 
people tend to perform best on 
tests like these when they have a 
specific goal. Then the goal 
assignment, that is, the 
experimental manipulation, took 
place. The purpose of each goal 
was (a) to perform better than the 
average total score in one’s norm 
group (performance approach); 
(b) not to perform worse than the 
average total score in one’s norm 
group (performance avoidance); 
(c) to perform better than one’s 
total score in Version 1 (mastery 
approach); and (d) not to perform 
worse than one’s total score in 
Version 1 (mastery avoidance).  
Appendix E – Sample Records Set with Data Collected 
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Coop-Purpose Purpose 
Sanderson, 1938 
Purpose 
Simon, 1964 
Purpose 
Beedles, 1977 
Purpose 
Anspach, 1991 
Purpose 
Van Yperen, 2003 
Incorporated in 
Typology 
Only as part of 
classification of 
groups; “purpose” a 
part of “voluntary” 
groups that are 
deemed 
“associations” 
N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Cited By: None in JSTOR 70 in JSTOR 1 in JSTOR 2 in JSTOR 38 in PsycARTICLES 
Other 
Comments 
 “Few discussions of 
organization theory manage 
to get along without 
introducing some concept 
of “organization goal.” In 
the classical economic 
theory of the firm, where no 
distinction is made between 
an organization and a single 
entrepreneur, the organiza- 
tion’s goal-the goal of the 
firm-is simply identical 
with the goal of the real or 
hypothetical entrepreneur. 
In general, it is thought not 
to be problematical to 
postulate that individuals 
have goals. If it is not, this 
solution raises no 
difficulties. When we are 
interested in the internal 
structure of an organization, 
however, the problem 
cannot be avoided in this 
way. Either we must 
explain organizational 
behavior in terms of the 
goals of the individual 
members of the 
organization, or we must 
postulate the existence of 
one or more organization 
goals, over and above the 
“One possible reason for the 
popularity of the assumption of 
single objective maximization 
is its amenability to the 
derivation of powerful 
normative con- clusions. 
Additionally, the powerful and 
popular multivariate technique 
of single equation regression is 
often appropriate for empirical 
works with only one endog- 
enous variable.” 
Note that author’s approach 
to goal/systems controversy 
is simply to sidestep it and 
allow everything to be 
subjective, anyway:  “In this 
paper I do not join the quest 
to develop a superior 
conception of effectiveness, 
but rather enter a different 
universe of discourse. I 
propose to treat effectiveness 
as a socially constructed 
phenomenon, focusing on 
subjective assessments of 
effectiveness by members of 
a particular service delivery 
system.’ The analysis begins 
with the premise that 
effectiveness is what W.J. 
Gallie (Bosk 1979; Lukes 
1977) calls an “essentially 
contested” concept. Much 
like the notions of “truth” 
and “beauty,” there are 
grounds for debating the 
appropriateness of this 
concept on every occasion of 
its use. Thus, instead of 
developing a more 
“objective” concep- tion, 
definition, or criterion for 
measuring effectiveness, the 
empirical questions become: 
Unique “purpose goal” 
terminology - but none of this is 
in organizational context (all 
seemingly in relation to 
education) 
Appendix E – Sample Records Set with Data Collected 
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Coop-Purpose Purpose 
Sanderson, 1938 
Purpose 
Simon, 1964 
Purpose 
Beedles, 1977 
Purpose 
Anspach, 1991 
Purpose 
Van Yperen, 2003 
goals of the individuals.”  
Repeats “motivational 
theory developed by 
Barnard and me” – This 
article later incorporated as 
chapter in 1970s edition of 
Administrative Behavior 
How do participants in social 
programs determine that 
their organizations are 
effective? What in- digenous 
or folk methods do they use 
in evaluating social 
programs? How do the folk 
methods compare to those 
commonly used in 
organizational theory and 
social program evaluation? 
What role do indigenous 
methods play in an 
organization’s social life? In 
effect, what the goal- 
attainment and systems 
models often treat as an 
obstacle to the assessment of 
effectiveness- namely, that 
members have subjective 
criteria for assessing the 
effectiveness of 
organizations, programs, and 
service delivery systems-
becomes the topic for this 
analysis (see Zimmerman 
and Pollner 1970).” 
How Found Found by search for 
“common purpose” 
Found in search for 
“organization (or 
organizational) goal” in 
full-text 
Found by search for “purpose” 
or “objective” WITHOUT 
“organization” in title 
Found by search for 
“organization/al purpose” in 
full-text 
Found in PsycARTICLES 
through search for “purpose” in 
keywords 
 
Appendix E – Sample Records Set with Data Collected 
Five records each with codings of “Cooperation,” “Purpose,” and “Both” 
 
15 
 
 
Coop-Purpose Both 
Waldo, 1947 
Both 
de Grazia, 1960 
Both 
Kerppola, 1974 
Both 
Keeley, 1984 
Both 
Witt, 1998 
Author(s) Waldo, C. Dwight de Grazia, Alfred Kerppola, Klaus Keeley, Michael Witt, L. A. 
Year 1947 1960 1974 1984 1998 
Article Organizational Analysis: 
Some Notes on Methods 
and Criteria 
The Science and Values of 
Administration-I 
Participatory 
Administration and 
Teamwork in Labor-
Management Cooperation 
Impartiality and Participant-
Interest Theories of 
Organizational 
Effectiveness 
Enhancing organizational 
goal congruence: A solution 
to organizational politics 
Journal Public Administration 
Review 
Administrative Science 
Quarterly 
American Journal of 
Economics and Sociology 
Administrative Science 
Quarterly 
Journal of Applied 
Psychology 
Volume 7 5 33 29 83 
Issue 4 3 1 1 4 
Pages 236-244 362-397 19-31 1-25 666-674 
Author’s Professional 
Title 
Assistant Professor Professor N/A Associate Professor N/A 
Author’s Institution University of California New York University Tempere University of 
Technology (Finland) 
Loyola University of 
Chicago 
University of New Orleans 
Author’s Discipline Political Science Government N/A Management Management 
JrnlDisc-Stdized Mgmt-OB Mgmt-OB BlendSS Mgmt-OB Psych 
Definition Presented By “cooperation” is meant 
here the bringing together 
or joint use of personnel or 
the bringing together or 
joint use of equipment or 
supplies (other forms of 
cooperation are, I trust, 
adequately dealt with under 
other headings). The 
questions that are posed are 
these: Irrespective of 
whether two organizational 
units have a “common 
purpose” is there an 
advantage in bringing their 
personnel together for 
consultation or a joint 
effort? 
Goal (almost never 
“purpose”) conceived as 
“target” of “action” by 
person - “All action is in a 
profound sense purposive. 
Human behavior is 
distinctive in its 
preoccupation with ends or 
goals.  More precisely, 
human behavior can only be 
distinguished by 
understanding its ends or 
goals. Whether these ends 
or goals are deduced from 
behavior or studied directly 
by inquiry or introspection, 
they present an 
indispensable subject for 
the methodology of social 
None explicit - use “labor 
management cooperation” 
with implicit expectation 
that it implies commitment 
to common purpose (use 
“objectives” most 
commonly) 
No explicit definition for 
“cooperation” but implicitly 
a view (through 
“interactionist” approach to 
organizations) not 
dissimilar to B’s - Keeley 
argues for “shared 
activities” that serve 
individual ends [very much 
like B’s cooperative system, 
but denying the existence of 
an org-level concept]: cf. 
““Interactionist models do 
not deny that a shared 
purpose may emerge among 
participants, but such a 
purpose is not assumed to 
be an essential aspect of 
organizations; it is an 
None explicit - no usage of 
“purpose,” but “goal” 
implied as coincident with 
“priority” or “priorities” 
(use of phrase “goal 
priorities”) as what one (or 
one’s supervisor) desires 
most for organization [or, as 
operationalized, what one 
desires most to “do” in 
some cases]; implicitly that 
“cooperation” is coincident 
with positive “performance” 
at the job - cf. “political 
environments may reduce 
the levels of cooperation 
from others, as cooperation 
may not only be against the 
norm but also risky. ..Low 
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Coop-Purpose Both 
Waldo, 1947 
Both 
de Grazia, 1960 
Both 
Kerppola, 1974 
Both 
Keeley, 1984 
Both 
Witt, 1998 
science.” Usage of 
“cooperation” in passing as 
seemingly equivalent to 
“democracy” or democratic 
participation in leadership: 
“The precondition to 
control is co-operation 
(hence the eternally 
perplexing problem posed 
by despotisms founded 
upon consensus, which has 
plagued rationalistic writers 
on democracy from the 
eighteenth century on).” 
occasional feature requiring 
empirical confirmation. It is 
not assumed to be a goal of 
the organization as a 
personified entity; it 
remains a goal for the 
organization of natural 
persons. And it is not 
assumed to have any 
intrinsic value; it is but a 
means of furthering 
individual purposes for 
cooperation.” ... “Contrary 
to received doctrine, 
organizations need not 
entail shared purposes, but 
only shared activities, 
which serve the diverse and 
conflicting purposes of 
individuals - profits for 
some, wages for others, etc. 
(Keeley, 1980).” 
levels of cooperation 
compromise goal 
achievement and degrade 
efficiency. “ 
Cites None for this definition None for definition None for explicit 
definitions; loose history of 
org theory/behavior 
includes Taylor, Fayol, 
Merton, Selznick, Argyris, 
etc. in timeline 
Mostly himself for 
theoretical development; 
also lots of Rawls on justice 
theory 
None for definitions or 
assertions re cooperation -  
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Coop-Purpose Both 
Waldo, 1947 
Both 
de Grazia, 1960 
Both 
Kerppola, 1974 
Both 
Keeley, 1984 
Both 
Witt, 1998 
Used to define other 
Constructs? 
None “Action” generally (also 
taken to define 
“administration”) - “a 
purposive human event is 
the predicate of an actor. It 
assumes a process that 
involves a goal.” 
No No Related through “goal 
congruence” (calculated 
through match of 
supervisor’s and 
employee’s answers in 
ranking goal set - 
Congruence calculated as 
“The D statistic is the 
square root of the sum of 
the squared differences 
between each goal ranking 
of the individual and the 
ranking of the other 
constituency, either the 
average ranking of peers in 
the work unit or the ranking 
of the immediate 
supervisor” 
Objection Raised Does argue that: “In truth 
no organizational unit, no 
matter how small and 
rudimentary, is single 
purpose.” 
None to terms, though lots 
to administrative theory 
generally 
None Can’t have singular org 
goal; reality is people have 
their own, etc. 
None 
Substitutes 
Introduced 
None “target” for “goal” (and 
therefore “purpose”) 
“objective” (no other term 
used consistently for 
purpose/goal) 
Uses “goal” as well as 
“purpose” 
“goal” and essentially 
“priority” treated as the 
same (also “goal priority” 
as phrase) 
Used in Hypotheses N/A N/A N/A N/A Perceptions of politics are 
more strongly related to 
commitment among 
individuals who do not 
share the priorities of their 
supervisors than among 
those whose goal priorities 
are consistent with those of 
their supervisor. 
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Coop-Purpose Both 
Waldo, 1947 
Both 
de Grazia, 1960 
Both 
Kerppola, 1974 
Both 
Keeley, 1984 
Both 
Witt, 1998 
Operationalized N/A N/A Survey of workers “with the 
explicit purpose of 
ascertaining the attitudes of 
workers in an enterprise 
toward the primary 
objectives of the business 
management” (e.g., growth 
of company, entry into new 
markets, etc.) “We can 
clearly see that the attitudes 
of the workers towarl the 
primary objectives of the 
management as reported, 
are favorable” 
N/A The collectors ranked from 
1 (most important) to 8 
(least important) these eight 
goals: (a) “achieve career 
growth through self-
development,” (b) “develop 
win–win solutions to 
delinquency problems,” (c) 
“accurately document 
work,” (d) “ensure personal 
productivity,” (e) “maintain 
professional interactions 
with customers,” (f) “get 
facts during initial customer 
contact,” (g) “prevention 
loss through delinquency 
control,” and (h) “assist less 
experienced workers.”   - 
The industrial workers 
ranked from 1 (most 
important) to 5 (least 
important) these five goals: 
(a) “satisfy the customer,” 
(b) “get the job done fast,” 
(c) “get the job done right,” 
(d) “maintain safe 
practices,” and (e) “help 
develop new work 
procedures.” - The 
production workers ranked 
from 1 (most important) to 
8 (least important) these 
eight goals: (a) “upgrade 
physical work 
environments,” (b) “be a 
company that most people 
would really want to work 
for,” (c) “develop new 
sources of income,” (d) “be 
a leader in providing equal 
opportunity for all 
employees,” (e) “reduce 
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Coop-Purpose Both 
Waldo, 1947 
Both 
de Grazia, 1960 
Both 
Kerppola, 1974 
Both 
Keeley, 1984 
Both 
Witt, 1998 
unit operational costs,” (f) 
“be a production leader,” 
(g) “be a leader in 
exploiting technology for 
competitive advantage,” 
and (h) “achieve superior 
client satisfaction.” -  The 
telemarketers ranked from 1 
(most important) to 8 (least 
important) these eight 
goals: (a) “deliver products 
and services in a cost-
effective and efficient 
manner,” (b) “maximize 
sales results and income 
opportunities for [company 
name],” (c) “improve 
customer retention,” (d) “be 
an organization that people 
would want to work for,” 
(e) “solve customer 
problems,” (f) “deepen 
customer relationships,” (g) 
“foster a climate that 
emphasizes teamwork and 
personal growth while 
rewarding superior 
performance,” and (h) 
“provide the highest quality 
of customer service.” - 
The distribution workers 
ranked from 1 (most 
important) to 8 (least 
important): (a) make the 
[distribution facility] a 
place where people want to 
work; (b) work as quickly 
as possible; (c) produce 
error-free work; (d) be seen 
by our customers as being 
the best at what we do; (e) 
use supplies (e.g., paper, 
Appendix E – Sample Records Set with Data Collected 
Five records each with codings of “Cooperation,” “Purpose,” and “Both” 
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Coop-Purpose Both 
Waldo, 1947 
Both 
de Grazia, 1960 
Both 
Kerppola, 1974 
Both 
Keeley, 1984 
Both 
Witt, 1998 
pencils, paper clips, staples) 
wisely; (f) work as a team 
to get the job done; (g) 
provide training and career 
advancement opportunities 
for all employees; and (h) 
introduce new procedures to 
improve work efficiency. 
Incorporated in 
Typology 
N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Cited By: None in JSTOR 1 in JSTOR None in JSTOR 5 in JSTOR 49 in PsycARTICLES 
Other Comments  Author listed as publisher of 
American Behavioral 
Scientist;  quotes Bacon for 
rationale of why goals (i.e., 
teleology) is acceptable in 
social science: “The father 
of modern methodology in 
the natural sciences, Francis 
Bacon, declared in the 
Novum Organum that 
Aristotle’s fourth type of 
cause-final or goal cause-
”corrupts the sciences 
except in the intercourse of 
man with man.” [author 
footnotes that it “does not 
corrupt the other sciences 
either” but has just proven 
too difficult to work with 
(!)].  Wide-ranging effort to 
redefine basis of 
administrative science as 
such (but obviously not 
picked up...) 
Argues that the concurrence 
of workers with objectives 
shows there is room for 
improved cooperation, but 
that human nature is such 
that conflict will always 
occur (anti-utopian view - 
more Hobbes than Locke) 
Several ASQ articles by 
Keeley, but views not 
apparently widely adopted - 
same issues as for B? 
Note the use of 
“cooperation” in passing as 
being related to 
organizational efficiency 
(but not with explanation or 
definition); that “goal” here 
as operationalized is 
sometimes personal job 
performance goal and 
sometimes more group-
related, depending on 
research site 
How Found Found by search for 
“Gulick Science 
Administration”~15 and 
Purpose 
Found in search for 
“organization (or 
organizational) goal” in 
full-text 
Found by search for 
‘cooperate#’ in title 
Found by search for 
“organization/al goal” in 
full text without “goal/s” in 
title 
Found in PsycARTICLES 
through search for 
“organizational goal/s” in 
title 
 
